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1. Introduction
Competition law is a relatively new law regime. Nonetheless, it became an integral part of 
modern regulation of public economic law. The subject of this work is the Polish antimonopoly 
law. Polish competition law has been developing since the collapse of communism in 1989. 
The implementation of the law reflects the change of economic regime and is indispensible 
for the proper functioning of the free market economy in Poland. Although Polish legislator 
has been inspired by foreign legal traditions – especially EU – when adopting antimonopoly 
acts the relevant statutes and regulations are adapted to the Polish legal system and contain 
many specific provisions. This is particularly true with regard to procedural and institutional 
issues.
The aim of this publication is to present foreign readers with the first English course on Polish 
competition law. The book consists of three parts. First is a monographic presentation of the 
Polish antimonopoly law. The considerations are not, however, limited to the antimonopoly 
act in force. Presentation of the current model of the competition law is preceded 
by the comprehensive theoretical study laying down the origins and basic definitions of 
contemporary Polish antimonopoly law. The second part is a selection of judicial case law 
in competition cases. Its role is to provide a reader with a practical insight into how the 
competition law is applied by the courts and what are the most important issues developed 
by the judiciary. The last part brings basic legal texts. It enables readers to confront the 
theoretical background and the case law with actual wording of relevant regulations or soft 
law documents. a combination of these three parts aims at giving an overview of the Polish 
competition law. The three parts supplement each other and are cross-referenced. Such 
method allows avoiding duplication of certain contents. Therefore it is suggested to study all 
three parts in parallel in order to get the more comprehensive view of the presented issues.
Attention should be drawn to the terminology. Despite theoretical nuances the terms: 
‘competition’ (as an adjective) and ‘antimonopoly’ are used interchangeably. Furthermore, 
apart from the official name of the antimonopoly authority – the President of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection the shorter form – “the antimonopoly authority” or 
“UOKiK” is used as well. Similarly, the official name of the completion act i.e. the Act on 
competition and consumer protection is used interchangeably with the name “antimonopoly 
act”. If there are, in the text, considerations regarding person or persons it shall mean both 
– natural and legal persons. The historical numbering of articles of the European treaties 
may be a little bit confusing; therefore new numbers are used with a reference to previous 
numbers whenever it is necessary. 
The Polish antimonopoly law has gained quite an extensive literature1. There are four 
commentaries available by K. Kohutek and M. Sieradzka2, C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds)3, T. 
Skoczny (ed.)4 and A. Stawicki and E. Stawicki (eds)5. There are several textbooks published 
on the competition law i.e. the classical one by S. Gronowski6 or Z. Brodecki (ed.)7 and 
1 The section presents only basic literature limited to books. Comprehensive list is given in the end of this part. For the 
ease of the foreign reader, Polish titles are additionally translated into English and provided in brackets. 
2 K. Kohutek, M. Sieradzka, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, [Act on competition and 
consumer protection. Commentary], Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2008.
3 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, Komentarz, [Act on competition and 
consumer protection. Commentary], LexisNexis, Warsaw 2009.
4 T. Skoczny (ed.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, [Act on competition and consumer 
protection. Commentary], Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2009.
5 A. Stawicki (ed.), E. Stawicki (ed.), J. Baehr, J. Kreuger, T. Kwieciński, M. Radwański, B. Turno, A. Wędrychowska-
Karpińska, A. Wiercińska-Krużewska, A. Wierciński, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, [Act on 
competition and consumer protection. Commentary], Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2010.
6 S. Gronowski, Polskie prawo antymonopolowe, [Polish antimonopoly law], ZPP, Warsaw 1998.
7 Z. Brodecki (ed.), Konkurencja, [Competition], LexisNexis,Warsaw 2004.
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M. Stefaniuk8. Merger control attracted moderate attention of academics, with the exception 
of J. Olszewski9 and M. Błachucki10. The basic book on cartels is the work of M. Król–
Bogomilska11. Various aspects of anticompetitive practices were analyzed: block exemptions12, 
vertical restraints13, refusal to deal14 or the abuse of dominance15. Furthermore, there are 
several monographs on selected general issues of antimonopoly law: fines16, rule of reason17, 
the notion of undertaking18, procedural fairness in the antimonopoly proceedings19, right to 
be heard20 or relation between competition law and intellectual property law21. Procedural 
issues of Polish competition law were covered in three monographs by D. Sylwestrzak22, 
K. Róziewicz23 and M. Błachucki24. It is worth mentioning that UOKiK has also published 
numerous books and monographs25 – some of them are available in English26. To complete this 
presentation of the relevant literature Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies should 
be mentioned. This is a yearbook printed in English which makes it particularly useful for 
foreign readers27.
8 M. Stefaniuk, Publicznoprawne reguły konkurencji, [Public law rules of competition], Verba, Lublin 2005.
9 J. Olszewski, Nadzór nad koncentracją przedsiębiorców jako forma prewencyjnej ochrony konkurencji, [Supervision 
over concentration of undertakings as a form of preventive competition protection], URz, Rzeszów 2004.
10 M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców, [The 
system of antimonopoly merger proceedings], UOKiK, Warsaw 2012.
11 M. Król–Bogomilska, Zwalczanie karteli w prawie antymonopolowym i karnym, [Combating cartels in the 
antimonopoly and criminal law], Scholar, Warsaw 2013.
12 E. Kosiński, Rodzaje i zakres sektorowych wyłączeń zastosowania ogólnych reguł ochrony konkurencji, [Types 
and scope of sectoral exemptions from general competition rules], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2007 and 
Wyłączenia grupowe spod zakazu porozumień ograniczających konkurencję we Wspólnocie Europejskiej i w Polsce, 
[Block exemptions from prohibition of anticompetitive agreements in the European Community and Poland], A. 
Jurkowska, T. Skoczny (eds.), Wydawnictwa Naukowe WZ UW, Warsaw, 2008. 
13 R. Poździk, Dystrybucja produktów na zasadzie wyłączności w Polsce i Unii Europejskiej, [Exclusive distribution of 
products in Poland and European Union], Verba, Lublin 2006.
14 M. Kolasiński, Obowiązek współpracy gospodarczej w prawie antymonopolowym, [Duty to cooperate in the 
antimonopoly law], TNOiK, Toruń 2009. 
15 A. Brzezińska, Zakaz nadużycia pozycji dominującej we wspólnotowym i polskim prawie antymonopolowym, 
[Prohibition of abuse of a dominant position in the Community and Polish antimonopoly law], TNOiK, Toruń 2008, K. 
Kohutek, Praktyki wykluczające przedsiębiorstw dominujących. Prawidłowość i stosowalność reguł prawa konkurencji, 
[Exclusionary practices of dominant undertakings. Correctness and applicability of competition law rules], Wolters 
Kluwer, Warszawa 2012 or M. Szydło, Nadużywanie pozycji dominującej w prawie konkurencji, [Abuse of dominance in 
competition law], Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2010.
16 M. Król-Bogomilska, Kary pieniężne w prawie antymonopolowym, [Financial penalties in the antimonopoly law], 
KiK, Warsaw 2001.
17 D. Miąsik, Reguła rozsądku w prawie antymonopolowym, [Rule of reason in the antimonopoly law], Wolters Kluwer, 
Warsaw 2004.
18 G. Materna, Pojęcie przedsiębiorcy w polskim i europejskim prawie ochrony konkurencji, [The notion of undertaking 
in Polish and European competition law], Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2009.
19 M. Bernatt, Sprawiedliwość proceduralna w postępowaniu przed organem ochrony konkurencji, [Procedural fairness 
in the proceedings before the competition authority], Wydział Zarządzania, Warsaw 2011.
20 K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, Prawo do obrony w unijnych postępowaniach antymonopolowych – w kierunku unifikacji 
standardów proceduralnych w UE, [Right to be heard in the European antimonopoly proceedings – towards the 
unification of procedural standards in the EU], Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2012.
21 D. Miąsik, Stosunek prawa ochrony konkurencji do prawa własności intelektualnej, [The relationship between 
competition law and intellectual property law], Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2012. 
22 D. Sylwestrzak, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, [Proceedings before 
the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection], LexisNexis, Warsaw 2012.
23 K. Róziewicz-Ładoń, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów w zakresie 
przeciwdziałania praktykom ograniczającym konkurencję, [Proceedings before the President of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection in antitrust cases], Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2011.
24 M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców, [The 
system of antimonopoly merger proceedings], UOKiK, Warsaw 2012.
25 For example M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, Wspólnotowe prawo konkurencji. Skutki dla Polski, [Community competition 
law. Conclusions for Poland], UOKiK, Warsaw 2006, C. Banasiński (ed.), Ochrona konkurencji i konsumentów w Polsce i 
Unii Europejskiej (studia prawno-ekonomiczne), [Competition and consumer protection in Poland and European Union 
(legal and economic studies)], UOKiK, Warsaw 2005 or C. Banasiński (ed.), Prawo konkurencji - stan obecny oraz 
przewidywane kierunki zmian, [Competition law – the current state and foreseeable developments], UOKiK, Warsaw 
2006. All available at www.uokik.gov.pl. 
26 M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel (ed.), Changes in Competition Policy over the Last Two Decades, UOKiK, Warsaw 2010 or 
Consumer Protection and Competition Policy – working together?, UOKiK, Warsaw 2006.
27 Selected volumes are available at http://www.yars.wz.uw.edu.pl/.
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PART I COMMENTARY
Chapter 1. The development of the Polish  
 antimonopoly legislation
This chapter presents the history of the Polish antitrust legislation. All six adopted 
antimonopoly acts are discussed here. However, not all of them are of the same importance 
for the development of the Polish competition law. Such opinion is especially relevant 
in relation to the first discussed Acts of 193328 and of 193929. Therefore a very careful 
attention is drawn to the Act of 198730, the Act of 199031 and the Act of 200032 with the 
subsequent amendments. The chapter aims at identifying trends in the development of 
the Polish antitrust law as well as procedure and at evaluating the result of those changes.
1.1. Cartel legislation in the years 1918–1939
Regaining of independence by Poland in 1918 was a great achievement. However, it was 
only a first step in building of a sovereign state. One of the next steps was unification and 
adoption of legislation. The problem of cartels was present in the governmental policy from 
the very beginning. However, this policy was different from the present standards. Cartels 
were not only allowed but, in certain periods of time, they were even supported by the 
government33. The first act that indirectly covered the problem was the Act of 2 July 1920 
on war usury34. It sanctioned “the participation in agreement or in association that was 
intended for economic activities”. Despite this unequivocal article, that rule was never 
applied to cartels. The coup d’état of J. Piłsudski in 1926 started a new era in the Polish 
politics. At the beginning marshal Piłsudski and his supporters were looking for help from 
the industrial and business elites. Therefore normative regulation of cartels was constantly 
postponed. Nonetheless the economic crisis of 30’s and the growing criticism of cartels 
made the government put forward a project of a cartel act. The Polish parliament adopted 
the act on 28 March 1933. 
The Act of 1933 regulated “all agreements, resolutions and decisions, which by the way of 
mutual obligations, aiming at control or regulation of production, sell, prices or conditions 
of exchanging goods in the field of mining, industry and trade” (Article 1). All such activities 
were to be in a written form, under the pain of nullity (Article 2) and notified to the Minister 
of Industry and Trade within 14 days from the day of conclusion. All notified cartels were 
registered in the cartel registry maintained and run by the Minister (Article 3). The Minister 
was obliged to refuse to accept the notified agreement if provisions of such contract or 
the execution of those provisions were against the public good (Article 4), and then to 
file a motion to the Cartel Court to cancel the agreement (Article 5). The Cartel Court 
28 Act of 28 March 1933 on cartels, Journal of Laws No. 31, item 270. Hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1933.
29 Act of 13 July 1939 on cartel agreements, Journal of Laws No. 63, item 418. Hereinafter referred to as the Act of 
1939.
30 Act of 28 January 1987 on counteracting monopolistic practices in national economy, Journal of Laws No. 3, item 18, 
with further amendments. Hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1987.
31 Journal of Laws of 2000 No. 31, item 381, with further amendments. Hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1990.
32 http://uokik.gov.pl/a_akty.phtml?z=1&d=1&lang=1 (06/09/12).
33 Z. Landau, Rozwój ustawodawstwa kartelowego w Polsce międzywojennej na tle polityki kartelowej rządu, 
[Development of cartel legislation in the interwar Poland from the perspective of government cartel policy], Kwartalnik 
Historyczny 1972, No. 1, p. 72
34 Journal of Laws No. 65, item 449.
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was a special court established alongside the Supreme Court. It consisted of 5 members: 
three Supreme Court judges, one representative of the Minister and one representative of 
chambers of commerce and industry (Article 6). The judgments of the Court were legally 
binding and final (Article 7(1)(5)). Moreover, during the proceedings before the Cartel Court, 
Civil procedural code of 29 November 193035 applied. The evidence procedings before the 
Court were much deformalised – what was important in cases when, there was not written 
proof of the agreement. The Minister had limited investigating competences – he could only 
oblige the undertaking to exhibit financial records and other documents relevant to the 
notified agreement (Article 9). Apart from procedural provisions, the Act of 1933 contained 
also sanctions of administrative nature36. The Minister of Industry and Trade imposed a fine 
of PLN 50 000 or 100 000 for the infringement of the obligation of notification. Penal 
sanctions were imposed by the regional court for execution of repealed agreement37. 
Commenting the Act of 1933 scholars underline that, in practice, the bill did not change 
anything in the legal situation of cartels. The only new provision was the introduction of 
obligation of revealing cartel agreements. Nevertheless it was a clear sign that the Polish 
government wanted to increase supervision over cartels. Together with the economic crisis 
the side effects of cartels became more and more toilsome for the society. Such situation 
created a decisive impulse for a new cartel policy. The Minister of Industry and Trade 
started to execute his powers and filed several motions to the Cartel Court to nullify cartel 
agreements. Furthermore, the governmental control over cartels was strengthened after 
the amendment of the Act of 193338. The most important change was granting a competence 
for the Minister of Industry and Trade to nullify cartel agreements. The Minister’s decision 
was, from then on, final unless one of the parties of repealed agreement filed a motion to 
the Cartel Court to review this decision. However, in order to limit appeals, all costs of the 
court proceedings were barred by the losing party who had filed the motion. Such financial 
restrains had preventive effect on minor undertakings. The negative aspect of this change 
was deterioration of the legal position of the Cartel Court. And last but not least, new 
sanctions of criminal nature were introduced. 
The amendment of 1935 was an unambiguous signal for the industry that the government 
kept intending to increase supervision over cartels. Soon after, in the December 1935, the 
Minister of Industry and Trade nullified 93 cartel agreements (out of 274 existing). As it 
could have been foreseen there were only few appeals39. However, the government decided 
that the act on cartels was not restrictive enough and the draft of new act was prepared. 
It became a law on 13 July 193940. Under the Act of 13 July 1939 on cartel agreements41, 
conclusion of cartel agreements was still legal if notified. New premise was added, the aims 
of such agreements must have conformed to interests of national economy (Article 2). As 
a result, the discretionary power of the Minister of Industry and Trade was augmented. Some 
commentators called it “socialization” of cartels42. The supervision procedure remained, in 
35 Journal of Laws No. 83, item 651.
36 M. Król-Bogomilska, Kary pieniężne w polskim prawie antymonopolowym na tle europejskiego prawa wspólnotowego, 
[Financial penalties in the Polish antimonopoly law from the perspective of the European law], Państwo i Prawo 1998, 
No. 7, p. 42.
37 Several ordinances were adopted in course of implementation of the Act of 1933: Ordinance of the Minister of 
Justice with consultation of the Minster of Industry and Trade and the Minister of Treasury of 28 June 1933 on execution 
of provisions of the cartel act in relation to the Cartel Court, Journal of Laws No. 33, item 381, Ordinance of the 
Minster of Industry and Trade of 4 July 1933 on reporting of resolutions and decisions of cartels, Journal of Laws No. 
33, item 382, Ordinance of the Minster of Industry and Trade of 4 July 1933 on registry of cartels, Journal of Laws No. 
33, item 383.
38 Decree of the President of Poland of 27 November 1935 on amending the Act on cartels of 28 March 1933, Journal 
of Laws No. 86, item 529.
39 Z. Landau, op. cit., p. 83.
40 The Act of 1939 was adopted on July 13, but formally came into force on October 20.
41 Journal of Laws No. 63, item 418.
42 Z. Landau, op. cit., p. 84.
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practice, unchanged, as well as the sanctions. The Act of 1939 was far more comprehensive, 
many of the provisions previously placed in implementing ordinances were now transferred 
into the main act. Due to German aggression of September 1939, the Act of 1939, although 
legally binding, was never executed43. 
During the communistic time 1918–1939 the period of the antimonopoly legislation was 
totally criticized. For some scholars pre–September Poland patronized, under “the influence 
of capitalists, from the beginning to the end, promptly developing cartelization (...)”. The 
legislation on cartels is the vivid example of abusing the power, by national and foreign 
capital, for its own purposes44. The mentioned opinion is naturally ideologically based. 
The Acts of 1933 and of 1939 were not perfect but showed clearly that the governmental 
policy began to be stricter and anti–cartel oriented. The procedural rules of those acts did 
not constitute any special administrative procedure. There were very few such provisions 
and they were mostly of technical nature. The presented model of cartel proceedings and 
substantive law had no influence on further development of the Polish antitrust procedure 
and law. To be strict the development was blocked for almost four decades. The 1918–1939 
legislation is an example of the early stage of development of competition law representing 
contemporary view on the role of state in economy.
1.2. Legislation under the communistic regime
1.2.1. Rudimentary legislation in the years 1945–1987
After the end of the World War II communistic regime and economy were established by 
Soviets in Poland. As it is discussed elsewhere in this work, in totalitarian political systems 
with centralized economy there is no place for real competition and it is not possible 
to talk about monopolies, in classic economic meaning of this word, since the national 
economy is one large institutionalized monopoly. The People’s Republic of Poland was not 
an exception. As some scholars wrote in the late 70’s there were not any antimonopoly legal 
provisions in the Polish legislation45. They pointed out that in the “socialistic regime, it is 
the state itself, which directly designs and controls the activity of economic organizations” 
and therefore there is no need for such legislation. It was noticed elsewhere that there 
existed monopolies in Poland but those were special ‘social monopolies’46. The constitutive 
feature of such monopoly was that “the more powerful it is, the more it should feel obliged 
in relation to the society, on which behalf, it is performing its monopoly”. 
Those ideological axioms failed to confront the reality47. Accompanied by economic crisis and 
growing side effects of socialistic economy, scholars began to criticize negative implications of 
state monopolies. The articles cited above were the first cautious attempts to articulate the 
43 It has never been formally repealed. 
44 J. Jończyk, Prawo kartelowe, [Cartel law], [in:] Historia państwa i prawa Polski 1918 –1939, [History of Polish law 
and state 1918-1939], Part I, PWN, Warsaw 1962, p. 414. 
45 S. Sołtysiński, J. Trojanek, Proces koncentracji produkcji i usług a zagadnienie ochrony interesów konsumenta w 
PRL, [Process of concentration of production and services and the problem of protection of consumer interests in 
the People’s Republic of Poland], Studia Prawnicze 1978, No. 1, p. 23. However, such legislation was present in other 
communistic states e.g. Hungary or Yugoslavia – brief presentation of these legislations is carried out by I. Wiszniewska, 
A. Kawecki, Problem legislacji antymonopolowej w systemie zreformowanej gospodarki, [Problem of antimonopoly 
legislation in the system of reformed economy], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 1982, No. 10, p. 259 - 260.
46 J. Trojanek, O potrzebie i ekonomiczno-prawnych sposobach przełamywania monopolistycznych praktyk w 
gospodarce uspołecznionej, [On the need and economic and legal solution of breaking monopolistic practices in the 
socialized economy], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 1973, No. 3, p. 50.
47 J. Trojanek stated it clearly: theoretical presumption that the monopoly of socialistic company acts always in 
favour of social interest and that the more powerful it is, the more it should feel obliged in relation to the society... 
turned out to be idealistic and in consequence delusive and false - J. Trojanek, Ustawa antymonopolowa z 1987 roku. 
(Próba oceny podstawowych rozwiązań), [The antimonopoly act of 1987. (An attempt to evaluate its basic solutions)], 
Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 1987, No. 4, p. 1.
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necessity to contravene the monopolies’ abuses of their privileged positions. Academics pointed 
out at acts that may have been used to counteract monopolistic practices48. According to those 
Authors, such indirect effect may have had selected articles of Civil code49 or the activity of 
commissions of State Economic Arbitrage50. Later on it was indicated also that Article 8 of Act 
of 26 February 1982 on prices51 having prohibited a vender taking advantage of monopolistic 
situation and gaining the profit exceeding the average. Nonetheless such fragmentized 
legislation did not constitute an effective mechanism of competition and consumer protection 
nor could be regarded as a competition law within the meaning of this work.
1.2.2. The Act of 1987
The real breakthrough was, however, to come. The martial state declared in 1981 and the 
subsequent, the most serious (of systemic nature), economic crisis occurred and it created 
for communists an impulse to initiate in-depth economic reforms. Antimonopoly act seemed 
to be an integral part of the programme of restructuring the socialistic economy52. The 
programme consisted of several other acts and aimed at rationalization of socialistic 
economy and at elimination of some other inherent weaknesses e.g. the role of the so-
called ‘unions’ (zrzeszenia) was especially criticized53. The first draft of an antimonopoly 
act was prepared in 1984 and 198554. Nonetheless, it took the Polish parliament next two 
years to formally adopt the act55. On 28 January 1987 Polish parliament (Sejm) adopted the 
Act on counteracting monopolistic practices in national economy56.
According to the Preamble, the act was adopted in order to prevent national market and 
it’s participants from monopolistic practices economic of economic units. The Act was 
aimed at preventing establishment of new monopolistic structures by introducing a merger 
control. It was underlined that the consumer protection function, as well as a function 
of creation and protection of development of competition57. The Act formally covered 
a wide subjective and objective range. It was concerned with virtually all economic activity 
conducted by all legal and natural persons, irrespective of the form of property or size. 
However, at the same time, the scope of application of the Act of 1987 was limited in 
relation to several powerful state monopolies (Article 3(1)). The list of economic units 
excluded from the scope of its application was published in the Regulation of the Council 
of Ministers of 24 October 1988 on designation of economic units excluded from the scope 
of the Act on counteracting monopolistic practices in national economy58. As it can be seen, 
the Act did not combat monopolies. Their existence was neither forbidden nor subject to 
48 It was very characteristic that S. Sołtysiński and J. Trojanek did not criticize the principle of monopolization of 
economy but only some of the side effects of such economic regime.
49 Act of 23 April 1964 – Civil Code, Journal of Laws No. 16, item 93, with further amendments. It was possible thanks 
to the process of ‘socialization of civil law’ which strengthened the position of consumer in relations with ‘socialised 
economic units’ J. Trojanek, op. cit., p. 61.
50 Act of 23 October 1975 on State Economic Arbitrage, Journal of Laws No. 34, item 183, with further amendments). 
51 Journal of Laws No. 7, item 52.
52 Such necessity was stressed by S. Sołtysiński, O potrzebie ustawodawstwa zwalczającego praktyki monopolistyczne 
i nieuczciwą konkurencję, [On the need of adoption of legislation on combating monopolistic practices and unfair 
competition], Państwo i Prawo 1982, No. 12, p. 16–18.
53 I. Wiszniewska, Kartelowe zagrożenia w działalności zrzeszeń przedsiębiorstw państwowych, [Adverse effects of 
cartel activities of groupings of state undertakings], Part I and II, Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 1983, No. 
11 and 12, and K. Sobczak, Niektóre aspekty grupowania przedsiębiorstw oraz ochrony antymonopolowej, [Selected 
aspects of grouping undertakings and antimonopoly protection], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 1986, No. 6.
54 For details of the draft, see I. Wiszniewska, O projekcie ustawy antymonopolowej, [On the draft of the antimonopoly 
law], Państwo i Prawo 1982, No. 10. See also the interview with the author of the draft J. Gościński, Poskramianie 
monopolu, [Combating monopolies], Prawo i Życie 1983, No. 12.
55 Such a delay was criticized by E. Piontek, Znaki zapytania, [Question marks], Prawo i Życie 1986, No. 6.
56 Journal of Laws No. 3, item 18.
57 I. Wiszniewska, Praktyki monopolistyczne w świetle ustawy antymonopolowej, [Monopolistic practices in the light 
of the antimonopoly act], Państwo i Prawo 1987, No. 7, p. 33.
58 Journal of Laws No. 39, item 309.
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legal sanctions. Nonetheless, the Act prohibited their specific practices and monopolistic 
agreements. It created also a system of supervision over mergers of economic units (Articles 
17–19).
The Act of 1987 provided a catalogue of monopolistic practices and agreements that were 
prohibited. Article 8 outlawed: 
a) imposing, without reasonable explanation, onerous contract terms that yield 
undue benefits to the economic unit that imposes them;
b) making the conclusion of a contract contingent on having the other party 
accept or perform another service not connected with the object of the 
contract, which would not otherwise be accepted or performed if there were 
a choice;
c) imposing on the economic unit – party of the contract a duty of exclusive 
purchase, sell or conclusion of other contracts only with the certain economic 
unit;
d) charging excessively exorbitant prices, within the meaning of the Act on prices. 
Moreover, it was also prohibited: 
a) to share the market according to criteria of territorial scope or consumers; 
b) setting or limiting the volume of production or sales;
c) restricting the access to the market, or eliminating from a market, economic 
units not included in the agreement (Article 11). 
The Minister of Finance was appointed as the antimonopoly authority. He was competent 
to issue decisions and impose financial fines. The Council for Counteracting Monopolistic 
Practices was established as a consulting body to the Minister of Finance (Article 4). 
The Council was designed as forum for discussions and for formulation of proposals for 
the Minister for his antimonopoly policy. It consisted of representatives of authorities of 
public administration, cooperatives, trade unions and consumer organizations (Article 5). 
The competencies of the Council and the method of proceeding were regulated in details 
by Administrative ordinance of Prime Minister of 30 December 1987 on detailed tasks, 
composition and the method of proceeding of the Council for Counteracting Monopolistic 
Practices59. 
The Minister of Finance was the institution who took administrative decisions upon the Act of 
1987. The Administrative procedural code applied with only few exceptions. The proceedings 
could have been instituted ex officio or upon a motion. There was a limited group of persons 
authorized to demand initiation of administrative proceedings:
a) voivodeship national councils;
b) economic units whose interests were prejudiced or may be prejudiced by 
a monopolistic practice, as well as unions and associations of such economic units;
c) state and public inspection institutions and institutions supervising activity of 
economic units;
d) public institutions that protect consumer interests pursuant to statutory provisions, 
if that interest was or may be infringed. 
The motion initiating proceedings had to be made in a written form and be properly reasoned. 
Decisions issued by the antimonopoly body could be appealed to the Supreme Administrative 
Court. For procedure under the Court, general principles of administrative – judicial 
59 Polish Law Gazette of 1988 No. 1, item 3.
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procedure applied60. There was one exemption from the above regulations – the objection61 
made by the Minister of Finance to notified merger of economic units was governed by 
separate provisions. This specific appellate procedure was regulated by § 4 of Regulation of 
the Council of Ministers of 23 December 1987 on conditions and method of notification of 
intention of concentration of economic units and the procedure of appealing proceeding in 
case of making the objection by the antimonopoly authority62. 
The Act of 1987 contained sanctions for the infringement of the Act. They were of civil, 
administrative and criminal nature63. The basic sanction was the sanction of invalidity. It had 
been applied to monopolistic practices and agreements, as defined in the Act (Articles 10, 12 
and 23). Moreover, the antimonopoly body could impose an administrative fine (Article 20). 
However, those fines were not issued automatically for the infringement of the Act itself, 
but for not having obeyed the decision of antimonopoly institution interdicting monopolistic 
practices (Article 20(1)). In case of three former infringements of the Act within three past 
years the Minister of Finance may have divided or liquidated an economic unit (Articles 
21–22). There were also penal sanctions (including prison) for passing false data to the 
antimonopoly authority (Article 25). 
From the very beginning, the Act of 1987 raised controversies. Some stemmed from significant 
changes liberalising the Act and made by the parliament. Many of these provisions were 
unclear. However, the most important doubts provoked the problem of sanctions. Ambiguous 
formulation of rules caused that it was hard to determine whether the monopolistic practices 
and agreements forbidden by Articles 8 and 9 were null and void or it was the example of 
suspended invalidity like it was in the case of Articles 11, 12 and 13. Suspended invalidity was 
inappropriate solution for the antimonopoly act since it allowed an enterprise to use illegal 
monopolistic practices until receiving the nullity decision. Therefore such activity should be 
declared illegal, by the act, ex lege. Some academics criticized also premises of imposing 
administrative sanctions. The number of infringements of the antimonopoly act is not as 
significant as occupying a dominant position on the market. As a result the act may have been 
used mostly against small companies and partnerships instead of big state monopolies. Also 
the procedure of imposing administrative fines was a subject of criticism. They should be 
issued for infringing the Act automatically – the condition of preceding decision prohibiting 
monopolistic practices was unnecessary liberalization of preventive function of the Act.
Apart from sanctions another controversial rule of the Act of 1987 was granting a status 
of an antimonopoly authority to the Minister of Finance. It resulted in creation of self–
contradictory legal position of the Minister of Finance. On the one hand, he was representing 
the interest of the State Treasury and was responsible for sufficient state incomes – the 
source of such incomes were often state monopolies, and on the other hand, he was to fight 
monopolistic practices and agreements of those monopolies. a better solution would have 
been establishment of a special independent body directly subordinated to the parliament 
or the Council of State. 
The Act of 1987 turned out to be ineffective instrument of fighting monopolies. There had 
been only 9 decisions issued upon the Act. Several other proceedings were discontinued. 
Those taken decisions were concerned with monopolistic practices. Nevertheless, the 
basic problem of Polish economy, at that time, were monopolistic agreements leading to 
market sharing or setting and limiting production, and sales. Many of these provisions were 
60 For details see, Act of 31 January 1980 on Supreme Administrative Court and on amending the Act – Administrative 
Procedure Code, Journal of Laws No. 4, item 8, with further amendments.
61 This was an administrative decision, in the meaning of Procedure Administrative Code.
62 Journal of Laws No. 41, item 242.
63 S. Sołtysiński, Sankcje w ustawie o przeciwdziałaniu praktykom monopolistycznym w gospodarce narodowej, 
[Sanctions in the Act on the combating of monopolistic practices in the national economy], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny 1987, No. 4, p. 21.
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ambiguous and proved to be too liberal. Nonetheless, the Act of 1987 was unprecedented, in 
Polish post-war legislation, trial of legal limitation of the role of monopolies in a socialistic 
economy. It created a good basis for further development of competition law in a free– 
market economy. The model of antitrust procedure was partially adapted by the subsequent 
Act of 1990. 
1.3. Polish antimonopoly acts 
 in the years 1990-2007
1.3.1. The Act of 1990
Transition from centralized to free-market economy would not be possible without 
demonopolization of economy and development of competition. To achieve those aims, new 
and efficient antitrust legislation was necessary. Therefore one of the first acts adopted 
by the Polish parliament after 1989 was the Act of 24 February 1990 on counteracting 
monopolistic practices64. The Act was a basic regulation for the development of competition 
law during the first decade of economic transformation. It has been amended twelve times. 
The presentation of the Act of 1990 begins with exhibition of basic rules of original text of 
the Act. Afterwards subsequent amendments are discussed. Not all changes were of equal 
importance. Hence, the paper concentrates only on the most important ones. Moreover, 
literature and case law are limited to the necessary minimum since most of the problems 
will be further discussed in more detail.
The Act of 1990 was a semi-comprehensive act. It consisted of both procedural and materials 
rules. In comparison to the repealed Act of 1987, the new act was far more restrictive. 
The Act covered a wide subjective and objective range65. The catalogue of monopolistic 
practices was enlarged and the scope of exclusions from the application of the act – limited. 
Application of the Act was founded on ‘effects-based’ principle. It meant that the Act 
applied to all agreements having effect on Polish territory irrespective of the actual place 
of conclusion. The Act introduced new terms and definitions – a dominant position and abuse 
of such position. The rule of reason was introduced to Polish competition law. According to 
the Preamble, the Act was adopted in order to ensure the development of competition, 
to protect economic entities from monopolistic practices, and to protect the interests 
of consumers. Although the Preamble proclaimed three goals, the first one - preservation 
of free competition - was predominant. The other two were also important but in case of any 
conflict the first must have prevailed. 
The Act of 1990 introduced the term ‘monopolistic practice’ without defining it. It enumerated 
several kinds of monopolistic practices. Contrary to provision on abuse of dominant position 
the list of anticompetitive agreements was exhaustive66. 
First, there were prohibited agreements consisting of:
a) fixing, directly or indirectly, prices and rules of their formation among competitors, 
in their relationship with third parties;
b) sharing markets according to criteria of territories, product groups, or entities;
64 Journal of Laws No. 14, item 88.
65 W. Rakoczy, Podmiotowy zakres stosowania ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu praktykom monopolistycznym, [Subjective 
scope of application of the Act on combating monopolistic practices], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 1993, No. 15, p. 14.
66 This was changed in 1995 were open list of anticompetitive agreements was introduced. On this subject see M. Król 
–Bogomilska, Zwalczanie karteli w prawie antymonopolowym i karnym, [Combating cartels in the antimonopoly and 
criminal law], Scholar, Warsaw 2013.
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c) setting or limiting the volume of production, sales, or purchases of commodities;
d) restricting the market access of, or eliminating from a market, economic entities 
not included in the agreement;
e) setting among competitors or their associations of terms of their contracts with 
third parties.
Apart from agreements the Act of 1990 recognized also other types of monopolistic practices. 
Some of them were transferred directly from the Act of 1987. For example prohibition of 
imposing onerous contract terms making the conclusion of a contract contingent on having 
the other party accept another service not connected with the object of the contract. A new 
provision was referred to as ‘interdiction of competition’. It prohibited combining of managing 
functions in competing economic entities. It was strange and rather too far-reaching that 
the Act of 1990 treated interlocking directorates as a form of prohibited anticompetitive 
agreement, not as a form of merger (as it was in the antimonopoly act of 2000).
The second major group of practices constituted the ones consisting in the abuse of 
a dominant position. For purposes of the Act, a dominant position was defined as position 
of economic entity if it does not encounter significant competition on a national or local 
market; it is presumed that an economic entity has a dominant position if its market share 
exceeds 40%. There were listed several ways of abusing a dominant position by:
a) counteracting the formation of conditions indispensable for the emergence 
or development of competition;
b) dividing the market according to criteria of territories, product groups, or entities;
c) selling commodities in a way that leads to offering privileged status to certain 
economic entities or other entities;
d) refusing to sell or purchase commodities in a way discriminating against certain 
economic entities when here are no alternative supply sources or outlets;
e) unfair influence on price formation, including fixing resale prices and selling below 
costs of production in order to eliminate competitors.
All legal actions constituting any of the mentioned practices were null and void unless the 
economic entity invoked the ‘rule of reason’ and proved that such practice was necessary to 
conduct activity and did not result in a significant restriction of competition. Nonetheless, 
there were three types of monopolistic practices that could not be justified on any ground 
(including ‘rule of reason’):
a) limiting production, sale, or purchase of commodities, despite having adequate 
capacity, particularly when it leads to an increase in sales prices or a reduction in 
purchase prices;
b) refraining from the sale of commodities to increase prices;
c) excessive pricing.
The Act of 1990 also governed merger control for the first time. Economic entities were 
obliged to notify an intention to merge or transform in order to establish a new economic 
entity whenever the new economic entity gained a dominant position. The antimonopoly 
body had two months to take a decision. Merger, transformation or establishment of a new 
economic entity could be implemented if the antimonopoly authority did not oppose in 
a negative decision. Obtaining a positive clearance was not necessary to perform the 
operation.
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The Act established a new antimonopoly body – the Antimonopoly Office. The Office had 
a legal status of central state administration authority. It was subordinated to the Council 
of Ministers which appointed and recalled the President of the Office (Article 17). The 
Antimonopoly Office structure consisted of several regional offices and the head office in 
Warsaw. The most important tasks and activities of the Office were as follows: 
a) issuing, in cases pursuant to the Act, administrative decisions;
b) supervising the observance of the law and passing the law and regulations 
on counteracting monopolistic practices of economic entities;
c) registering economic entities enjoying a dominant position on the home market;
d) reviewing prices fixing under conditions of restricted competition;
e) conducting research on the state of concentration of the economy and presenting 
conclusions;
f) drafting or advising on draft proposals for new laws concerning monopolistic 
practices or development of competition;
g) preparing government proposals for competition policy (Article 19).
The antimonopoly authority was vested with investigating competencies. Staff members 
of the Office during an inspection were empowered to enter premises of the inspected 
economic entity and look into its documents or collect data and information on operations 
of the inspected party. The information obtained by inspectors was confidential. 
The model of proceedings before the President of the Antimonopoly Office remained 
practically unchanged. The Code of Administrative Procedure applied accordingly. They 
could have been instituted ex officio or upon a motion. There was also, almost the same, 
a limited group of persons authorized to demand initiation of administrative proceedings:
a) economic entities whose interests were prejudiced or might be prejudiced by 
a monopolistic practice, as well as unions and associations thereof; 
b) state and public inspection institutions;
c) public institutions that protect consumer interests pursuant to statutory provisions, 
if that interest was or may be infringed.
As it can be noticed the authorities of public administration of local level were deprived 
of such right. The most significant change, though, was made in relation to the appellate 
procedure. Decisions issued by the President of the Antimonopoly Office, from then on, may 
have been appealed to a special court, established upon the Act of 1990, the Voivodeship 
Court of Warsaw – the antimonopoly court67. The proceedings before the Court followed the 
rules of Civil procedural code68 in economic cases. Binding judgments of the Antimonopoly 
Court may have been revised in course of extraordinary revision (pl. rewizja nadzwyczajna) 
by the Supreme Court. It should also be indicated that a party lodging an appeal to the 
Antimonopoly Court did not have right to the legal measures to revise administrative 
decision, specified in the Administrative procedural code, in particular the measures that 
would result in resumption of proceedings, abrogation, amendment or an assessment of 
invalidity of a decision (Article 23). 
Infringements of the provisions of the Act were sanctioned by the antimonopoly authority. 
The basic sanction was administrative fine. It was imposed for violation of prohibitions listed 
in the Act. It was a measure of administrative nature69. The amount of fine was up to 15% 
67 Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 13 April 1990 on the establishment of antimonopoly court, Journal of Laws 
No. 27, item 157.
68 Act of 17 November 1964 – Civil procedural code, Journal of Laws No. 43, item 296, with further amendments.
69 I. Wiszniewska, Polska ustawa antymonopolowa z 1990 r., [Polish antimonopoly act of 1990], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa 
Gospodarczego 1990, No. 7-8, p. 130.
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of the revenue. It could have been issued for having failed to execute the decision of the 
antimonopoly institution or the judgment of the Antimonopoly Court. Even more severe 
sanction was the one introduced by Article 15. According to this provision state enterprises, 
cooperatives, and companies under Commercial Law that have a dominant position on 
a market can be divided or liquidated if they permanently restrain competition or the 
conditions for its emergence.
From the very beginning the Act of 1990 was subject to criticism. Some authors underlining 
positive aspects of the Act, pointed out at negative provisions which should have been 
amended70. First of all, the formulation of the rule of reason was ambiguous. Also the 
regulation of the obligation of notification of a merger was a potential source of problems. It 
was also pointed out that the merger regulations should be providing for exemptions from the 
obligation to notify. Lack of such exemptions resulted in notifications of transactions which 
did not have any impact on competition in Poland. Also other authors put forward several 
remarks upon the application of the Act of 199071. They criticized the lack of provisions 
governing appellate procedure in relation to orders issued by the antimonopoly institution 
during the antitrust proceedings72. It indicated the significant role of the Antimonopoly Court 
in interpretation (or potentially creation?) of legal norms of competition law. Finally, the 
lack of many essential definitions (e.g. notion of concentration) and the vagueness of many 
existing definitions (e.g. dominant position) were criticized73. 
1.3.2. The amendments to the Act of 1990
The Act of 1990 was an important step forward in the history of Polish competition law. 
Nonetheless, from the very beginning it was obvious that it needed to be amended in order 
to become an efficient instrument of demonopolization of the market74. The first change was 
rather insignificant. The Act of 17 May 1990 on division of tasks and competencies, laid down 
in specific acts, between the authorities of municipalities and authorities of government 
administration and on amending various acts75 vested the authorities of municipalities with 
the right to demand the initiation of the antitrust proceedings. The next amendment was 
far more complex76. Market share necessary to presume a dominant position was heightened 
up to 40%. However, it was the antitrust procedure that was changed and supplemented 
substantially. The burden of proof was transferred on a party invoking the rule of reason. The 
antimonopoly body could, from then on, issue a decision only within one year in which the 
monopolistic practice was ceased. The amendment developed the specific meaning of rule of 
process economy in the antitrust procedure. If, according to the information in demand and 
the information obtained by the Antimonopoly Office the Act of 1990 was not infringed, no 
administrative proceedings should be commenced. The party submitting the demand must 
be informed about it and provided with a justification of such decision. However, if a party 
kept standing for its claim the antimonopoly body must initiate proceedings. And last but not 
least, the group of people liable under the Act for not cooperating with antimonopoly body 
during investigation was widened.
70 Ibidem, p. 131–132.
71 T. Gosztyła, Wybrane problemy regulacji i orzecznictwa antymonopolowego, [Selected problems of antimonopoly 
enforcement and jurisprudence], Radca Prawny 1993, No. 2.
72 Ibidem, p. 24–25.
73 W. Szpringer, Koncepcja „przyjaznych” i „wrogich” fuzji kapitałowych w prawie spółek i prawie rynku kapitałowego, 
[The concept pf friendly and hostile takeovers in the company law and capital market law], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 
1993, No. 7, p. 15.
74 For details see W. Rakoczy, Zastosowanie instrumentów demonopolizacyjnych w restrukturyzacji gospodarki, 
[Application of demonopolization legal instruments in the restructuration of economy], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa 
Gospodarczego 1993, No. 11, p. 24.
75Journal of Laws No. 24, item 198.
76 Act of 28 June 1991 on amending the Act on counteracting monopolistic practices, Journal of Laws No. 65, item 279.
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The following amendment77 was of a systemic nature. It was the most serious change from 
the adoption of the Act in 1990. Firstly, new definitions of competitor, average salary and 
income were added. The definition of economic entity was altered by inclusion entities 
organizing or rendering services of public utility, which were not business activity in the 
meaning of provisions of Act of 23 December 1989 on business activity78. Secondly, significant 
changes were made to provisions on merger control. They were almost completely rewritten. 
Especially important were new sanctions for infringing provisions on merger control. Also 
the catalogue of monopolistic practice was a subject to alteration and transformation. In 
relation to antitrust procedure the amending Act introduced clear rule that orders of the 
Antimonopoly Office could be revised by the Antimonopoly Court in appellate procedure 
upon filing a complaint (pl. zażalenie). All economic entities and their associations were 
obliged to submit all documents and data relevant to case pending before the antimonopoly 
institution on his demand. Moreover, new provisions on protecting business secrecy during 
an investigation were brought in. However, the most serious changes in the antirust 
procedure were made by introduction of the application of enumerative list of articles of 
Civil procedural code during antimonopoly proceedings in relation to the matters concerning 
the evidence and costs of proceedings. It created several problems, but it was perceived as 
a step towards a better adjustment of provisions on antimonopoly process to the complex 
character of antimonopoly cases79.
The next two amendments were connected with the reform of the so-called “economic 
centre” of a government. The first Act of 8 August 1996 amending the Acts regulating 
functioning of economy and public administration80 changed the name of the Antimonopoly 
Office to the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK). Also, a new 
definition of consumer was added. The Act introduced rules for protecting and taking under 
consideration the consumer interest. In order to ensure execution or those rules, the Act has 
widened tasks of the antimonopoly authority in respect of protection of consumer interest 
and subordinated the Trade Inspection to the President of the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection. Main function of the Trade Inspection is market surveillance and 
providing help to consumers81. Financial sanction was raised from 15 to 100% of income for 
having committed the most serious monopolistic practices. The later Act of 20 December 
1996 on amending the Acts related to the reform of functioning of economy and public 
administration, and on amending the Act on commercialization and privatization of state 
– owned enterprises82 changed the legal position of the antimonopoly body. The Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection was subordinated directly to the Prime Minister. He 
was vested with the right to appoint and recall the President of the Office. 
The next Act of 20 August 1997 – Provisions introducing the Act on National Judiciary 
Registry83 replaced the term “economic entity” with “undertaking”. Far more important 
was one of the next amending acts – Act of 24 July 1998 on amending certain acts regulating 
competencies of authorities of public administration – in connection with the reform of 
state regime84. It established a new institution in competition and consumer policy – district 
consumer ombudsmen. Their main task is protecting consumer interests but they may also 
77 Act of 3 February 1995 June on amending the Act on counteracting monopolistic practices, Journal of Laws No. 41, 
item 208.
78 Journal of Laws No. 41, item 324. 
79 M. Król-Bogomilska, Zasady procedury cywilnej w postępowaniu przed Urzędem Antymonopolowym cz. I, [Principles 
of the civil procedure in the proceedings before the Antimonopoly Authority. Part I], Glosa 1995, No. 8, p. 5.
80 Journal of Laws No. 106, item 496.
81 See art. 3 of the Act of 15 December 2000 on Trade Inspection, Journal of Laws of 2001 No. 4, item 25, with further 
amendments.
82 Journal of Laws No. 156, item 775.
83 Journal of Laws No. 121, item 770, with further amendments.
84 Journal of Laws No. 106, item 668.
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play a certain role in competition policy85. The said act was a sign of development of Polish 
competition law and policy. The legislator noticed that antitrust law should be supplemented 
by consumer law to ensure proper functioning of the market. The most visible sign of this 
tendency was alteration of the title of the antimonopoly act86. Not of a less importance 
was increasing the role of local government in the competition policy by adding relevant 
provisions to the Act of 1990. The subsequent amendment resulted from the Act of 22 
October 1998 on amending the Act on monopolistic practices87. The change concerned mostly 
the third chapter of the Act of 1990. The amendment aimed to speed up the procedure of 
merger control by exclusion from the obligation of notification mergers of undertakings when 
their combined turnover did not exceed ECU 25 million. Notification was not mandatory in 
case when the person acquired stocks or shares of another undertaking resulting in achieving 
less than 10% of votes at a general assembly or assembly of partners. 
The said amendments of 1998 were warmly welcomed by scholars and practicing lawyers. 
They underlined importance of introducing of new provisions increasing the protection of 
consumers’ interests88. Many of them were in favor of changes in the notification procedure, 
which, in their opinion, accelerate proceedings. They evaluated positively exclusion from the 
notification procedure privatization and transformation of state enterprises. It was argued 
that the Polish economy is so advanced in transformation that such provisions were no longer 
necessary89. Some academics disagreed with this opinion90. For them, such amendment may 
lead to strengthening of monopolistic position of state enterprises. They were in favor of 
new consumer-oriented provisions. However, they pointed out that they did not create 
comprehensive consumer regulation, yet, and it needed to be developed91. New provisions 
on merger control widened the subjective scope of applicability of the antimonopoly act. 
Those changes were, generally, evaluated positively92. 
The last significant change of the antimonopoly act of 1990 was made by the Act of 30 June 
2000 on the conditions for admissibility and supervising of state aid for undertakings93. Upon 
this act the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection was vested with 
a new competence of supervision over state aid granted to undertakings.
The Act of 1990 is a good example of the evolution of economic law in a transforming 
economy. Together with its development, the Act was liberalized and the supervision of the 
antimonopoly authority tended to be relaxed, more selective and subtle. It also gives a full 
picture of the process of constant improvement of law. The law will always lag behind the 
economic reality but it’s an inevitable signum tempore of the world of globalization and 
rapidly changing forms of competition. The development of the Act of 1990 is a clear hint 
for the parliament to adopt comprehensive acts with unequivocal provisions. Otherwise it 
85 Legal character of district (municipal) consumer ombudsman is discussed by M. Skorb, Instytucja powiatowego 
rzecznika konsumentów w kontekście ochrony praw konsumentów w Polsce, [Institution of the district (municipal) 
ombudsman in the light of consumer protection in Poland], Prawo Spółek 1999, No. 7-8, S. Kania, Status prawny 
powiatowego rzecznika konsumentów, [Legal status of district (municipal) ombudsman], Samorząd Terytorialny 2001, 
No. 5, and A. Wierzbica-Barbarowska, Pozycja prawna powiatowego (miejskiego) rzecznika konsumentów, [Legal 
status of district (municipal) ombudsman], Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne 2001, No. 63.
86 From then on, the official title was the Act of 24 February 1990 on counteracting monopolistic practices and 
protection of consumers’ interests.
87 Journal of Laws No. 154, item 938.
88 S. Gronowski, Zmiany w ustawie antymonopolowej, [Changes of the antimonopoly act], Monitor Prawniczy 1999, 
No. 2, p. 9.
89 Ibidem, p. 12.
90 J. Olszewski, Uwagi o zmianach i propozycje dalszego reformowania prawa antymonopolowego, [Remarks on chan-
ges and proposals for further reforms of the antimonopoly law], Rejent 2000, No. 3, p. 78.
91 Ibidem, p. 82.
92 R. Pasiak, Niektóre skutki ostatnich zmian ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu praktykom monopolistycznym dla spółek 
publicznych, [Selected effects of the change of the antimonopoly law for public undertakings], Prawo Spółek 1999, 
No. 6, p. 25 and 29.
93 Journal of Laws No. 60, item 704, with further amendments.
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will be the courts that not only decide upon, but create the law, as well, even though they 
do not have any legitimization. 
1.3.3. The Act of 2000 – the first modern antimonopoly act
Since passage of the Act of 1990, the economic and political situation of Poland has 
substantially changed. Establishment of free-market economy and close joining the European 
Union have created an impulse for adoption a new antimonopoly act. According to Narrative 
memorandum94 there were several reasons for such act:
a. significant transformation of Polish economy;
b. rearrangement of Polish legislation after adoption of the Constitution in 199795;
c. need of effective legal instrument of competition protection;
d. harmonization of Polish law with EC standards96.
The Act of 2000 pretended to have been a comprehensive act regulating all matters related 
to the competition and consumer protection. It was true only in relation to provisions on 
competition protection – those provisions were well-developed and several new rules were 
added. Nevertheless, the Act of 2000 provided only selective regulation of the consumers’ 
protection – there were only institutional provisions. Therefore, the basic aim of the 
antimonopoly act was determination of conditions for the development and protection 
of competition. It was done by the regulation of rules and measures of counteracting 
competition-restricting practices and anticompetitive concentrations of undertakings and 
associations thereof. The Act did not introduce the definition of competition but thanks to 
defining the term ‘competitor’ it was possible to determine the mechanism of competition. 
It is a situation of simultaneous release or possibility of release for free circulation, purchase 
or possibility to purchase products on the relevant market. The Act of 2000 governed all 
anticompetitive practices or concentrations which cause or may cause effects in the territory 
of Poland. It proved that antimonopoly act was to combat actual and potential distortions 
of competition.
UOKiK gained more independence thanks to the new regulation of appointment process. The 
President of UOKiK was appointed by the Prime Minister for the period of 5 years, selected 
by way of a contest, from among the persons with university education, in particular in 
the field of law, economy or business administration, distinguished by their theoretical 
knowledge and practical experience in the scope of market economy and competition and 
consumer protection (Article 25(2)). The contest was governed by the regulation of the Prime 
Minister97 and it used to be the only such contest in the Polish public administration. The 
Prime Minister might recall the President of the Office. However, there was an enumerative 
list of grounds for such recall:
a. assuming relation of work, with the exception of employment as professor at the 
university or in scientific institution,
b. undertaking business activity in a capacity of undertaking or assuming function of 
a member of managing or controlling body of the undertaking,
c. condemnation by a lawful judgement for the offence committed in deliberate 
guilt,
94 All drafts of the acts in the parliamentary proceedings are accompanied by narrative memorandums were objec-
tives and impact of the proposed act are presented by the authors of the legislative proposal.
95 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws No. 78, item 483 with further amend-
ments.
96 Narrative memorandum… , op. cit., p. 44–45.
97 Regulation of the Prime Minister of 29 June 2001 on the method and procedure for organising the contest for the 
office of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, Journal of Laws No. 69, item 720.
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d. flagrant infringement of their responsibilities,
e. resigning from their office (Article 25 (5)).
This regulation guaranteed independence and stability of work of the antimonopoly 
authority.
The substantive provisions were significantly modified. The Act of 2000 prohibited two kinds 
of anticompetitive practices of undertakings (individual and collective) and anticompetitive 
concentrations. This division of practices and whole systematics of the antimonopoly act was 
based on the Community legislation98. The Act of 2000 introduced prohibition of collective 
competition-restricting practices. a new definition of ‘agreement’ and ‘competition-
restricting agreement’ was added. At first, legislator determined types of cooperation that 
fall within the scope of application of the antimonopoly act (Article 3 (4)). 
The Act of 2000 stipulated general prohibition of competition-restricting agreements 
and it provided only exemplary list of such practices. This list contained horizontal and 
vertical (including distribution) agreements. In comparison to the Community legislation 
two additional types of agreements were added i.e. agreements on limiting access to the 
market or eliminating from the market undertakings which are not party to the agreement 
and agreements on fixing conditions of a bid made by undertakings participating in a tender. 
There was one, general exclusion from the scope of the said prohibition, concerning 
agreements of insignificant market relevance. Apart from it, the Council of Ministers issued 
block exemptions. Such exemptions were issued four times99.
The second type of competition-restricting practices was abuse of a dominant position. The 
antimonopoly act introduced the uniform term of a dominant position – the idea of monopolistic 
position is abandoned. Dominant position was a position of the undertaking which allows him 
to prevent the efficient competition on the relevant market thus enabling him to act in 
a significant degree independently from competitors, contracting parties and consumers; it 
is assumed that undertaking holds a dominant position where his market share exceeds 40%. 
Contrary to the Act of 1990 the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position was of absolute 
character and cannot be justified on any ground. Moreover, this prohibition referred not only 
to the individual undertakings but also to practices applied by a group of undertakings, by 
introduction of a new prohibition of abuse of collective dominant position. The antimonopoly 
act did not define the term ‘abuse’ but it indicated a few examples of such activity. 
The antimonopoly act of 2000 regulated also merger control. Contrary to the previously 
binding provisions on anticompetitive practices – mergers were allowed but were subject 
to preventive supervision. The Act of 2000 introduced a wide definition of undertaking by 
supplementation of the basic definition of undertaking from the Act of 19 November 1999 – 
Law on business activity100. In the meaning of the antimonopoly act, undertaking was as well:
a. natural and legal person as well as organisational unit without legal status, 
organising or rendering services of public utility nature, which are not business 
activity;
98 R. Janusz, M. Sachajko, T. Skoczny, Nowa ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, [New Act on competition 
and consumer protection], Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 2001, No. 3, p. 176.
99 Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 July 2002 on exemption from the prohibition of competition restricting 
agreements of certain categories of agreements concluded between the undertakings conducting insurance business 
activity, Journal of Laws No. 137, item 1151, Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 July 2002 on exemption 
from the prohibition of competition restricting agreements of certain categories of agreements concerning transfer 
of technologies, Journal of Laws No. 137, item 1152, Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 13 August 2002 on 
exemption from the prohibition of competition restricting agreements of certain specialization agreements and 
research – development agreements, Journal of Laws No. 142, item 1188, Regulation of the Council of Ministers 
of 13 August 2002 on the exemption of certain vertical agreements from the prohibition of competition restricting 
agreements, No. 142, item 1189.
100 Journal of Laws No. 101, item 1178, with further amendments.
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b. natural person exercising profession on its own behalf and account or performing 
activity in the frame of exercising such profession;
c. natural person being in a possession of stocks or shares ensuring at least 25% of 
votes in bodies of at least one undertaking or having control over at least one 
undertaking, even if not conducting business activity, provided that this person is 
undertaking further activities subject to control of concentrations.
This definition was criticized for establishing more restrictive provisions than Community 
law101. Excessive scope of supervision over concentrations was also a result of the lack 
of definition of concentration. The Act of 2000 listed circumstances when notification is 
necessary i.e. in cases of mergers, acquisitions and joint–ventures. Moreover, notification 
was compulsory also in situations of quasi-concentrations as follows: 
a. taking over or acquisition of stocks or shares of another undertaking resulting in 
achieving at least 25% of votes at a general assembly or assembly of partners;
b. assuming by the same person the function of a member of the managing or 
controlling body of the competing undertakings;
c. initiating to exercise the rights arising from stocks or shares taken over or acquired 
without prior notification.
The development of definitions in the Act of 2000 was assessed positively, though it is 
a subject of criticism for lack of precision and granting too much discretionary power to the 
antimonopoly authority102.
The Act of 2000 established several exemptions from the obligation of notification of 
concentration. Firstly, concentrations of insignificant market relevance were exempted. This 
lack of relevance was identified in cases, where:
a. turnover of the undertaking did not exceed, in the territory of the Republic of Poland, 
during any of two accounting years preceding the notification, the equivalent of 
EURO 10 million (in cases of mergers, acquisitions and joint–ventures);
b. combined market share of undertakings intending to concentrate does not exceed 
20%;
c. financial institution acquires on a temporary basis stocks and shares with a view 
to reselling them.
The first exemption was perceived well, although it was hard to find a rational explanation 
why it is limited to certain types of concentration103. The turnover threshold of EURO 10 
million was regarded as set at the optimum in the reality of Polish economy. The method of 
calculating turnover was defined in the Regulation of the Prime Minister of 23 May 2001 on 
the method for calculating the turnover of undertakings participating in concentration104. 
Nevertheless, 20% market share in the second exemption was criticized as set at too high 
level105. Apart from the mentioned exemptions there were also three more, though of a less 
practical importance.
101 R. Janusz, M. Sachajko, T. Skoczny, op. cit., p. 190.
102 M. Rogala, Kontrola koncentracji przedsiębiorców w nowej ustawie antymonopolowej, [Merger control in the new 
antimonopoly act], Prawo Spółek 2001, No. 9, p. 47 and 52.
103 Not covering minority shareholiding or interlocking directorates which were also notifiable at that time.
104 Journal of Laws No. 60, item 611.
105 J. Olszewski, Nowa ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów cz. II, [New Act on competition and consumer 
protection. Part II], Monitor Prawniczy 2001, No. 15, p. 776.
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Chapter 2. The present antimonopoly act   
 - overview and application
2.1. Overview
The present Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection106. entered 
into force on 21 April 2007. This act is now the main source of general competition rules 
in Poland. This statute regulates institutional, substantive and procedural issues of Polish 
competition law. The act describes proceedings before the President of UOKiK in cases 
concerning anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position, merger control 
and abuse of collective rights of consumers. All those matters are to some extent regulated 
distinctively but many provisions are common for all cases. This is especially true with regard 
to procedural provisions. Those provisions take a special place in the antimonopoly act since 
they form almost 60% of all provisions of this act. The Act on competition and consumer 
protection empowers the Council of Ministers to issue several implementing regulations. 
Such regulations were adopted – the detailed list is presented in the third part of this book. 
Furthermore, several soft law documents have been issued by the antimonopoly authority – 
they are presented in the third part of the book, as well.
The characteristic feature of the antimonopoly act is that its procedural provisions are 
not exhaustive and there are numerous references to procedural codes and statutes to be 
applied accordingly. Three references are of crucial importance. Firstly, there is a general 
reference to administrative procedural code107. This means that procedural aspects that are 
not regulated directly in the antimonopoly act are generally governed by the administrative 
procedural code unless otherwise provided in the act. In particular, the regulation of the 
evidence proceedings contained in the antimonopoly act is supplemented by the provisions 
on evidence of the civil procedural code108 i.e. Articles 227-315 of the code. Procedure on 
search in turn refers to the provisions of the criminal procedural code109. As a result of this 
legislative technique it is necessary to bear in mind that understanding and knowledge of all 
the main Polish procedural codes is indispensable to properly follow the course of conduct 
during antimonopoly proceedings. 
2.2. Scope of application
The antimonopoly act is an administrative economic law statute and it regulates only public 
intervention in the market. It establishes public authority competent to undertake such 
intervention. The act defines procedural framework and substantive base for actions of 
UOKiK. The intervention is carried out in the public interest. The public interest premise 
plays a jurisdictional role determining which cases should be taken by the antimonopoly 
authority. Private interests are protected only as a function of the primary goal. It is assumed 
that the public interest is defined through the prism of the consumer welfare standard110. 
UOKiK counteracts anticompetitive practices and supervises concentrations of undertakings 
if they have or may have impact in the territory of the Republic of Poland, following the 
106 Journal of Laws No. 20, item 331.
107 Act of 14 June 1960 – Administrative Procedural Code, Journal of Laws of 2000 No. 98, item 1071, with further 
amendments.
108 Act of 17 November 1964 – the Civil Procedural Code, Journal of Laws No. 43, item 296, with further amendments.
109 Act of 6 June 1997 – Criminal Procedural Code, Journal of Laws No. 89, item 555, with further amendments.
110 D. Miąsik, Controlled Chaos with Consumer Welfare as the Winner – a Study of the Goals of Polish Antirust Law, 
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 2008, vol. 1(1), p. 57.
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extraterritoriality principle111. In consequence, the Polish antimonopoly authority may institute 
proceedings against any undertaking irrespective where the anticompetitive agreement 
was concluded or a concentration will take place provided that their effects are or may be 
detected in Poland112. Furthermore, any foreign company may seek protection from the Polish 
competition authority against any Polish company engaged in anticompetitive behavior113.
The Act on competition and consumer protection recognizes restrictions of competition 
allowed by the separate statutes. Such restrictions preclude the antimonopoly authority 
from intervening114. Furthermore, the Act on competition and consumer protection explicitly 
exempts certain activities from its scrutiny. The most important are:
1. activities covered by the act on games of chance and mutual bets;
2. offset agreements entered into in connection with an agreement of supply for the 
purposes of the state defense and security;
3. certain mergers resulting from the Act on restructuring of iron and steel industry.
All exemptions are interpreted strictly so as not to undermine the basic goals of the 
antimonopoly intervention. It is also necessary to remember that none of the exemptions is 
of an absolute character and each is applicable within the proscribed limits. Outside those 
limits the antimonopoly act applies without any constraints115. 
Moreover, the antimonopoly act is applied without prejudice to any intellectual property 
rights. It clearly acknowledges legal monopoly resulting from rights following from provisions 
concerning the protection of intellectual and industrial property, in particular the provisions 
on the protection of inventions, utility models and industrial designs, topography of 
integrated circuits, trademarks, geographical indications, copyright and neighboring rights. 
However, it does not mean that holders of such rights are exempted from the antimonopoly 
scrutiny. On the contrary, the competition act explicitly states that it applies to:
1. contracts between undertakings, in particular licences, as well as to practices 
other than contracts concerning exercising rights mentioned earlier;
2. contracts between undertakings related to:
a) technical or technological information,
b) principles of organisation and management
– which have not been disclosed to the general public and in relation to which measures 
have been taken to prevent their disclosure, where such contracts result in an unjustified 
limitation of the freedom of business activity of their parties or in a significant restriction of 
competition in the market.
It is hence clear that anticompetitive practices connected to intellectual property rights, 
such as e.g. refusal to deal or to grant certain license agreements are punishable under the 
Polish competition law. It should also be noted that exemption regulation has been issued 
covering certain categories of technology transfer agreements116.
111 R. Stankiewicz, Zasada eksterytorialnego stosowania przepisów ustawy antymonopolowej do spraw z zakresu 
nadzoru nad procesami koncentracji przedsiębiorców, [Principle of extraterritorial application of the antimonopoly act 
with regard concentrations of undertakings], Przegląd Prawniczy UW 2006, No. 1, p. 121.
112 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 May 2007, III SK 24/06, nyr.
113 Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 18 December 2002, XVII Ama 19/01, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2003, No. 2, item 260.
114 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 5, item 56.
115 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 October 2000, XVII Ama 10/00, Wokanda 2002, No. 7-8, item 100.
116 Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 July 2007 on exemption from the prohibition of competition restricting 
agreements of certain categories of agreements concerning transfer of technologies, Journal of Laws No. 137, item 963.
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2.3. Notion of ‘undertaking’
Antimonopoly law regulates only behavior of undertakings. Therefore any restrictions of 
the competition caused by the activities of consumers are allowed. The particularity of 
the antimonopoly act is the fact that it defines the undertaking in widest possible way. 
The antimonopoly act aims at capturing all real market participants117 irrespective of their 
legal form or function (gaining profits or organizing public services). According to Article 
4(1) ‘undertaking’ shall mean an undertaking in the meaning of the provisions of the Act on 
freedom of business activity118, as well as:
a) natural and legal person as well as an organisational unit without a legal status 
to which legislation grants legal capacity, organising or rendering public utility 
services, which do not constitute business activity in the meaning of the provisions 
on freedom of business activity,
b) natural person exercising a profession on its own behalf and account or carrying 
out an activity as part of exercising such a profession,
c) natural person having control, in the meaning of subparagraph 4 herein, over at 
least one undertaking, even if the person does not carry out business activity in the 
meaning of the provisions on freedom of business activity, if this person undertakes 
further actions subject to the control of concentrations, referred to in Article 13;
d) associations of undertakings119 – for the purposes of the provisions on competition-
restricting practices and practices infringing collective consumer interests.
The definition captures different legal persons which are not treated as undertakings under 
separate provisions. a good example is the local government. This is a public authority but 
under certain circumstances it may be regarded as an undertaking under the antimonopoly 
act. The decisive criterion is whether the local government executes its public authority 
or whether it acts as an economic operator. In the later scenario, the local government is 
treated as undertaking120. Furthermore, other forms of associations of individuals taking the 
form of local government organization (often called liberal profession organizations) are 
regarded as undertaking within the meaning of the antimonopoly act such as organizations 
of pharmacists121, medical doctors122, architects123, advocates124, notaries125, tax advisors126, 
as well as organization of farmers127. Analysis of case law proves that the antimonopoly 
act treats as undertakings: cemetery128, building cooperatives129, state and private 
117 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 April 2004, III SK 22/04, OSNP 2005, No. 3, item 46.
118 According to Article 4 of the freedom of business activity act, undertaking is a natural person, legal person and 
– if it is endowed with legal personality by force of a separate act – an organizational entity which is not a legal 
person, but conducts an economic activity in their own name. Partners in a civil partnership are also undertakings 
to the extent of an economic activity conducted by them. Furthermore, the mentioned act defines that economic 
activity is a professional profit-gaining activity in the field of production, construction, commerce, services and in the 
prospecting for, exploration and extraction of minerals from deposits, as well as professional activity conducted in an 
organized and uninterrupted manner.
119 “Associations of undertakings” are chambers, associations and other organizations associating undertakings, as 
well as associations of such organizations.
120 Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 3 August 2005, XVII Ama 36/04, Wokanda 2006, 
No. 4, item 52.
121 Decision of the President of the Antimonopoly Authority of 17 August 1993, DO–II–500–8-93/1285, nyr.
122 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 6 April 2005 No. RPZ 10/2005, nyr.
123 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 18 September 2006 No. DOK - 106/06, nyr.
124 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 14 May 1997, XVII Ama 11/97, nyr.
125 Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 14 May 2003, XVII Ama 55/02, nyr.
126 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 7 June 2006 No. RKT-31/2006, nyr.
127 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 20 April 2007 No. RPZ 24/2007, nyr.
128 Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 12 January 2006, XVII Ama 105/04, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2006, No. 2, item 28.
129 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 24 October 2001, XVII Ama 107/00, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2001, No. 
3, item 130.
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universities130, private high schools131, collective rights management organizations like ZPAF132 
(pl. Związek Polskich Artystów Fotografików – Association of Polish Art Photographers) or 
ZAIKS133, (pl. Zwiazek Autorów i Kompozytorów Scenicznych - Polish Society of Authors and 
Composers) and last but not least churches134.
Polish competition law provides for wider definition of the undertaking than European 
competition law. a good example could be legal status of the public health insurance 
institutions under the competition law135. The status of such undertakings under the European 
competition law is not always clear and depends on additional factors136. Whereas the Polish 
antimonopoly act has been applied to Healthcare Chambers137, as well as to the National 
Healthcare Fund138. 
Chapter 3. Public and private enforcement  
 of antimonopoly law
The aim of this chapter is to present institutional framework of public and private enforcement 
of competition rules in Poland. First, the role and competences of the antimonopoly authority 
will be discussed. Then the regime and jurisdiction of the courts are presented. The last 
topic is the private enforcement issue. 
3.1. Antimonopoly authority
The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection is the antimonopoly 
authority in Poland. The antimonopoly authority is the central public administration 
authority who has two main domains of activity: first ‘traditional’ antimonopoly matters 
(such as cartel, antitrust, abuse of dominance and merger control cases) connected with 
the protection of competition (in the public interest) and the second one connected with 
protection of consumer interests. Furthermore, UOKiK has competences regarding the state 
aid monitoring and market surveillance. The President of UOKiK is a permanent member 
of the committees of the Council of Ministers and thus is authorised to participate in all 
legislative works of the government, and is additionally obliged to develop draft legal acts 
on issues within its competence. 
The President of UOKiK is primarily responsible for public enforcement of competition 
rules. This combines functions of investigating and of adjudicating on infringements of the 
antimonopoly act. UOKiK is a singular post with no advisory or decisive board. There is 
a legal presumption that all decisions are taken by the same person taking the seat of the 
President of UOKiK. Activities of the President of UOKiK are supervised by the Prime Minister.
In principle, UOKiK is an independent body and the political influence from other public 
administration or government bodies is limited. Therefore, any political intervention is 
130 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 April 2004, III SK 22/04, OSNP 2005, No. 3, item 46.
131 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 9 March 2006, I CSK 135/05, OSNC 2006, No. 12, item 205.
132 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 16 April 2007 No RWA – 10/2007, nyr.
133 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 16 July 2004 No. RWA – 21/2004, nyr.
134 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 18 August 2004 No. RLU-26/2004, nyr.
135 G. Materna, Publiczne instytucje ubezpieczenia zdrowotnego w świetle prawa antymonopolowego, [Public 
healthcare insurers in the light of the antimonopoly law], Państwo i Prawo 2005, No. 6, p. 65.
136 Judgments of the Tribunal of Justice of 16 March 2004 - AOK Bundesverband (Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 
and C-355/01), European Court Reports 2004, p 00000 and Court of First instance of 4 March 2003 - FENIN (Case 
T-319/99), European Court Reports 2003, p. II-00357. 
137 Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 5 February 2003, XVII Ama 18/02, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2003, No. 2, item 263.
138 Decision of the President of UOKiK of 6 July 2007 No. RLU 28/2007, nyr.
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excluded in reference to examination of any case handled by UOKiK. There is no legal basis 
in the Polish system of competition protection for any other authority to change the decision 
of UOKiK or impose obligations on the authority. However, the independence of the President 
of the Office may be questionable in view of the fact that there is no term of the office, 
the one is appointed by the Prime Minister for indefinite period of time. The Prime Minister 
nominates the President of the Office from among the persons selected as a result of an open 
and competitive recruitment process conducted by the recruiting team. There are several 
requirements to be met by the candidate for this post:
1) a Master’s or equivalent degree;
2) Polish citizenship;
3) full public rights;
4) not being sentenced with a valid verdict for a deliberate crime or a deliberate 
fiscal crime;
5) possession of managerial abilities;
6) minimum 6 years of employment track record, including minimum 3 years on 
managerial positions;
7) possession of education and knowledge in the fields for which the President of the 
Office is responsible.
As a result of the recruitment process maximum 3 candidates are presented to the Head 
of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Then the Prime Minister may choose either of 
them. He is also competent to dismiss the President of UOKiK at any time. No reasons are 
required for such an action. Previous antimonopoly acts provided for formal guarantees of 
independence such as fixed term or limited grounds for recall from the office. Therefore 
it is justified to say that the antimonopoly authority was deprived of these guarantees of 
independence and it became a politicized body under the competition act of 2007, at least 
from the formal point view. 
The most important activities of the President of UOKiK include:
1) controlling undertakings’ compliance with the antimonopoly act;
2) issuing decisions in cases concerning counteracting competition-restricting 
practices, concentrations of undertakings, infringements of collective consumer 
interests, as well as other decisions stipulated in the antimonopoly act;
3) preparing the draft government programmes for the development of competition 
and the draft government consumer protection policy, as well as draft legal acts 
concerning the protection of competition and consumers;
4) cooperating with foreign and international consumer and competition protection 
authorities and organisations;
5) cooperating with the local government authorities in the scope resulting from the 
government consumer policy;
6) preparing and editing publications and educational programmes promoting 
awareness of competition and consumer protection;
7) addressing undertakings in matters concerning the protection of rights and 
interests of consumers;
8) fulfilling the international obligations of the Republic of Poland in the scope of 
cooperation and exchange of information in the field of consumer and competition 
protection and state aid;
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9) cooperating with the Head of the National Crime Information Centre in the scope 
essential for the fulfillment of his statutory tasks; 
10) performing other tasks defined by the antimonopoly act or by separate acts (Article 
31 of the antimonopoly act).
Analysis of those activities shows that the antimonopoly authority is a decision making body 
and is also responsible for conducting competition policy. Advocacy responsibilities form an 
important part of workload of UOKiK. The Polish competition authority takes an active part 
in international initiatives and forums of cooperation for the protection of competition, 
namely the European Competition Network, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the International Competition Network. Authority’s staff is involved in the 
work of the working groups of the forums devoted to competition policy. However, UOKiK is 
not a party to other agreements, which in any way affect the jurisdiction or lay down the 
rules for cooperation with other competition authorities.
UOKiK is composed of the central office, in Warsaw, and nine regional offices. The central 
office consists of 21 divisions: 
1. Department of Legal Affairs, 
2. Department of Competition Protection, 
3. Department of Concentration Control, 
4. Department of Market Analyses, 
5. Department of State Aid Monitoring, 
6. Department of Consumer Policy, 
7. Department of Market Surveillance, 
8. Department of Trade Inspection,
9. Laboratories – there are nine specialized laboratories performing technical analysis 
connected to tasks performed by the Trade Inspection. They are incorporated all 
over Poland, 
10. Department of International Relations and Communication, 
11. Department of Budget and Administration,
12. Office of the Director General,
13. President’s Secretariat. 
The territorial and substantive jurisdiction of UOKiK regional offices is determined by 
a regulation of the Prime Minister139. Departments are further subdivided into units according 
to subject matter criteria. Last but not least, the Trade Inspection is subordinated to the 
President of UOKiK.
Decentralised structure of UOKiK and the division of case-handling tasks between the central 
office and the regional offices is typical of the organisation of the Polish system of competition 
protection. The task of the central office consists mainly in handling cases concerning 
competition-restricting practices that are taking place on the national or even broader scale, 
as well as all merger cases. The regional offices are responsible for the protection of local 
and regional markets from anti-competitive practices140. Among departments in the central 
office competition protection is a sole domain of department of competition protection and 
department of merger control. Department of market analyses supports those departments 
139 Regulation of the Prime Minister of 17 July 2007 on determination of the territorial and substantive jurisdiction 
of delegations of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, Journal of Laws No. 134, item 939.
140 M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, Perspectives of Competition Policy in Poland: On the 20th Anniversary of UOKiK [in:] 
Changes in Competition Policy over the Last Two Decades, UOKiK, Warsaw 2010, p. 509..
>> POLISH COMPETITION LAW – COMMENTARY, CASE LAW AND TEXTS
28
>>  Mateusz Błachucki
29
with economic studies and it conducts market surveys – it performs duties of chief economist 
unit. Department of competition protection is responsible for proceeding with anticompetitive 
practices cases of national character. Furthermore, all regional offices conduct antimonopoly 
proceedings in anticompetitive practices cases. Those cases are usually of local character. 
Merger cases are dealt exclusively by the department of merger control. 
3.2. Courts competent in competition matters
There are two types of courts competent in antimonopoly matters: civil and administrative 
ones. The primary role serves civil courts adjudicating on appeals from decisions of the 
antimonopoly authority. In addition to that, administrative courts provide the judicial 
protection for individuals in antimonopoly cases with regard to specific process acts or 
failure to act of the antimonopoly authority. Detailed delimitation of jurisdiction of civil and 
administrative courts is sometimes confusing and leads to jurisdictional disputes141.
3.2.1. The court of competition and consumer protection
The appeals against the rulings of the antimonopoly authority are heard by the antimonopoly 
court. The official name of the antimonopoly court is the Court of Competition and Consumer 
Protection142 (pl. SOKiK, which stands for: Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów). The 
Court was established by the Minister of Justice as a department of the Voivodeship Court in 
Warsaw143. Formally the antimonopoly court is a civil court. Nonetheless its legal character has 
been unclear. It was argued that the antimonopoly court cannot be described as a civil court 
or as an administrative court since the proceedings that are taking place before it consist 
of elements of civil and administrative procedure144. The others described the proceedings 
before the antimonopoly court as an external extraordinary procedure i.e. judicial scrutiny 
of legality of antimonopoly decisions done by the civil court145. Even the Antimonopoly Court 
used to characterize itself as essentially administrative court146 and a court of administrative 
nature with strictly defined scope of cognition restricted to hear appeals against decisions 
and concerning issues which are governed by the antimonopoly act147. These ambiguous 
concepts were typical till the early 90’s when the Polish antimonopoly law started to 
develop. At present, the civil nature of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection 
and proceedings before it are not being contested.
The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection is also competent to hear:
a. appeals and complaints against the rulings of the antimonopoly authority issued in 
the course of other proceedings conducted by virtue of the provisions of the Act 
of 2000 e.g. in cases of practices violating collective interests of consumers, or 
pursuant to separate provisions e.g. the Act on unfair competition;
141 Comprehensive discussion of those problems is presented by M. Błachucki, Właściwość sądów administracyjnych 
i sądów powszechnych w sprawach antymonopolowych, [Jurisdiction of civil and administrative courts in the 
antimonopoly cases], [in.] M. Błachucki, T. Górzyńska (eds.) Aktualne problemy rozgraniczenia właściwości sądów 
administracyjnych i powszechnych, [Current issues in delimitating of jurisdiction of civil and administrative courts], 
NSA, Warsaw 2011
142 The name was changed in 2002 by the Act of 5 July 2002 on amending the Act on competition and consumers 
protection, the Act – Civil procedural code and the Act on unfair competition, Journal of Laws No. 129, item 1102.
143 Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 30 December 1998 on the establishment of antimonopoly court, Journal of 
Laws No. 166, item 1254.
144 T. Ereciński, Postępowanie w sprawach o przeciwdziałanie praktykom monopolistycznym, [Proceedings in the 
antimonopoly cases], Państwo i Prawo 1991, No. 1, p. 33.
145 T. Woś, Glosa do wyroku SN z dnia 26 listopada 1993 r., [Comment on the judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 Nov. 
1993], III CZP 63/93, Państwo i Prawo 1995, No. 5, p. 104.
146 The judgement of the Antimonopoly Court of 16 July 1991, XVII Amr 8/91, Wokanda 1992, No. 4.
147 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 September 1991, XVII Amr 9/91, Wokanda 1992, No. 6.
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b. complaints against orders issued in the course of execution proceedings conducted 
in order to enforce obligations resulting from decisions and resolutions issued by 
antimonopoly authority;
c. appeals and complaints against the rulings of the President of the Office for Energy 
Regulation issued in the course of proceedings conducted by virtue of the Act of 10 
April 1997 – Energy Law148 or based on separate provisions;
d. appeals and complaints against the rulings of the President of the Office for 
Telecommunications Regulation issued in the course of proceedings conducted by 
virtue of the Act of 21 July 2000 – Telecommunications Law149 or based on separate 
provisions;
e. appeals and complaints against the rulings of the President of the Office for Rail 
Transport issued in the course of proceedings conducted by virtue of the Act of 27 
June 1997 on rail transport150 or based on separate provisions.
Analysis of the jurisdiction of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection proves 
that this court is a specialized civil court competent in all competition related matters i.e. 
general and regulatory.
3.2.2. Administrative courts
Administrative courts in Poland consist of two instances: Voivodeship administrative courts 
and the Supreme Administrative Court. Voivodeship courts hear all the complaints unless 
something is reserved to the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative 
Court hears appeals from the rulings of the voivodeship courts and issues resolutions to resolve 
complex legal problems and resolves jurisdictional disputes between public authorities. 
Administrative courts review challenged decisions or acts through the prism of principle of 
legality. They may issue only cassation rulings i.e. either upheld or set aside contested act.
Administrative courts may review all activities of public administration and adjudicate on 
complaints against:
1) administrative decisions,
2) administrative orders,
3) acts or actions, other than decisions and orders, made within the area of public 
administration affecting the rights or obligations ensuing from provisions of law,
4) local law adopted by the local government,
5) acts of supervision over the local government,
6) failure to act by the public authorities.
Furthermore, administrative courts resolve jurisdictional disputes between public 
authorities. In principle administrative courts may control all public authorities. 
As it was explained here-above, legislator decided to alter jurisdiction of the administrative 
courts and empower civil court to control certain activities of public administration 
authorities. This is the case of competition law matters. Alteration of judicial jurisdiction 
in antimonopoly law cases raises various problems – ranging from disputes of character and 
competences of the civil court to denial of judicial protection. There are no patterns why 
these matters have been allocated to civil courts. On the contrary, this change was accidental 
and it is hardly impossible to identify reasons for the legislator’s choice151. 
148 Journal of Laws No. 54, item 348, with further amendments.
149 Journal of Laws No. 73, item 852, with further amendments.
150 Journal of Laws No. 96, item 591, with further amendments
151 M. Błachucki, Sądownictwo antymonopolowe w Polsce – historia i ustrój, [The antimonopoly courts in Poland – 
history and regime], UOKiK, Warsaw 2011, p. 7.
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Earlier analysis of the jurisdiction the Antimonopoly Court shows that the antimonopoly court 
is competent to hear appeals only from decisions and orders of specified public authorities. 
However, the court may not review other acts or actions taken by those authorities, including 
President of the UOKiK. Those acts and actions may be controlled by the administrative 
courts. With respect to competition law matters, administrative courts are thus competent 
to hear complaints against:
1. failures to act of the antimonopoly authority, such as lack of response to formal 
notification of potential anticompetitive behavior of market participants or non 
transfer of files to the antimonopoly court;
2. excessive prolonging of the explanatory proceedings and antimonopoly proceedings 
in anticompetitive practices cases;
3. some forms of discontinuance of antimonopoly proceedings;
4. returning of merger notification motion.
However, administrative courts are not very eager to hear antimonopoly cases. This is due to 
the fact that in some instances it is not always clear which court should deal with the case – for 
example it is unclear which court should control transmission of appeal and case files to the 
Antimonopoly Court152. Administrative courts denied their jurisdiction in this case and at the 
same time the Antimonopoly Court has no legal means to hear such case. As a result, the party 
has been deprived of the judicial protection153. Quite recently administrative courts attempted 
to change their position and agree to hear complaints against failure to act of antimonopoly 
authority154. This is a positive sign but it is too early to say that it is a stable line of case law.
3.3. Private enforcement
Private enforcement attracts growing attention. However, real cases are yet to be seen. 
a gradual increase of civil suits brought against companies infringing antimonopoly law 
is generally expected to be seen. This is due to the fact that public enforcement does 
not entail any compensation to entities who suffered losses as a result of anticompetitive 
behaviour. Such possibility is offered by the private enforcement. For many years Polish 
courts were reluctant to admit possibility of private enforcement. Supreme Court ruled that 
the antimonopoly authority is the only competent authority to determine infringement of 
the antimonopoly act. Therefore civil courts were obliged to suspend the proceedings until 
the issuance of the relevant decision by the antitrust institution155. This jurisprudence is no 
longer valid. The Supreme Court changed its position and ruled that civil courts should proceed 
with private antimonopoly claims and not suspend their proceedings until the decision of 
the Antimonopoly Authority is issued156. It was confirmed by the later jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court157.
Polish law does not recognize the particular character of antimonopoly claims in terms 
of calculation of the damage and hence general rules on seeking compensation apply. It 
means that the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff bringing private claim for the damage 
suffered as a result of the infringement of the competition rules. Civil court should proceed 
with the case. No prior decision of the antimonopoly authority is needed. However, it does 
not mean that the civil court may disregard decisions of the President of UOKiK. On the 
152 Order of Voivodeship Administrative Court of 17 February 2009, VI SAB/Wa 91/08, nyr and resolution of the 
Supreme Administrative Court of 24 February 2010, II GPS 6/09, nyr.
153 For detailed discussion see M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli 
koncentracji przedsiębiorców, [The system of antimonopoly merger proceedings], Warsaw 2012, p. 412.
154 The order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 May 2012, II GSK 620/12, nyr.
155 The order of the Supreme Court of 27 October 1995, III CZP 135/96, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich 1996, No. 6, 
item 112. 
156 The judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 March 2006, I CSK 83/05, nyr.
157 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 July 2008, III CZP 52/08, OSNC 2009, No 7-8, item 107.
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contrary, such decisions may play a significant role for civil courts, since courts are bound 
by the findings of the authority. Principle of res iudicatae limits the civil court jurisdiction. 
However, the judgment of the civil court is not binding for the antimonopoly authority with 
regard to adjudication on alleged infringement of the antimonopoly act. The judgment of 
the civil court binds solely the parties and the civil court issuing the judgment158. Under the 
Polish law the plaintiff may seek full compensation for losses caused by infringement of the 
competition rules. However, the civil courts are competent to mitigate the amount of the 
compensation. So far, no successful private enforcement case has been reported in Poland.
Chapter 4. Anticompetitive practices
From the very beginning counteracting the anticompetitive practices of undertakings 
has been crucial for the antimonopoly enforcement. The perception of cartels and other 
anticompetitive behaviour of undertakings has been changing throughout the 20 century 
but the necessity to combat such activities is not questioned in Poland nowadays. Polish 
legislation concerning anticompetitive behaviour of undertaking has been drafted in 
accordance with European competition rules and therefore is harmonised to a large extent 
with them. Nevertheless, some particularities of Polish antimonopoly law and administrative 
enforcement may be noticed. 
Anticompetitive practices of undertakings may take a form of anticompetitive agreements 
or unilateral anticompetitive conduct (abuse of a dominant position). Those two forms of 
anticompetitive behaviour are treated by law separately since they pose different problems 
and require distinct framework for analysis. Therefore this book also follows this distinction 
by presenting them case by case.
4.1. Anticompetitive agreements
The antimonopoly act explicitly forbids any agreements which have as their object or effect 
elimination, restriction or any other infringement of competition on the relevant market 
(Article 6). This provision introduces general prohibition of such behaviour of undertakings. 
It consists of three elements which are vital for its interpretation:
1) notion of ‘agreement’; 
2) object or effect of the agreement; 
3) elimination, restriction or any deviation of the competition. 
To prove that a particular cooperation of undertaking is anticompetitive all three elements 
must be established.
Similarly to EU competition law, the antimonopoly act and Polish jurisprudence follow 
a very broad interpretation of the notion of ‘agreement’. Article 4(5) of the antimonopoly 
act provides for definition of agreement. Under this definition ‘agreements’ means: 
a) agreements concluded between undertakings, between associations thereof and between 
undertakings and their associations, or certain provisions of such agreements, b) concerted 
practices undertaken in any form by two or more undertakings or associations thereof, 
c) resolutions or other acts of associations of undertakings or their statutory organs. 
Analysis of the case law leads to the conclusion that it covers three types of cooperative 
arrangements of undertakings: 
1) agreements - anticompetitive agreements may take the form of a contract 
or any informal consent leading to elimination, restriction or deviation of 
158 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 December 1997, XVII Amz 5/97, nyr.
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competition. The Antimonopoly Court explains that the antimonopoly act 
presents a very flexible approach towards establishing the existence of an 
anticompetitive agreement. It only requires proving that any exchange of acts 
of will of undertakings took place irrespective of their form159. Agreement may 
be concluded orally or in writing. The formal description of the agreement is 
irrelevant. Free exchange of acts of will of undertakings engaged is crucial to 
establish the existence of agreement. This exchange may be direct or indirect. 
The crucial element of agreement is a mutual consent to act together to the 
detriment of other market participants and against the antimonopoly law160. 
2) concerted practice – is a form of anticompetitive coordination where no proper 
agreement was concluded but undertakings involved consciously coordinate 
their behaviour. According to the Supreme Court judgment when three 
independent undertakings producing the same products set their prices several 
times on the same days it is enough to presume that it was the result of their 
concerted and anticompetitive practice161. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish 
between concerted practice and parallel behavior of undertakings. Concerted 
practices rely not on formal agreement but actual behavior aiming at reduction 
of commercial uncertainty. Whereas parallel behavior is a legal and normal 
commercial adaptation to changing strategy of competitor162. Exchange of 
information may facilitate collusive cooperation which may be a sufficient means 
to achieve anticompetitive effect without entering into a formal anticompetitive 
agreement163. However, the analysis of the exchange of information between 
competitors should be done carefully and the conclusions should be economically 
grounded in order to avoid the problem of over-enforcement164.
3) decisions of associations of undertakings – historically, undertakings tend to 
create different kinds of association to represent their collective interests and 
to lobby for them. However, sometimes the protection of interests of a particular 
group may act to the detriment of public interest. Furthermore, membership of 
competitors in the same organization may facilitate collusion among them. For 
instance, it was established in the case law that the bar of advocates as an 
association of undertakings may be the party to the antimonopoly proceedings 
and may be charged with the infringement of the antimonopoly act. The bar 
limited the competition among advocates by adopting internal resolutions 
setting up the code of conduct of advocates what led to the violation of the 
public interest165. 
This division is not strict and particular types of listed arrangements may overlap. However, 
when the fact of an anticompetitive cooperation is established, the form of this cooperation 
plays only subsidiary role in application of Article 6 of the antimonopoly act.
Anticompetitive agreements are the form of cooperation between undertakings which has 
as their object or effect deviation of mechanism of free competition. The antimonopoly act 
clearly determines that object and effect of the agreement are not interlinked and either 
159 The judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 12 July 2007, XVII Ama 64/06, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2007, No. 4, item 46
160 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 15 March 1995, XVII Amr 66/94, Wokanda 1996, No. 3.
161 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 April 1996, I CRN 49/96, OSNC 1996, No. 9, item 124.
162 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 June 1997, XVII Ama 17/97, nyr.
163 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK-7/2009 of 8 December 2009, nyr.
164 S. Jóźwiak, Wymiana informacji między konkurentami jako praktyka ograniczająca konkurencję — kierunki 
rozwoju analizy prawno-ekonomicznej, [The exchange of information between competitiors as an anticompetitive 
practice – development of legal and economic patterns of analysis], UOKiK, Warsaw 2011, p. 26.
165 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 14 May 1997, XVII Ama 11/97, nyr
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of them is sufficient to fulfil the premise of Article 6. As a result of such wording of this 
provision the antimonopoly authority may regard as anticompetitive the agreement under 
which undertakings obliged themselves to undertake anticompetitive activities but failed to 
achieve any effect166, as well as the agreement under which undertakings did not intend to 
restrict competition but nevertheless did so. In some cases anticompetitive object of the 
agreement is accompanied by the adverse effects of the cooperation. Therefore, UOKiK 
investigates both the intention of undertakings and results of cooperation. The object of the 
agreement may be expressly stated by the undertaking and it may be interpreted indirectly 
from the provision of the agreement. Some types of anticompetitive agreements constitute 
hardcore violations of the antimonopoly law. In such situation there is no need to conduct 
a comprehensive investigation to establish anticompetitive object of the agreement.
The anticompetitive aim or result of the agreement takes a form of elimination, restriction or 
any other infringement of competition on the relevant market. Elimination of the competition 
takes place where no free commercial rivalry between actual or potential competitors is 
possible even though there operate undertakings willing to engage in a competitive fight 
against the participants to the agreement resulting from the anticompetitive cooperation. 
Undertakings restrict competition even if some form of a free commercial rivalry is possible 
but it is limited. Limitation may concern certain goods or their features, as well as certain 
group of contractors or consumers. Anticompetitive agreements result in constraining market 
independence of other undertakings. However, it does not cover usual constraints (legal, 
economic or social) that exist on the market that all market participants face167. Other 
infringements of competition are a group consisting of any deviations of the mechanism of 
competition altering the normal result of free commercial rivalry. Similarly to the notion of 
agreement, the division is not strict and particular types of analyzed effects may overlap or 
coexist.
The broad definition of ‘agreement’ is supplemented by exemplification of anticompetitive 
agreements. The list in not exhaustive and there might occur other activities of undertakings 
of anticompetitive character unless they fulfil general definition of anticompetitive 
agreement. They are as follows:
1. fixing, directly or indirectly, prices and other trading conditions. This is one of 
the hardcore infringements of the antimonopoly law since it affects the basic 
mechanism of the competitive process that is competition on prices. These 
practices cover both direct and indirect setting of prices, irrespective of whether 
the undertakings set the total price or the elements of prices. It is illegal to set 
prices in horizontal and vertical relations. Price fixing may take the form of setting 
minimum or predetermined prices. It is not necessary for all competitors to be 
engaged in price fixing – it suffices to have two parties colluding to qualify such 
behaviour as an infringement of the antimonopoly act168. Analysis of the case law 
of UOKiK proves that resale price maintenance violations form a significant number 
of investigated cases. Of the recent cases: in 2011 UOKiK fined the distributor 
and the retailer of clothing, footwear, sports, tourist and climbing equipment, 
as well as commercial partners of the company169 and producer of windows and 
doors together with its distributors — the collusion consisted in fixing prices 
for sales of windows and balcony door170. By one of the most recent decisions 
166 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1993, XVII Amr 37/92, Orzecznictwo Gospodarcze 1993, No. 
3, item 63.
167 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 May 1992, XVII Amr 13/92, Wokanda 1992, No 12. 
168 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1993, XVII Amr 37/92, Orzecznictwo Gospodarcze 1993, No 
3, item 63.
169 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RKT-16/2011 of 1 July 2011, nyr.
170 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RLU 9/2011 of 8 July 2011, nyr.
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concerning price fixing in vertical relations, issued in 2012 - Kronopol, (a producer 
of chip and fibre boards used mainly in furniture industry) was fined for fixing the 
minimum wholesale resale prices of its products in cooperation with its authorized 
representatives and warehouses. As a result of the collusion, the selected products 
of Kronopol were not available for purchase at prices lower than the minimum 
price agreed by undertakings. Agreements provided for deterrence mechanisms 
for distributors. If authorized distributors applied prices lower than the fixed ones 
they could face imposition of financial sanctions by the Kronopol171. Akuna Polska 
was fined for fixing retail prices at which distributors were obliged to sell products 
to consumers. Moreover, Akuna was hindering its trading partners to select their 
contractors freely - instead, it forced contractors to trade goods only with selected 
partners172. There may be identified some sectors where undertakings engage 
in price-fixing more often than in the others. For example, this refers to taxi 
companies, operating on the same local market, which were fined in 2011173 and 
subsequently in 2012174. This seems to be true especially for construction market 
in a broad sense;
2. limiting or controlling production or sale as well as technical development or 
investments. The analysed practice aims at restricting the supply which eventually 
should lead to higher prices. This may take a form of specializing agreement where 
participants decide to specialize in production of certain goods leaving other 
goods to remaining participants. It may also lead to restriction on investments or 
reduction of existing output of participating undertakings. The peculiar form of this 
type of anticompetitive agreements are crisis cartels where during an economic 
downturn competitors agree to limit production in order to stay on market. 
Polish antimonopoly act outlaws this form of cooperation. The good example of 
this practice is the cartel of companies providing outdoor advertisement services. 
Those undertakings publicly announce that in order to face the economic crisis they 
decided to ‘optimize’ the network of billboards. They agreed to reduce the number 
of available billboards and set a minimum price for renting one. The agreement 
was found anticompetitive and eventually was terminated by the antimonopoly 
authority175. Similarly the agreement between ironworks and their main contractors 
on limiting the number of suppliers for ironworks was found illegal. This agreement 
was aimed at restricting the export of scrap-metal176. Another example of this 
practice is the agreement concluded between two national producers of petrol 
in Poland on refraining from production of certain type of petrol. Decision to stop 
the production was rational since the market for this type of petrol was declining 
and new environmental laws would make in a few years the production impossible. 
However, the antimonopoly authority questioned the way in which this decision was 
taken. The crucial element of the agreement was that both producers agreed to 
simultaneously stop the production securing each other that neither of them would 
continue the production and dominate the market for a few remaining years 177;
3. dividing markets of sale or purchase. Market division may be done according to 
various criteria: geographic (undertakings are limited to certain areas), product 
(undertakings are limited to certain products) or subjective (undertakings are 
limited to certain customers or contractors). All of these division criteria are 
171 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK 8/2012 of 27 December 2012, nyr.
172 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK 7/2012 of 27 December 2012, nyr.
173 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RBG-9/2011 of 8 July 2011, nyr.
174 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RBG - 29/2012 of 26 November 2012, nyr.
175 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RPZ - 21/2002 of 22 October 2002, nyr
176 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 May 1996, XVII Amr 15/96, Wokanda, 1997, No. 8.
177 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK 99/2007 of 31 December 2007, nyr.
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illegal under the antimonopoly act. The antimonopoly authority and court found 
illegal agreement under which one undertaking was granted the exclusive right to 
sell one special type of vodka i.e. kosher vodka178. Furthermore, the pharmacists 
association was found guilty of infringing the antimonopoly act by issuing 
negative recommendations179 for establishing new pharmacies, even though those 
pharmacies met the requirements of pharmaceutical law180. One of the recent 
cases involved agreement on the insurance market concluded between insurer 
and broker — the undertakings divided the market of group accident insurances 
for children, youth and personnel of education centres in one voivodeship. For the 
conclusion of anticompetitive agreement, the companies were fined with nearly 
PLN 57 million181;
4. applying to equivalent agreements with third parties onerous or not homogenous 
agreement terms and conditions, thus creating for these parties diversified 
conditions of competition. Discriminatory agreements aim at putting parties to 
the agreement in a privileged position vis a vis their competitors. They are usually 
concluded in vertical relations and result in market foreclosure for undertakings 
outside the agreement. a good example of this practice would be an agreement 
concluded by Philips Poland with one of its distributors Brabork. Under this 
agreement Philips Poland put in a privileged position one of its distributors by 
granting Brabork higher rebates. The antimonopoly authority proved that there 
was no objective justification for such a privileged position of one distributor and 
as a result it deteriorated conditions of competition for other distributors182;
5. making conclusion of an agreement subject to acceptance or fulfilment by the other 
party of another performance, having neither substantial nor customary relation 
with the subject of such agreement. Tying agreements are much more frequent in 
the case of abuse of dominance, but may be result of anticompetitive agreements, 
as well. The gist of this practice is forcing a contractor to buy additional product 
or service which they would not normally buy or buy on different conditions and on 
different markets. The aim of this agreement is facilitating the new market entry 
for the parties to the agreement or leveraging their position;
6. limiting access to the market or eliminating from the market undertakings 
which are not parties to the agreement. This anticompetitive agreement may 
take a form of exclusive dealing arrangements or of collective boycott. Exclusive 
dealing should be assessed with caution since it is not illegal but it may be 
treated as such in given circumstances183. Therefore the antimonopoly authority 
should limit its intervention to these agreements which pose a threat to the 
public interest and are not covered by the block exemption184. The goal of this 
anticompetitive practice is to restrict or remove from the market an undertaking 
not being party to the agreement. An interesting example of this practice may 
be the agreement concluded by Polish Football Association (PZPN) and Canal+. 
PZPN owns exclusive rights to broadcast Polish premier football league. Under the 
agreement PZPN granted Canal+ precedence in acquiring the exclusive licence 
to broadcast premier football leagues on television. The result of this agreement 
was elimination from the market of other tv operators185. In 2012, UOKiK detected 
178 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 November 1993, XVII Amr 27/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 5.
179 Such positive recommendations were of decisive character in the process of establishing the pharmacy in Poland.
180 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 July 1994, XVII Amr 8/94, Wokanda 1995, No. 3.
181 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RBG-28/2011 of 30 December 2011, nyr.
182 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK 87/2006 of 1 August 2006, nyr.
183 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 September 1992, XVII Amr 21/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 2.
184 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 27 October 1992, XVII Amr 21/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 3.
185 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK 49/2006 of 29 May 2006, nyr.
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anticompetitive agreement concluded by public hospitals aiming at eliminating 
private hospitals and healthcare providers from the market for publicly financed 
medical treatment. Public hospitals exclusively provide certain highly specialized 
medical tests. In order to get a contract from the public health insurer any 
hospital or healthcare provider must secure all variety of medical tests, including 
those highly specialized ones. Those tests may be conducted by the provider 
itself or be outsourced. By restriction of access to those highly specialized tests 
public hospitals intended to remove private hospitals from the market for publicly 
financed medical treatment since they would not be able to get a contract from 
the National Health Fund186;
7. collusion between undertakings entering a tender, or by those undertakings and 
the undertaking being the tender organiser, of the terms and conditions of bids to 
be proposed, particularly as regards the scope of works and the price. This type 
of anticompetitive agreement consists in cooperation between bidders in order to 
deviate the auction process. As a result the contract is not attributed to the best 
offer and the the tender holder pays more than assumed in the competitive auction 
process. Collusive tendering may take place in horizontal relations (between 
undertakings presenting offers in the tender) and vertical relations (between the 
tender holder and one of the bidders). In 2012 there was an interesting case where 
the consortium was treated as a form of anticompetitive cooperation involved in 
bid rigging. The decision187 concerned the tender for the collection and disposal 
of municipal waste. The consortium of two undertakings submitted the winning 
bid. They were two largest enterprises operating in the area and the only ones 
which provided services to municipality before. The undertakings established the 
consortium, which stemmed from their alleged technical limitations making it 
impossible for them to submit two separate bids. However, the investigation proved 
that the cooperation of the said undertakings (consisting in using the equipment, 
e.g. dustcarts) was in fact non-existent. Therefore, creating the consortium was 
merely a means to allow the undertakings to maintain their current market shares 
with the exclusion of competition mechanisms188.
Prohibition of anticompetitive agreements is not of absolute character. The antimonopoly 
act provides for two sets of exemptions from the prohibition introduced by Article 6. First, 
there is a self-assessment de minimis exemption. Second, there are individual and block 
exemptions. These exemptions may be perceived as a rationalization of the system of 
competition protection. They enable the antimonopoly authority to concentrate on the most 
serious infringements of competition rules.
De minimis rule is based on the assumption that some agreements, even though they are 
anticompetitive, they are too minor to induce any detectable effect. Under the de minimis 
rule agreements are exempted from the general prohibition of anticompetitive agreements 
providing that:
1. competitors whose combined market share in the calendar year preceding the 
conclusion of the agreement does not exceed 5%;
186 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RLU-31/2012 of 18 December 2012, nyr.
187 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RLU-38/2012 of 31 December 2012, nyr. This is the first decision by the 
Polish antimonopoly authority where the cooperation of undertakings within a consortium – which in principle is not 
prohibited - has been put into question. UOKiK decided to refrain from imposing a fine on the undertakings concerned. 
The decision is to be of preventive nature, aimed at pointing undertakings whose practices can be regarded as 
anticompetitive in respect of cooperation when bidding.
188 The law allows for joint bidding of independent undertakings during a tender. However, whenever the entities have 
a possibility to render services on their own, and there is no necessity to cooperate with competitors – then establishing 
a consortium raises doubts of undertakings’ unlawful and competition-restricting cooperation. Therefore, UOKiK found 
that the undertakings involved concluded a prohibited anticompetitive agreement.
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2. undertakings which are not competitors, if the market share of any of them in the 
calendar year preceding the conclusion of the agreement does not exceed 10%.
De minimis rule does not apply to hardcore restrictions of competition. Therefore price 
fixing, market sharing, production restriction and collusive tendering are always punishable 
under the Polish antimonopoly law.
The second important exemption is a result of application of individual exemption. This 
exemption is based on the assumption that some anticompetitive agreements may lead to 
positive results which outweigh adverse effects of anticompetitive coordination. Article 
8(1) of the antimonopoly law exempts anticompetitive agreements which at the same time 
fulfil four cumulative premises. First two premises are positive and the remaining two are 
negative. Those four premises are:
1. contribution to improvement of the production, distribution of goods or to technical 
or economic progress;
2. allowing the buyer or user a fair share of benefits resulting thereof;
3. non-imposition upon the undertakings concerned such impediments which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
4. not affording these undertakings the possibility to eliminate competition in the 
relevant market in respect of a substantial part of the goods in question.
When applying the individual exemption, the burden of proof lies upon the undertaking 
concerned. The burden of proof is high since all exemptions should be interpreted very 
strictly in order not to undermine general goals of the antimonopoly act189.
The second set of exemptions from the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements consists 
also of block exemptions. The rationale of this exemption is the same as with regard to 
individual exemption. The Council of Ministers has issued five block exempting regulations:
1. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 13 December 2011 on exemption from 
the prohibition of competition restricting agreements of certain specialization 
agreements and research – development agreements190.
2. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 March 2011 on the exemption of certain 
types of vertical agreements from the prohibition of competition restricting 
agreements of certain vertical agreements191. 
3. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 8 October 2010 on the exemption of 
certain vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector from the prohibition of 
competition-restricting agreements192.
4. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 July 2007 on the exemption from 
the prohibition of competition restricting agreements of certain categories of 
agreements concerning transfer of technologies193.
5. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 22 March 2011 on the exemption from 
the prohibition of competition restricting agreements of certain categories of 
agreements concluded between the undertakings conducting insurance business 
activity194.
189 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 23 April 1992, XVII Amr 5/92, Wokanda 1992, No. 4.
190Journal of Laws No. 288, item 1691.
191Journal of Laws No. 81, item 441.
192 Journal of Laws of 2010, No. 198, item 1315.
193 Journal of Laws No. 137, item 963.
194 Journal of Laws No. 67, item 355.
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4.2. Abuse of a dominant position
The antimonopoly act prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. It is clear that the dominant 
position is not forbidden and it shows the success of the business strategy of the undertaking. 
However, any form of excessive exercising of such market power restricting competition 
is outlawed. The dominant undertaking may freely increase their market share on various 
markets provided that the instruments they are using to achieve this goal are not contrary to 
the antimonopoly act195. The antimonopoly act provides for definition of market dominance. 
An undertaking enjoys market dominance when it has a market position which allows it to 
prevent effective competition in a relevant market thus enabling it to act to a significant 
degree independently of its competitors, contracting parties and consumers. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that an undertaking holds a dominant position if their market share in the 
relevant market exceeds 40%. This presumption is only formal and it is rebuttable196. Market 
dominance may be established with regard to some periods of time. Temporary changes of 
market shares or market power being a result of changing market strategies or shocks do 
not allow for establishing market dominance197. Market dominance may be unilateral and 
collective – both forms are captured by the Polish antimonopoly act. 
Abuse of a dominant position may take a form of an action or failure to act198. The gist of the 
abuse of dominance is depravation of independence of other market participants. As a result 
of such practice they are forced to conduct their business on less profitable conditions or 
completely disappear from the market199. The result of the abuse of a dominant position may 
be also exploitation of other undertakings or consumers by the dominant company. When 
interpreting the notion of ‘abuse’ the emphasis should be put on the reality of a threat 
posing a serious and potential risk of a serious loss. This forces the undertaking to accept 
contract terms that would not be acceptable under the normal circumstances. It is not 
relevant whether the threat was fulfilled at the end by the dominant undertaking200.
The antimonopoly act does not define the notion of ‘abuse’ of market dominance but it 
provides for examples of such abuse. The list is not exhaustive and there may exist other 
activities of undertaking constituting the abuse of dominance. In practice, it is often the case 
that the behaviour of a dominant undertaking infringes more than one of listed violations of 
the antimonopoly law. They are as follows:
1. direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices, including excessive or predatory 
pricing, delayed payment terms or other trading conditions. The analyzed practice 
covers all strategies regarding the abuse of a dominant position that lead to 
price manipulation to the detriment of contractors or consumers. This outlawed 
price strategy consists in charging prices regardless of the commercial value of 
the good or service offered. Such prices deviate substantially from the level that 
would be established if the market was competitive201. Diversity of prices should 
not be perceived negatively. On competitive markets price differences stimulate 
competition and result in elimination of inefficient undertakings202. To establish 
such abuse of dominance it is necessary to compare the cost of production and 
the price. It is also advisable to compare prices on neighbouring competitive 
markets to examine the prices of similar products203. In practice, this may be really 
195 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 12 February 1993, XVII Amr 33/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 7.
196 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 October 1994, XVII Amr 5/93, Wokanda 1995, No. 9.
197 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 26 April 1995, XVII Amr 73/94, Wokanda 1996, No. 4.
198 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 15 May 1996, XVII Amr 21/96, Wokanda 1997, No. 8.
199 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 May 1993, XVII Amr 6/93, Wokanda 1993, No. 9.
200 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1995, XVII Amr 59/94, Wokanda 1996, No. 1.
201 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 26 February 1993, XVII Amr 35/93, Wokanda 1993, No. 7. 
202 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 15 September 1992, XVII Amr 18/92, Wokanda 1993, No.3.
203 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 June 1992, XVII Amr 10/92, Wokanda 1992, No.12.
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difficult to provide convincing proof of such strategy of undertaking. Therefore, 
for instance if the dominant undertaking offers goods at prices lower than the cost 
of production of the competitor, it is not sufficient ground to establish predatory 
pricing. On the contrary, it may be a sign of the economy of scale or other economic 
efficiencies enjoyed by the dominant undertaking204. a good example of this practice 
is the case against the National Health Fund who was fined for forcing providers 
of dental services to accept prices of those services that were below the cost of 
their provision. The National Health Fund is a monopolist who contracts healthcare 
services financed from the public money. The antimonopoly authority found that 
contracts for provision of dental services contained prices which were below the 
cost of provision. An expert witness was called upon who independently calculated 
costs and proved that prices offered by the National Health Fund did not cover costs 
barred by dentists. As a result of the proceedings, the fund has refrained from the 
practice205;
2. limiting production, sale or technological progress to the detriment of contracting 
parties or consumers. This practice covers all strategies of dominant undertakings 
aiming at exploiting contractors or consumers by depriving them of access to goods 
or services. The example of such practice may be refusal to deal or refusal to 
access the infrastructure network in the absence of economical, technical or other 
objective explanation. Some exclusive dealing arrangements may also be treated 
as the analyzed infringement if they unduly foreclose the market. However, the 
refusal to deal may be rational and admissible behaviour of a dominant undertaking. 
The undertaking is not obliged to enter into or prolong the contract with the party 
which did not pay for the services previously provided206. Similarly, the dominant 
undertaking would not be obliged to enter into agreement with the undertaking 
which was found guilty of committing unfair competition practices against it in the 
past207. However, a dominant undertaking cannot refuse to provide services without 
any objective justification if it is capable of providing such services. This was the 
case of Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo (PGNiG) who is an incumbent 
monopolist and owns approximately 98 percent of share on the retail natural gas 
market in Poland. PGNiG refused to transfer gas imported by the independent 
trader Bartimpex. The antimonopoly authority proved that there existed technical 
conditions to provide this service by PGNiG but the undertaking refused to enter 
into agreement with Bartimpex. The aim of restriction of gas transfer was clearly 
to secure the monopolistic position of PGNiG against any potential undertaking 
willing to sell gas in the territory of Poland208;
3. application to equivalent agreements with third parties onerous or not homogenous 
agreement terms and conditions, thus creating for these parties diversified 
conditions of competition. The analyzed practice is of discriminatory character. 
By differentiating contract terms a dominant undertaking puts some of contractors 
in a privileged position versus the others. This provision must be interpreted with 
caution since the antimonopoly act does not require dominant undertakings to 
offer the same contract terms to all their contractors. However, the differences 
in contract terms should have an objective justification. The antimonopoly court 
found that the term consisting in additional fee levied on some contractors in 
exchange for a guarantee of further shipments was not justified. At the same 
time, the provision concerning the selective additional fee levied for the delay 
204 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 12 October 1994, XVII Amr 30/94, Wokanda 1995, No.8.
205 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK - 28/2007 of 7 March 2007, nyr.
206 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 November 1995, XVII Amr 38/95, nyr.
207 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 August 1994, XVII Amr 18/94, Wokanda 1995, No. 5.
208 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK - 91/2005 of 9 August 2005, nyr.
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in payment was found admissible209. When proving this discriminatory practice, 
entire contracts should be carefully examined along with the accompanying 
commercial circumstances. The inability to supply all the contractors in full 
may not be approached as an excuse for discrimination. Especially, in case of 
shortages in supply it is important for dominant undertakings to reasonably and 
fairly distribute goods among all contractors210. Rebates schemes are among the 
most frequent scrutinized business strategies under this provision. This type of 
practice is often committed by the local government authorities. For instance, 
UOKiK found that a municipality charged non-municipal funeral undertakings with 
the additional administrative fee for providing service on the municipal cemetery 
which put a municipal funeral company in a privileged position211;
4. making conclusion of the agreement subject to acceptance or fulfilment by the 
other party of another performance having neither substantial nor customary 
relation with the subject of the agreement. Tying and bundling strategies aim at 
foreclosing the market for competitors offering their products or services which 
are substitutes of tied or bundled product or services. When analyzing this practice 
the relation between the additional product or service with the principal one is of 
crucial importance. The substantial relation concerns the physical or functional 
link between the two contracted products which is natural or typical under certain 
circumstances. Customary relation relates to links between the products that 
are results of commercial customs and traditions. The example of this practice is 
behaviour of the municipality which made estate connection to the municipal water 
and sewage system conditional upon incurring the charge for the municipality212 
or the behaviour of municipal water supply company which imposed on recipients 
the cost of damage repair, maintenance and renovation of connections beyond 
the estate owners’ plot213. Another case regards the relation between licensors 
and licensees. The antimonopoly authority prohibited phonographic licensors to 
impose on licensees an obligation to bear the cost of production of hologram214, thus 
vesting themselves with the right to terminate the licence agreement whenever the 
licensee refused to bear this cost215;
5. counteracting formation of conditions necessary for the emergence or 
development of competition. Incumbent monopolists or undertaking enjoying the 
dominant position for a long time may undertake strategies to petrify such market 
structure and counteract any new entrants or market change. Competitors are 
affected only indirectly since the results of applying such strategy by the dominant 
undertaking are rather structural. a typical example of such practice would be 
cross-subsidization which constitutes an infringement of the antimonopoly act216. 
The example of such practice is the case where the heating company obliged 
the consumers to use meters produced by the selected company, whereas there 
were no technical reasons for this. The antimonopoly court found that such 
behaviour adversely affected other undertakings producing meters, preventing 
them from entering the local market217. Similarly, the gas supplier was found guilty 
of infringing the antimonopoly law by forcing contractors and consumers to buy 
materials necessary to build a gas line exclusively from him under the threat that 
209 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 13 November 1996, XVII Amr 41/96, Wokanda 1997, No.12.
210 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 October 1997, XVII Ama 23/97, nyr.
211 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RWR-10/2011 of 17 June 2011, nyr.
212 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RKR-10/2011 of 20 April 2011, nyr.
213 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RŁO-14/2011 of 20 June 2011, nyr.
214 Holograms are used to certify the originality of purchased copy of phonographic recording. 
215 The judgment of the Supreme Court of 20 June 2006, III SK 8/06, OSNP 2007, No. 13-14, item 208.
216 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 23 March 1994, XVII Amr 59/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 8.
217 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 27 October 1992, XVII Amr 22/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 4.
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the gas undertaking would not connect the newly build gas line to the existing 
gas network218. Furthermore, the administrator of municipal cemeteries may not 
choose only one undertaking to offer cemetery services when there operate other 
undertakings offering the same quality services219;
6. imposition of onerous agreement terms and conditions, yielding to this 
undertaking unjustified profits. This practice is a typical exploitative practice 
under which the dominant undertaking forces the other undertaking to agree 
on contract terms which are not equivalent and hard to follow in order to gain 
additional profits. Those profits would be impossible to gain but for the coercion 
of the contracting party. Those profits should be gained at the expense of the 
contracting party and constitute a direct result of the onerous terms forced by the 
dominant undertaking220. Onerous terms are terms which are harder than terms 
typical of this kind of contract. Objective criteria should be used to assess it. 
The antimonopoly authority may also use counterfactual to predict the level of 
competitive prices221. Such practices are often committed by natural monopolists. 
The antimonopoly authority fined municipal undertakings for imposing unfair 
prices by municipal water supply company on consumers, e.g. including the cost 
of the meter reading in the price for services provided to the persons who did not 
possess the measurement equipment222 or for imposing charges for keeping bus 
stops inadequate, inter alia, to frequency of using them by carriers; excessive 
rates enabled municipal transport company to cover most expenditures related to 
the maintenance of these stops223;
7. dividing the market according to territorial, product, or entity-related (subjective) 
criteria. To establish division of the market according to territorial criteria, it is 
not enough to show that the undertaking offers the same products at different 
prices on different local markets. Such price differentiation may be justified by the 
features of offered product or local trading conditions224. Furthermore, territorial 
or entity-oriented division of the market may not necessarily consist of charging 
higher prices. However, when the prices are varied according to subjective criteria 
aiming at preventing competitors from effective competition, such practices 
constitute an abuse of market dominance225. The antimonopoly court found that 
municipality has abused its monopolistic position by dividing the market according 
to product and territorial criteria when it adopted the local law differentiating the 
market fee and levying the lower fee on markets operated by the municipality itself 
and higher fees for markets operated by independent undertakings226. Similarly, 
when the operator of the only one in the area dissecting-room offers to waive the 
storage fee for clients who contract his funeral services he is dividing the market 
according to entity-related criteria227. 
The prohibition on abuse of dominance is of absolute character. Unlike in the case of 
anticompetitive agreements, the antimonopoly act does not provide for any exemptions.
218 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 27 October 1992, XVII Amr 20/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 4.
219 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 14 April 1994, XVII Amr 53/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 10.
220 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 24 January 1991, XV Amr 2/90, Wokanda 1992, No. 2.
221 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 63/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 7.
222 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RKR-18/2011 of 3 June 2011, nyr.
223 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RLU-8/2011 of 6 July 2011, nyr.
224 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 12 October 1994, XVII Amr 30/94, Wokanda 1995, No. 8.
225 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 28 May 1997, XVII Ama 13/97, nyr.
226 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 May 1994, XVII Amr 64/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 12.
227 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 May 1994, XVII Amr 61/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 12.
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4.3. Decisions of the antimonopoly authority
Separate chapter of the antimonopoly act is devoted to the procedure of issuance of 
decisions in cases of anticompetitive practices. The President of UOKiK issues administrative 
decisions, as a result of completion of antimonopoly proceedings, instituted upon Articles 
6–9 or upon Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU. The antimonopoly authority may deliver several 
types of decisions. They are as follows:
1. assessment of the practice as restricting the competition and order to refrain from 
such practise - such decision is taken if the market behaviour of the undertaking 
infringes the provisions of Articles 6 and 9 or upon Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU;
2. assessment of the practice as restricting the competition and declaration of 
discontinuance of the practices – such decision is taken if the undertaking no 
longer infringes the prohibitions specified in Articles 6 and 9 or upon Articles 101 
and 102 of the TFEU. The burden of proof of desistance of the practice lies upon 
the undertaking;
3. commitment decision – such decision is taken if in the course of the antimonopoly 
proceedings, it has been rendered plausible – on the basis of the circumstances 
of a given case, information comprised in the notification or information forming 
the basis for instituting ex officio proceedings – that the prohibition referred to 
in Articles 6 and 9 or upon Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU has been infringed, 
whereas the undertaking being charged with having infringed such prohibition 
has agreed to take or discontinue certain actions aiming at preventing those 
infringements. Under this decision the antimonopoly authority imposes upon the 
undertaking an obligation to exercise the undertaken commitments.
The antimonopoly authority is always open to conclude proceedings with a commitment 
decision. In order to increase awareness among undertakings and to facilitate the process 
of adopting commitment decisions the antimonopoly authority issued Clarifications on 
issuing the commitment decision in cases of competition restricting practices and practices 
infringing collective consumer interests.
In 2012, UOKiK delivered 38 commitment decisions. Two of those cases are good examples of 
issuing commitment decisions.
The first case regards Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo (PGNiG) who abused its 
dominant position by forcing contracting parties to accept onerous terms. PGNiG is an 
incumbent monopolist and owns approximately 98 percent of share on the retail natural gas 
market in Poland. The proceedings against the company were instituted in July 2011. The 
clauses applied in contracts allowed PGNiG to withdraw from the fuel supply contract in case 
of changing the seller. According to these provisions, filing a statement regarding contract 
withdrawal after 30th September of a given year resulted in dissolving the contract at the 
end of subsequent year at the earliest. Such long terms of notice, even up to 15 months, 
may have discouraged business partners of PGNiG to resign from the contract and choose 
services rendered by other entities. During the investigation, PGNiG committed to change 
the contested practice. Consequently UOKiK issued a decision obliging the undertaking to 
fulfil specific commitments. In new agreements, PGNiG had to shorten the contract term of 
notice (whenever a party intends to change the gas seller) till the end of a subsequent month 
after which the contract withdrawal statement was filed (e.g. when a recipient resigns from 
the contract in July, then the agreement is binding till the end of August). Furthermore, 
the company was obliged to propose its customers new draft contracts in line with newly 
established terms and conditions. PGNiG had three months to introduce new contracts and 
present annexes to them. PGNiG was obliged to periodically submit reports concerning the 
stage of fulfilling the commitment. Additionally, till the end of January 2013, PGNiG had to 
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provide information either on recipients who changed the contract or on parties who denied 
accepting the annex228.
The second case concerned Mennica Polska who is the sole distributor of public transport 
tickets in Wrocław. UOKiK challenged several clauses in contracts concluded by Mennica 
Polska with its sellers. They concerned mainly the unequal liability for improper contract 
performance. One of them provided for a sanction for delay in payment. Mennica Polska 
restricted the right to block the terminal for selling tickets without any prior warning, and in 
the case of threefold delay and blockade, to terminate the contract without delay. Pursuant 
to the Civil Code, before withdrawal from a contract, the creditor should indicate the debtor 
the time limit for repayment of financial liabilities. Moreover, severe fines were provided in 
the event of disclosure of confidential information by retail sellers as regards the agreement 
concluded with Mennica Polska which were found to have been disproportionate. The 
President of UOKiK ordered Mennica Polska to discontinue the said practices and imposed on 
the undertaking a fine amounting to nearly PLN 160 000. In the course of proceedings the 
company committed to change three other clauses of discriminatory nature to its trading 
partners. One of them concerned unequal fines for failure to perform the contract properly. 
For causing damages in this respect, the sellers had to pay the full amount of fine, whereas 
Mennica Polska restricted its liability to a fixed amount. The President of UOKiK accepted 
the obligation undertaken by Mennica Polska and ordered the company to delete this clause 
from new agreements229.
The table below presents the number of decisions of the antimonopoly authority issued in 
antitrust cases in the years 2011 and 2012230:231 
 Horizontal 
agreements
Vertical 
agreements
Abuse of 
dominance
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Decisions finding the practice to be 
competition-restricting and ordering its 
discontinuation
7 3 4 4 26 19
Decisions finding the practice to be 
competition-restricting and recognizing that 
it has been discontinued
5 5 8 6 17 11
231Other decisions 1 1 3 1  29 43
Total 13 9 15 11 72 73
Proceedings discontinued in total 
including:
3 1 1 0 8 1
Finding no competition-restricting 
practice
2 1 1 0 7 3
Other reasons 1 0 0 0 1 3
228 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK 1/2012 of 13 April 2012, nyr.
229 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RWR 29/2012 of 5 July 2012, nyr.
230 Data taken from the annual reports of UOKiK’s activity.
231 The statistics include: commitment decisions, decisions concerning imposing a fine on an undertaking and decisions 
recognizing no application of a practice (issued pursuant to provisions of the previous Act on competition and consumer 
protection of 15 December 2000). 
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Chapter 5. Merger control
5.1. Brief characteristics of the system
Merger control system has been functioning in Poland since 1990. At the moment, it largely 
corresponds to the standards maintained in the OECD and the ICN. Merger control is a part of 
competition policy together with separate anticompetitive practices provisions. The merger 
control includes all concentrations, which might affect the territory of Poland and meet 
the turnover criteria set out in the Act on competition and consumer protection. Merger 
control system in Poland is mandatory, and undertakings have an obligation to refrain 
from carrying out the transaction until its evaluation by the antitrust authority. Evaluation 
of concentration is based on the SIEC test. The wording of the test and its fundamental 
interpretation is consistent with the European law. An additional and complementary test to 
assess the concentration is a public interest test, which allows for authorizing anticompetitive 
mergers, if it is in other overriding public interest, such as national security. All transactions 
are treated in the same manner. There are no separate rules for cross-border transactions. 
Transactions must be notified using a special form, which also determines what kind of 
documents should be submitted. Notification applications are subject to a fee232. 
5.2. The notion of ‘concentration’
The Polish antimonopoly law does not introduce the definition of concentration, but indicates 
what kinds of transactions are considered as concentrations. This solution is far from being 
perfect as it does not take due account of the plurality of forms business concentrative 
transactions may take. In some instances mergers may take the form of combination of 
listed types of transactions and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between transactions 
(for example between joint venture and acquisition of join control). Proper designation of 
specific type of notified merger since wrong indication of the type of transaction may result 
in returning the notification motion. Pursuant to Article 13(2), concentrations covered by the 
antimonopoly act are as follows:
1. merger of two or more independent undertakings;
2. takeover – by way of acquisition or entering into a possession of stocks, other 
securities, shares or in any other way obtaining direct or indirect control over one 
or more undertakings by one or more undertakings;
3. creation by undertakings of one joint undertaking;
4. acquisition by the undertaking, of a part of another undertaking’s property (the 
entirety or part of the undertaking), if the turnover achieved by the property in 
any of the two financial years preceding the notification exceeded in the territory 
of the Republic of Poland, the equivalent of EUR 10,000,000.
When analyzing types of notifiable transactions, defining of joint ventures is not always clear. 
Contrary to EU law, Polish antimonopoly act does not distinguish between concentrative and 
cooperative joint ventures. As a result, all joint ventures irrespective of their permanent or 
temporary character are subject to notification. It is difficult to find any rationale of legislator 
for such a wide scope of notification obligation since the antimonopoly authority reviews even 
transitory and short-term transactions233. Attempting to clarify the issue, the President of 
232 Around EUR 1,250.
233 R. Stankiewicz, Joint ventures w prawie antymonopolowym, [Joint ventures in the antimonopoly law], Przegląd 
Prawa Handlowego 2007, No. 8, p.16.
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UOKiK explains as follows: the obligation to notify the intention of concentration consisting 
in creation of the joint undertaking refers both to the situation where participants of 
concentration (founding undertakings) establish, for this purpose, a new joint undertaking 
and to the situation where, for example, in order to create the joint undertaking, one of 
participants will establish a new company and then other participants will purchase or take 
up its shares/stocks. To establish the joint undertaking, participants of concentration may 
also use the existing undertaking (the joint undertaking is established, e.g. on a basis of 
a company functioning within the capital group of one of founders)234. This interpretation is 
assumed to clarify the situation when a transaction constitutes the creation of joint venture 
and when it is an acquisition of joint control. Such distinction is of crucial importance since 
there are some differences in calculating turnover for the purposes of distinct types of 
transactions (especially the exemption from Article 14(1) applies only to the acquisition of 
joint control). In practice, the decisive factor will be the will of the parties to the transaction 
expressed in the document or action constituting the intention to merge. Furthermore, the 
rationale of the transaction may indicate the type of transaction235. The timing of transaction 
will be important, as well236. All those factors may help to distinguish between those two 
types of concentrations. However, in case of serious doubts it is always advisable to contact 
the antimonopoly authority in advance.
5.3. Turnover thresholds
The Polish system of merger control is based on compulsory notification of all transactions 
meeting the notification criteria. The criteria are objective in nature and are based on 
the turnover of enterprises engaged in concentration. Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the 
antimonopoly law, the concentration is subject to notification if:
1. the combined worldwide turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration 
in the financial year preceding the year of the notification exceeds the equivalent 
of EUR 1,000,000,000, or
2. the combined turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration in the 
territory of the Republic of Poland in the financial year preceding the year of the 
notification exceeds the equivalent of EUR 50,000,000.
Both criteria are independent of each other and the transaction may fulfil just one of them. 
It is worth underlining that, it is not required for the transaction to take place in Poland in 
order to be notified, unless the worldwide turnover criterion is met. Notification turnover 
thresholds were significantly increased over the past 10 years. Because of this, all cross-
border transactions, which even slightly could affect the markets in the Polish territory 
are subject to notification. The increase of turnover thresholds served to reduce business 
transaction costs by limiting the obligation of notification. However, a problem can be noticed 
that by increasing the turnover thresholds and adapting them to transnational transactions, 
they have become too high for certain transactions of a purely local nature. The result is that 
it may be reasonable to reinstate the notification criteria based on subjective indicators, 
such as the market share. Furthermore, worldwide threshold serves no rational purpose if 
there is no domestic turnover of undertakings concerned237.
When calculating turnover, one should remember to include the turnover of undertakings 
234 Point 2.4. of Clarifications concerning criteria and procedure of merger notifications to the President of UOKiK.
235 If a transaction involves the change of business activity of the target company, it may be indicated that this is 
a partial acquisition, not the joint venture.
236 After a year from the date of establishment of an undertaking it would be hard to treat a new investor as a party 
to joint venture.
237 M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców, [The 
system of antimonopoly merger proceedings], UOKiK, Warsaw 2012, p. 158-159.
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directly participating in the concentration as well as of the remaining undertakings 
participating in the capital groups to which undertakings directly taking part in the 
concentration belong. There is only one exception to this rule. When applying exemption 
from the notification obligation (Article 14(1)), solely the turnover of the target undertaking 
is taken into account. Detailed rules of calculating the turnover are set in Regulation of the 
Council of Ministers of 17 July 2007 concerning the method of calculation of the turnover of 
undertakings participating in the concentration238.
5.4. Exemptions from the notification obligation
Notification criteria are based on formal premises and derived from substantive factors. 
Therefore there is a need to relax these formal premises by introducing exemptions. Those 
exemptions aim at eliminating from the scrutiny transactions which are insignificant or by 
their nature it is unlikely that may cause any competitive problems. Article 14 indicates that 
the obligation to notify the intention of concentration shall not apply where:
1. the turnover of the undertaking over which the control is to be taken in accordance 
with Article 13(2)(2) did not exceed in the territory of the Republic of Poland 
in any of the two financial years preceding the notification, the equivalent of 
EUR 10 000 000;
2. the financial institution, the normal activities of which include investing in stocks 
and shares of other undertakings, for its own account or for the account of others, 
acquires or takes over, on a temporary basis, stocks and shares with a view to 
reselling them provided that such resale takes place within one year239 from the 
date of the acquisition or taking over, and that:
a) this institution does not exercise the rights arising from these stocks or 
shares, except for the right to dividend, or
b) exercises these rights solely in order to prepare the resale of the entirety 
or part of the undertaking, its assets, or these stocks and shares;
3. the undertaking acquires or takes over, on a temporary basis, stocks and shares 
with a view to securing debts, provided that such undertaking does not exercise 
the rights arising from these stocks or shares, except for the right to sell;
4. the concentration arises as an effect of insolvency proceedings, excluding the 
cases where the control is to be taken over by a competitor or a participant of 
the capital group to which the competitors of the to-be-taken undertaking belong;
5. the concentration applies to undertakings participating in the same capital group.
All exceptions are of absolute character. If a transaction fulfils any of premises set out in 
Article 14, it is exempted from the scrutiny of the antimonopoly authority even if it is or may 
be anticompetitive. The most important is the first exemption. Together with special rules 
on calculating the turnover,240 it constitutes the most frequent situation when undertakings 
are exempted from the obligation to notify the merger. When interpreting the fourth 
exemptions, it should be remembered that it applies only to insolvency proceedings taking 
place in Poland and conducted according to Polish provisions. Furthermore, it is limited 
solely to one form of concentration i.e. takeover.
238 Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 134, item 934 and 935.
239 The time period may be extended by one year if the institution proves that resale of stocks or shares was not 
possible or economically justified before the lapse of one year from the date of their acquisition.
240 See the previous paragraph.
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5.5. Merger tests
A merger test is the heart of the merger control system. It is a set of legal premises 
that enables the competition authority to distinguish between pro- and anticompetitive 
concentrations. It is based on economic theories and it allows the antimonopoly authority 
to foresee the consequence of notified merger241. Pursuant to Article 18 of the antimonopoly 
act: The President of the Office shall, by way of decision, issue consent to implement 
a concentration, which shall not result in significant impediments to competition in 
the market, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in 
the market. Upon analyzing this provision it is possible to conclude that it is the test of 
significant impediment to competition. It is a two-step test. In the first step the influence of 
concentration on the market is analyzed. The Office analyzes the extent of the impediment 
to competition by the merger. In the second step it is examined whether an undertaking will 
achieve a dominant position or whether it will be strengthened. The introduction of the SIEC 
test constitutes an important process change in the merger analysis. It is no longer necessary 
to prove the dominant position for the purpose of possible blocking a concentration. In 
the new test the whole market environment of the undertaking and also influence on 
competitors, contractors and consumers is being analyzed to a much greater extent. In the 
dominance test, the central point was the undertaking and the aim of the analysis was to 
prove the entity’s dominant position. In the course of the examination of the merger, the 
Polish competition authority analyzes prospective efficiencies connected with the studied 
concentration. In concentration cases hitherto undertakings very rarely resorted to efficiency 
defence. The policy of the Polish competition authority within the scope of accepting the 
existence of such efficiencies is very cautious.
Analysis of judicial decisions provides arguments that for the purpose of interpretation of 
the concept of significant impediment competition test, the following circumstances are 
taken into consideration (the list is not exhaustive): 
1. Market structure – market shares of an undertaking and its competitors, changes 
of market shares over time242, 
2. Concentration of suppliers, the existence of significant purchasing power on the 
part of the contractors243, 
3. Entrance and exit barriers, possible new entrances and exits of the market244, 
4. The value and changes of market concentration ratio and HHI245, 
5. Market maturity, the role of innovativeness and market transparency246, 
6. Symmetry between competitors247,
7. Homogeneity of the sold goods and services248, 
8. Links between competitors and other mechanisms conducive to cooperation 
(collusion)249.
241 M. Błachucki, Ewolucja regulacji testów oceny koncentracji w polskim prawie antymonopolowym, [The evolu-
tion of merger control tests in the Polish antimonopoly law], [in:] Europeizacja publicznego prawa gospodarczego, 
[Europeisation of the public economic law], H. Gronkiewicz-Waltz i K. Jaroszyński (red.), C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2011, 
p. 38.
242 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK -52/2008 of 3 July 2008, nyr.
243 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK -67/09 of 8 October 2009, nyr.
244 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK -76/2008 of 24 September 2008, nyr.
245 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK -123/05 of 30 September 2005, nyr.
246 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK -5/08 of 4 January 2008, nyr.
247 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK -11/09 of 17 March 2009, nyr.
248 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK -17/09 of 8 April 2009, nyr.
249 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK -5/08 of 4 January 2008, nyr.
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The evidence of growing economization of the SIEC test is the acceptance and regulation 
of the specific efficiency defence problems. Apart from the usual analysis of the effects of 
concentration and potentially related efficiencies, the Polish competition authority may 
take into consideration some special effects of the qualified efficiency gains of undertakings. 
Pursuant to Article 20(2)(1) even when concentration leads to the significant impediment to 
competition, it may be implemented (cleared) if it contributes to economic development 
or technical progress. Therefore during merger review, a party may try to prove the 
existence of these special efficiencies. The burden of proof lies upon the undertaking. The 
standard of proof in such a case is exceptionally high and is connected with the need to 
prove beyond any doubt the increase of consumer welfare. Obviously efficiencies of this 
type will only relate to specific markets while the achieved benefits should relate to the 
widest possible group of consumers. It is justifiable to assume that possible significant 
impediment to competition should be of temporary nature and the entrepreneur should 
prove the existence of possible conditions for the market to come back to the equilibrium 
in the future. Despite the fact that this provision has been in force for years, it has never 
been the actual basis for examination of a case. 
The test used at present is fully adequate to the needs of counteracting anticompetitive 
concentrations of undertakings and for achieving goals of the antimonopoly act. It comprises 
both the situation when concentration results in unilateral and coordinated effects. It means 
that there is a prospect of counteracting the creation of both single and collective dominant 
position. It is worthwhile to stress at this point that in any of the cases examined so far, the 
possibility of creating a collective dominant position as a result of the implementation of the 
concentration and the existence of coordinated effects has not occured. Therefore, in Polish 
competition law, the concept of a collective dominant position is still a theoretical concept 
and there is no applicable case law. Similarly, no guidelines related to how this concept 
might be understood by the Polish competition authority have been issued.
Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that the significant impediment to the competition 
test is supplemented by the public interest test. Pursuant to Article 20(2)(2) of the 
antimonopoly act: the President of the Office shall issue, by way of a decision, consent for 
the implementation of the concentration as a result of which competition in the market 
will be significantly impeded, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position, in any case that the desistance from banning concentration is justifiable, and in 
particular it may exert a positive impact on the national economy. It is necessary to stress, 
however, that this test is rarely used. Not even one case has been examined on the basis of 
this test in the years 2011 and 2012. In the previous years the total number of cases did not 
exceed 5250. When applying the public interest test, the burden of proof rests entirely on the 
undertaking while the standard of proof is exceptionally high251. 
5.6. Decisions in merger cases
After conducting merger investigation, the antimonopoly authority may issue four types of 
decisions:
1. Clearance – if merger does not lead to significant impediment to competition, 
UOKiK is obliged to grant consent for such transaction.
2. Conditional clearance – when analysis of possible consequences of the notified 
transaction proves that it would restrict competition but those restrictions are 
250 These cases concerned exclusively state-owned enterprises from the sectors having strict links with national 
security, i.e. energy, fuel and military. 
251 M. Błachucki, R. Stankiewicz, Decyzja zezwalająca na dokonanie koncentracji z naruszeniem testu istotnego 
ograniczenia konkurencji (art. 20 ust. 2 ustawy antymonopolowej), [Decision of the antimonopoly authority clearing 
anticompetitive merger (Article 20(2) of the antimonopoly act)], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 2010, No. 
6, p. 5.
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removable and not essential to the transaction, UOKiK grants consent together 
with imposition of necessary remedies.
3. Extraordinary clearance – if merger is anticompetitive, but there is an overriding 
public interest the antimonopoly authority may grant its extraordinary consent for 
such transaction.
4. Prohibition – when analysis of notified transaction process indicates that the merger 
is anticompetitive and no remedies my change that, UOKiK is obliged to intervene 
and prohibit the merger.
Apart from decisions based on substantive analysis, antimonopoly proceedings may be 
concluded on the formal basis without adjudicating on the merits of the case:
1. Return of the notification form – the form is returned if there is a formal obstacle 
precluding the antimonopoly authority from adjudicating on the case. In principle, 
UOKiK returns the notification form if it is incomplete or it wasn’t corrected and 
supplemented on time. Furthermore, the notification form is returned if the 
notified transaction is exempted by Article 14 of the antimonopoly act. Moreover, 
the antimonopoly authority returns the form if the notification is premature 
(transaction is highly unlikely or speculative) or the wrong party filed the form 
or the form lacks most of the required information252. The notification forms are 
not returned too often and it usually does not exceed 10% of all notifications (in 
2011–12 and in 2012-16 forms were returned).
2. Discontinuance of proceedings – proceedings are discontinued if they became 
groundless for any reason - for example as a result of withdrawal of the notification 
form by the parties or referral of the case to the Commission. Merger proceedings are 
discontinued very rarely (in 2011 – 3 and in 2012 - 0 proceedings were discontinued).
The table below indicates the intervention ratio of the antimonopoly authority in merger 
cases253. It concerns only substantive based decisions254.
Year
Number of 
proceedings
Proceedings 
concluded
Clearance
Decisions 
with 
remedies
Prohibitions
2012 194 155 136 1 0
2011 206 187 166 3 2
2010 222 188 147 2 0
2009 144 123 97 1 3
2008 197 177 153 2 0
2007 310 263 203 2 0
2006 310 265 215 1 1
2005 378 329 265 0 2
2004 256 218 175 1 2
2003 194 151 149 2 0
2002 203 169 168 1 0
252 M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców, [The 
system of antimonopoly merger proceedings], UOKiK, Warsaw 2012, p. 311-312.
253 Data taken from the annual reports of UOKiK’s activity.
254 Decisions on discontinuance of proceedings or return of the notification forms are omitted. Due to difficulties in 
obtaining relevant and accurate data, statistics regarding extraordinary clearances are not included, as well.
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Number of 
proceedings
Proceedings 
concluded
Clearance
Decisions 
with 
remedies
Prohibitions
2001 592 542 n/a n/a n/a
2000 1262 1107 911 0 0
1999 1238 1079 917 0 0
1998 1872 1511 1510 0 1
1997 1387 1227 1225 0 2
1996 469 378 377 0 1
1995 384 333 333 0 0
1994 405 405 404 0 1
1993 537 537 513 13 7
1992 740 740 718 9 9
1991 974 974 895 63 4
1990 192 192 167 17 8
Decisions in merger cases are valid 2 years from the day of issuance. During this time parties 
may proceed and complete the transaction. If the transaction is not consummated within 
this time, the party is obliged to notify the transaction once more. However, it is possible 
to extend the said period with 1 year. Party may apply for such extension and is obliged to 
prove that market conditions did not change and that transaction would not have an adverse 
effect on competition. Such motion should be filed within the reasonable time before the 
expiration of the merger decision so as to allow the antimonopoly authority to carry out 
explanatory proceedings if necessary. The party bears all negative consequences of late 
application. If the antimonopoly authority finds that there have been relevant changes in 
market condition, it refuses to prolong the validity of merger decision. a refusal is issued in 
the form of order and is not subject to appeal. 
5.7. Remedies in merger cases
Polish procedures in merger cases are a one-stage process. The absence of two-stage 
proceedings means that there is no clear transition between the initial findings of the 
existence of competition concerns and an extended, in-depth investigation. Parties have 
the right to actively participate in all fact-finding activities at all stages of the proceedings. 
That right also includes the possibility of submitting commitments to eliminate identified 
competition concerns. It means that both the party and the competition authority have the 
right and the opportunity to propose remedies. In practice, due to the absence of two-stage 
proceedings, it is the President of UOKiK that comes forward with the initiative and the 
proposal of remedies. In that situation the undertaking is notified about the conclusions of 
the market investigation and the potential competition concerns only at the very end of the 
proceedings. Based on those findings, the competition authority presents the undertaking 
with the proposed remedies and at the same time sets a date for him to respond to those 
proposals. Usually such deadline is set at 14 days. The deadline may be extended if necessary. 
Proposals of the competition authority initiate the negotiations process. During that process, 
the undertaking has both the opportunity to discuss the functionality and validity of the 
assessment of competition concerns caused by the merger, as well as the content and scope 
of the proposed conditions. Findings of the competition authority made on the basis of 
the market survey set the framework for negotiations. Negotiations take place at the head 
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office of the competition authority and involve representatives of the undertaking and case 
handlers which conduct the proceedings.
The Polish competition authority enjoys a wide discretionary power when deciding on 
remedies in merger cases. These remedies can be both structural and behavioral, as well 
as any combinations thereof, for example hybrid conditions. In practice, the decisions 
issued by the President of UOKiK show an unequivocal preference for structural conditions. 
This is explained by the general observation that mergers produce permanent changes in 
the structure of the market, which means that preventing their negative impact requires 
the use of structural means. Structural conditions are usually easier to apply and do not 
require an expanded monitoring mechanism. In addition to structural conditions, the 
Polish competition authority also applies behavioral conditions, as well as mixed, or hybrid 
conditions. The application of a specific condition depends on the nature of the merger and 
the type of competition concerns found. For example, in the case of a merger between 
two manufacturers, or the merger of two retail chains, the most frequent conditions are 
structural conditions, consisting of the disposal of the factory or a production line, or 
specific stores. Of course, there may be situations when the subject of the transaction is 
indivisible, for example when it is a single factory; this opens up new opportunities with 
respect to the terms and conditions. Different types of concerns produced by horizontal and 
vertical consolidation also affect the type of conditions applied by the Polish competition 
authority. Due to the fact that vertical consolidation usually leads to various types of 
market foreclosure, the conditions applied should be aiming to preserve the openness of the 
distribution or supply channels. Such nature of the competition concerns may be eliminated 
by applying behavioral conditions which oblige the undertaking to maintain the openness 
of the distribution network. Such situation did take place in the case of the Carey Agri/
Polmos Bialystok255 merger on the alcohol market, the merger between the biggest alcohol 
distributor and the biggest maker of flavored vodkas. One of the conditions imposed on the 
undertaking in this transaction was the requirement to maintain distribution of alcohols 
of other producers at a specific level, which guaranteed the openness of the wholesale 
distribution channel.
When deciding to apply structural sanctions, an analysis is made to identify to what 
extent a part of the business subject to remedies would be able to perform its functions 
independently and effectively conduct business operations, exerting true competitive 
pressure. From that point of view, standalone business units of the undertaking stand the 
best chance. They do not require significant spinoff-related expenses and can be transferred 
to another undertaking within a relatively short period of time. In certain situations, it is 
possible to impose structural conditions on parts of the business, or a set of assets of the 
undertaking that was not a standalone entity. Such moves are possible provided that spinning 
them off from the remaining assets is possible to achieve and the time needed to do so 
is not excessive. Often such carved out assets are accompanied by intellectual property 
rights. a good example would be the merger of jam producers Agros Nova and Kotlin256, 
where competition disposal conditions were imposed on one production line, together with 
rights to brand names, contracts and the essential human resources. Combining all of these 
elements produced a chance that the potential and value of the jam production line would 
be preserved in the future and would serve as an effective competitor with respect to jams 
made by Agros Nova.
The Polish competition authority has seldom applied behavioral remedies. In most cases they 
were imposed with respect to vertical mergers as an attempt to prevent market foreclosure. 
They had the form of commitments to maintain a fixed level of turnover generated by selling 
goods from independent vendors and supplemented by fair-dealing clauses.
255 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK - 123/05 of 30 September 2005, nyr.
256 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DKK - 9/09 of 25 February 2009, nyr.
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The main instrument of control of the execution of remedies by undertakings is the reporting 
obligation imposed on them. These consist of requiring the undertaking to periodically 
present the reports about progress on the execution of those terms and conditions. Whenever 
doubts arise as to the proper execution of those provisions, the Polish competition authority 
may launch explanatory proceedings and conduct an on-site inspection at the undertaking. 
The inspection on the fulfillment of conditional clearance is conducted by the same people, 
who have conducted the proceedings related to that specific merger. There are no separate 
officials responsible solely for the inspection of the fulfillment of remedies.
5.8. Merger control undertaken by other public   
 authorities in Poland
It should be noted, however, that in addition to control of mergers exercised from the 
perspective of competition protection, there is a possibility of such control under other 
legislation. For example, the Financial Supervisory Authority also controls the concentration 
of undertakings from the financial sector in terms of transaction safety and consumer 
protection. Those two perspectives, do not necessarily lead to the same conclusions. Such 
a situation occurred in relation to the concentration of Unicredito/HVB257.
Chapter 6. Sanctions for infringements  
 of the antimonopoly act
6.1. Introduction
An efficient competition policy requires an adequate system of sanctions. Antimonopoly 
law creates additional transaction costs for undertakings, resulting in some instances in 
prohibiting certain commercial arrangements. Those antimonopoly limitations to the 
freedom of enterprise may form some encouragement for companies to attempt to escape 
from the antimonopoly scrutiny. Therefore the antimonopoly sanctions should outweigh 
profits from potential deviation from the competition law provisions. The type and the 
intensity of sanctions should depend on the type of misconduct of the company and reflect 
the danger for the public interest coming from such behaviour. Polish antimonopoly act 
distinguishes between procedural and substantive antimonopoly infringements. Furthermore, 
different sanctions apply to infringing provisions on prohibition of anticompetitive practices 
(anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position) and on merger control. Polish 
antimonopoly law expressly prohibits anticompetitive practices (collective and unilateral). 
If such a practice is undertaken, then it is void as a whole or in part. If an anticompetitive 
practice is proven, the antimonopoly authority orders the undertaking to refrain from it. 
This is the basic administrative law sanction. In case of merger control all transactions 
remain valid even if they were not notified258. Only administrative intervention from the 
antimonopoly authority may legally block the execution of such transaction.
In Poland, the antimonopoly act is a part of economic administrative law. It determines 
the character of liability and types of sanctions governed by this statute. Liability arising 
from infringement of the antimonopoly law constitutes the administrative law liability. 
Administrative law liability is distinct from the civil law or criminal law liability. Such 
257 Case No. COMP/M.3894 - UNICREDITO/HVB.
258 S. Gronowski, Glosa do postanowienia Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 27 października 1995 r., [Comment to the order of 
the Supreme Court of 27 October 1995], III CZP 135/95, OSP 1996, No. 6, item 112.
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liability is executed when companies violate their duties resulting from the antimonopoly 
law. The President of UOKiK is the only public authority competent to impose fines and 
sanctions for infringements of the Act on competition and consumer protection. During the 
court proceedings the antimonopoly court enjoys this competence, as well259. Furthermore, 
liability for the infringement of antimonopoly law is of objective nature, irrespective of 
the guilt or awareness of the person who violates the rules260. Subjective elements of the 
infringement of the antimonopoly act are essential only when determining the actual amount 
of the fine261.
In order to give the full picture of sanctions, it should be mentioned that the basic civil 
law sanction for the infringement of the antimonopoly act is a sanction of invalidity. All 
agreements which have as their object or effect elimination, restriction or any other 
infringement of competition on the relevant market are in their entirety or in the respective 
part null and void (unless they are exempted by the de minimis rule or the rule of reason). 
Similarly, it applies to the consequences of the abuse of a dominant position, but the said 
invalidity is of absolute character in the unilateral conduct cases. It means that all above 
agreements and legal actions are invalid ex ante. Therefore a decision of the antimonopoly 
authority is a declaratory one. 
Neither the antimonopoly act nor any criminal law act provide for any criminal liability for 
infringement of the Polish competition law. However, it should be noted that bid rigging 
is a separate and independent criminal offence and is punishable under Article 305 of the 
Criminal code262. This provision provides for sanction up to 3 years of imprisonment for 
collusive tendering. It should be noted that this crime regards only natural persons and is 
independent of liability of undertakings under the antimonopoly law. 
6.2. Financial sanctions
The antimonopoly act provides for sanctions that may be imposed both on undertakings 
and natural persons. Undertakings are the primary target of sanctions provided in the 
antimonopoly act, since they aim at counteracting anticompetitive behavior of undertakings. 
However, the auxiliary sanctions may be imposed on natural persons, as well. Until now, no 
natural person has ever been fined for antimonopoly practices. As mentioned before, all 
sanctions are of administrative not of criminal nature263. However, the nature of financial 
sanction is disputable in the light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Some authors claim, based on this jurisprudence, that financial sanctions under the 
Polish antimonopoly act should be regarded as criminal within the meaning of Article 6 of 
European Convention of Human Rights264.  
6.2.1. Sanctions for undertakings
Basic sanctions for infringing the antimonopoly act are financial sanctions. In principle, 
imposition of all fines lies within administrative discretion of the antimonopoly authority. In 
practice, this discretion is quite limited and the antimonopoly authority hardly ever desists 
259 T. Ławicki, Glosa do postanowienia Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 22 lutego 1994 r., [Comment to the order of the 
Supreme Court of 22 February 1994], I CRN 238/93, Państwo i Prawo 1995, No. 7, p. 101 and 102.
260 M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, Perspectives of Competition Policy in Poland: On the 20th Anniversary of UOKiK [in:] 
Changes in Competition Policy over the Last Two Decades, UOKiK, Warsaw 2010, p. 518 and 519.
261 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 April 2011, III SK 45/10, nyr.
262 The Act of 6 June 1997 – Criminal Code, Journal of Laws No. 97, item 553, with further amendments.
263 M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców,[The 
system of antimonopoly merger proceedings], UOKiK, Warsaw 2012, p. 325.
264 A. Błachnio–Parzych, The nature of responsibility of an undertaking in antitrust proceedings and the concept of 
„criminal charge’ in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory 
Studies Vol. 2012, 5 (6), p. 54.
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from imposing the fine when it identifies the infringement of the antimonopoly act. Sanctions 
may be imposed for violation of substantive and procedural rules. In the first case, the 
sanctions are more severe since the possible effects of such violations could be more harmful 
to the public interest. The latter group provides for sanctions for procedural infringements 
whose gravity is adjusted to the nature of those infringements. 
The antimonopoly authority may impose a maximum fine of 10% of the revenue earned in 
the accounting year preceding the year within which the fine is imposed, if the undertaking, 
even if unintentionally:
1. infringed the general prohibition of undertaking anticompetitive practices set out 
in Articles 6 and 9;
2. infringed Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU;
3. completed the concentration without a consent of the President of UOKiK;
This is the most important set of fines designed to sanction the elementary infringements of 
antimonopoly law. The ne bis in idem principle applies265.
Procedural infringements are subject to fines of up to EUR 50 000 000 on an undertaking. 
They may be imposed if an undertaking, even unintentionally:
1. provided false data in the application for extension of validity of merger decision 
as referred to in Article 23 or in the notification merger form as referred to in 
Article 94(2);
2. failed to provide information requested by the President of the Office pursuant to 
Articles 12(3), 19(3) or 50, or provided false or misleading information;
3. does not collaborate during the inspection performed within proceedings pursuant 
to Article 105a subject to Article 105d(2).
Procedural fines intend to ensure the appropriate course of process actions. They are levied 
for the behaviour that is contrary to a procedural obligation irrespective of whether this 
procedural duty was subsequently fulfilled266.
Furthermore, the antimonopoly authority may fine an undertaking with up to EUR 10,000 
for each day of delay in execution of the decisions issued pursuant to Articles 10, 12(1), 
19(1), 20(1), 21(2), 21(4), 26, 28(1), 89(1), 89(3) and 105g(1) or court judgements in cases 
concerning competition-restricting practices, practices violating collective interests of 
consumers and concentration; the fine shall be imposed as of the date specified in the 
decision. Those fines constitute measures of administrative execution character. They are 
independent of other fines and they may be imposed several times (the ne bis in idem 
principle does not apply).
6.2.2. Fines for natural persons267
The principal liability regards undertakings. Nonetheless, natural persons may also be 
sanctioned for violations of the antimonopoly act. Those are mainly procedural infringements 
affecting the effectiveness of antimonopoly proceedings. Natural persons may not be held 
liable for the substantive infringements of the antimonopoly act such as anticompetitive 
265 M. Sachajko, Istota i charakterystyka prawna antymonopolowych kar pieniężnych, [Concept and legal 
characteristics of antimonopoly financial penalties], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 2002, No. 1, 
p. 51.
266 Ibidem, p. 71.
267 Since natural persons may be treated as undertakings in certain situations it should be stressed that they are not 
covered here. This section refers only to situations where natural persons do not perform function of undertakings. 
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agreements or abuse of a dominant position. Article 108 is the legal basis for fining two 
categories of natural person. First, a maximum fine of fifty-fold the average remuneration 
may be imposed upon a person holding a managerial post or being a member of a managing 
authority of the undertaking, should such a person, intentionally or unintentionally, have 
not:
1. executed any of the decisions, resolutions or judgements referred to in Article 107;
2. notified an intention of concentration referred to in Article 13;
3. provided information, or have provided unreliable or misleading information, as 
required by the President of UOKiK pursuant to Article 50.
This category refers to the personal liability for serious procedural infringements of the 
antimonopoly act. Second, the same financial sanction may be imposed on:
1. persons authorised by the inspected party referred to in Article 105a(6), holders of 
apartments, premises, buildings or means of transportation referred to in Article 
91(1) and the persons referred to in Article 105a(7) for:
a) failure to provide information or providing incorrect or misleading information 
requested by the President of UOKiK,
b) failure to collaborate during an inspection held within proceedings pursuant 
to Article 105a;
2. witnesses for refusal to make testimony without valid reason.
The second group of financial sanctions may be imposed for procedural infringements of 
the antimonopoly act. Despite the legal possibility, the antimonopoly authority has never 
decided to issue any fine upon natural persons. It is surprising since foreign experiences show 
that personal liability of natural persons has a significant deterrent effect268. 
The state of law and administrative practice described above may change, though. The 
new draft on the amendment of the antimonopoly law provides for extension of liability of 
natural persons under the antimonopoly act. According to the draft Amendments, a fine up 
to Euro 500.000 could be imposed on the key managers, whose acts or negligence led the 
undertaking to breach Article 6 (1) 1-6 of the Competition Act or 101 (1) a-e of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. This possibility is not limited to cartels, but will 
also cover all horizontal and vertical agreements. Both fines – on an undertaking and an 
individual would be imposed within the same proceedings before the President of UOKiK. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that under the proposal, the individuals would be eligible 
for the leniency. Consequently, introducing such measure will provide the Office with access 
to the new sources of information, as individuals would take part in the leniency “race 
against the clock” next to undertakings. These proposals aim at increasing effectiveness of 
counteracting against the most serious substantive infringements of the antimonopoly law. 
However, this proposal raised initially a great deal of skepticism among stakeholders.
6.3. Directives of fines assessment
All of described financial sanctions are of facultative character. The antimonopoly authority is 
obliged to assess the grounds for fining the undertakings or natural persons for infringements 
of the antimonopoly act. As indicated earlier, the President of UOKiK hardly ever desists from 
fining undertakings if they violated the antimonopoly law. The antimonopoly act determines 
maximum amounts of fines and leaves a wide margin of discretion to the antimonopoly 
268 R. Molski [in:] Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, [Act on competition and consumer 
protection. Commentary], T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2009, p. 1650.
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authority to decide on the amount in each case. The minimum amount is not defined what 
means that in each case the antimonopoly authority may impose even a symbolic fine or 
abstain from fining the undertaking. 
The wide margin of administrative discretion does not mean that the antimonopoly authority 
imposes fines in a completely arbitrary manner. The limitations of administrative discretion 
are set by the antimonopoly act itself (Article 111 in particular), case law and soft law 
documents issued by the antimonopoly authority. First, the antimonopoly act sets forth that 
the antimonopoly authority calculating the amount of the fines referred to in Articles 106 to 
108 should take into account in particular: the duration, gravity and circumstances of the 
infringement of the provisions of the antimonopoly act, as well as the previous infringements 
of the act. These four factors are obligatory criteria applied by the antimonopoly authority 
when setting up the amount of fines. The list of applicable criteria is not exhaustive, though. 
Article 111 explicitly states that the catalogue of directives is open and it indicates only four 
most important. 
Second, the courts in many cases indicated circumstances which the antimonopoly authority 
is obliged to take into account when calculating the amount of fine. Those circumstances 
are as follows:
1. extent of threat to the public interest269;
2. duration, gravity and circumstances of the previous infringement of the 
provisions of the antimonopoly act;
3. intentionality and unintentionality;
4. financial profits from the infringement of the antimonopoly act;
5. refraining from the prohibited practise270;
6. irreversible market changes271;
7. income of the undertaking272.
Not all of those circumstances will be applicable in each case. Sometimes it will depend 
on the specific provisions of the antimonopoly act and the other time it will depend on the 
character of the case.
Third, the antimonopoly authority has issued the Guidelines on setting fines for competition-
restricting practices. One should note that the said document refers only to fines imposed 
for the anticompetitive practices. Financial sanctions in merger cases are quite rare and the 
antimonopoly authority reserved the possibility for a case by case approach when calculating 
them.
When levying a fine upon the undertaking, the antimonopoly authority should clearly state 
all established facts and present adequate legal reasoning273.
6.4. The leniency programme 
To increase the effectiveness of the antimonopoly intervention, the leniency programme 
has been introduced into the Polish competition law. The leniency programme allows the 
antimonopoly authority to grant immunity or reduction from fines to the undertaking which 
undertook cooperation with the authority and provided evidence of an existence of an 
269 S. Gronowski, Polskie prawo antymonopolowe (zarys wykładu), [Polish antimonopoly law], Wydawnictwo ZPP, 
Warsaw 1998, p. 250.
270 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 16 November 1994, XVII Amr 31/94, Wokanda 1995, No. 9.
271 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 26 April 1995, XVII Amr 74/94, Wokanda 1996, No. 5.
272 For detailed presentation of each directive see M. Król-Bogomilska, Kary pieniężne w prawie antymonopolowym, 
[Financial penalties in the antimonopoly law], Konieczny i Kruszewski, Warsaw 2001, p. 87–102.
273 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1995, XVII Amr 63/94, Wokanda 1996, No. 2.
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anticompetitive agreement. The leniency programme is open for participants of all kinds of 
anticompetitive agreements, irrespective of their horizontal or vertical nature. The powers 
of UOKiK and the rights of enterprises under the leniency programme are set forth in the 
antimonopoly act and the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 26 January 2009 concerning 
the mode of proceeding in cases of enterprises’ applications to the President of the Office 
of Competition and Consumer Protection for immunity from fines or their reduction274. 
Furthermore, the antimonopoly authority has issued Guidelines of the President of the 
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection on the Leniency Programme (the procedure 
of submitting and handling applications for immunity from or reduction of a fine ‛leniency 
applications’) which describe the course of actions under the leniency procedure.
Article 109 of the antimonopoly act sets several conditions that should be met jointly by the 
undertaking in order to benefit from the leniency programme. Those are as follows:
1. the applicant applies for the leniency as the first from the participants of the 
agreement, and:
a) provides the President of UOKiK with information concerning the existence 
of such a prohibited agreement, as may suffice for instituting antimonopoly 
proceedings, or
b) presents to the President of UOKiK, upon its own initiative, evidence sufficient 
to issue a decision referred to in Article 10 or 11 - provided that the President 
of UOKiK did not already have information or evidence sufficient for instituting 
antimonopoly proceedings or issuing a decision referred to in Article 10 or 11;
2. the applicant is fully co-operating with the President of UOKiK in the course of the 
proceedings, providing the President with any and all evidence at their disposal, 
or the ones they may have at their disposal, and promptly giving any information 
relating to the case, upon its own initiative or upon demand of the President of 
UOKiK;
3. the applicant has ceased participating in the agreement not later than as of the 
day on which it notified the President of UOKiK, the existence of an agreement or 
presented evidence referred earlier;
4. the applicant was not the initiator of the agreement and did not induce other 
undertakings to participate in the agreement.
If the applicant fulfils all of above conditions, they may enjoy full immunity from fines. The 
antimonopoly act indicated also a situation when the applicant does not meet all conditions 
qualifying for full immunity. In such a case, they may enjoy reduction of fines. The exact 
amount of fine reduction depends on the number of conditions laid down in Article 109(1) 
of the antimonopoly act.
In the event that an undertaking participating in an agreement referred to in Article 6(1) or 
in Article 101 of the TFEU, appears not to be meeting all the above-mentioned requirements, 
then the antimonopoly authority may decrease the fine being imposed on that undertaking, 
should the undertaking have jointly fulfilled the following conditions:
1. the applicant has presented to the President of UOKiK, upon their own initiative, 
evidence which to an essential extent will contribute to issuing a decision referred 
to in Article 10 or 11;
2. the applicant has ceased participating in the agreement not later than as of the 
day on which it presented the evidence referred to in Article 109(1);
274 Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 26 January 2009 concerning the mode of proceeding in cases of enterprises 
applications to the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection for immunity from or reduction of 
fines, Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 20, item 109.
>> POLISH COMPETITION LAW – COMMENTARY, CASE LAW AND TEXTS
58
>>  Mateusz Błachucki
59
3. the applicant has fully cooperated with the antimonopoly authority during 
proceedings.
In such a case the President of UOKiK shall impose a fine:
1. being not in excess of 5% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding 
the year within which the fine is imposed – upon the undertaking which has first 
met the conditions referred to in Article 109(2). As explained in the leniency 
guidelines, the fine may be reduced up to 50% of the maximum fine;
2. being not in excess of 7% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding 
the year within which the fine is imposed – upon the undertaking proving to be the 
second to have met the conditions referred to in Article 109(2). As explained in 
the leniency guidelines, the fine may be reduced up to 30% of the maximum fine;
3. being not in excess of 8% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding 
the year within which the fine is imposed – upon other undertakings which have 
met the conditions referred to in Article 109(2). As explained in the leniency 
guidelines, the fine may be reduced up to 20% of the maximum fine.
As indicated earlier, the Council of Ministers adopted the regulation regarding the procedure 
to be followed in the event when undertakings have applied for the leniency programme. 
The regulation determines the method of accepting and considering undertakings’ requests 
for fine immunity and the obligation of the antimonopoly authority of informing the 
undertaking about the outcome of the leniency scrutiny. Leniency applications should be 
submitted personally at the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection in Warsaw, to an 
Office’s official for the record, by post, fax or e-mail275. In the two latter cases, the original 
application must be delivered to the Office within 3 days276.
The number of leniency applications is moderate and it has been changing over the last 
decade277. The exact numbers are as follows:
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of 
leniency 
applications
0 2 3 6 3 6 8 2 16
Before 2012, there was a relatively insignificant number of leniency applications. 
Nonetheless, they proved to be effective tools in detecting anticompetitive behavior of 
undertakings. Thanks to intensive advocacy initiatives and information campaigns of UOKiK, 
the leniency programme has gained significance and the year 2012 witnessed a record 
number of applications. 
Several decisions have been issued using the leniency applicant information. Recent decisions 
of the antimonopoly authority under the leniency programme include:
1. Cement cartel – the most important antitrust case settled with the information 
provided by leniency applicant was the cement cartel. The antimonopoly authority 
established that 7 companies were engaged in the market sharing and price fixing 
practices for over 11 years. Two of them decided to blow the whistle on the cartel. 
Another interesting issue is that the legal basis of the proceedings were both 
national and European law (Article 81 of the Treaty). On 28th December 2006, 
UOKiK instituted antimonopoly proceedings and examined alleged anticompetitive 
275 leniency@uokik.gov.pl .
276 Official helpline of the leniency programme (+48 22) 55 60 555. 
277 Data taken from the annual report on UOKiK’s activity. 
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agreement concluded by the producers of grey cement - Lafarge Cement, 
Górażdże Cement, Grupa Ożarów, Cemex, Dyckerhoff, Cementownia Warta and 
Cementownia Odra – the combined market share of which amounted to almost 100 
percent. As a result of the 3-year investigation, as well as the biggest dawn-raid in 
the history of UOKiK, robust evidence had been collected, which was subsequently 
completed by the information furnished by the undertakings involved in the 
agreement. On the basis of this evidence, the President of the Office concluded 
that at least from 1998 the undertakings were sharing the national market for grey 
cement, when agreeing on freezing the market shares of each company, as well 
as fixing minimum prices of the cement, by inter alia fixing the minimum prices, 
the timetables, the amounts and the order of applying the increases in prices. To 
this end, during numerous multilateral and bilateral meetings the producers were 
exchanging confidential commercial information, inter alia on the sales volumes. 
The investigation revealed, that the cartelists did realize that the practices 
they were engaged in were illegal. They selected a limited number of persons 
directly taking part in the information exchange, as well as a coordinator of the 
information exchange (an employee of one of the producers). The coordinator 
was responsible for passing on the data to the cement producers and contacting 
selected employees of the cement mills via a pre-paid telephone. Two leniency 
applications were filed in the case, the President of UOKiK refrained from imposing 
a fine on Lafarge Cement and reduced by 50% a fine imposed on Górażdże Cement. 
The remaining cartelists – Grupa Ożarów, Cemex, Dyckerhoff, Cementownia Warta 
and Cementownia Odra – were fined with the maximum penalties possible, totaling 
to PLN 411 586 477 (around EUR 100 million). This is the highest fine ever imposed 
in the 20-year history of UOKiK278;
2. IMS Sofa, furniture manufacturer, was fixing with its distributors prices for the 
company’s selected products for nearly 9 years. The company obliged its trading 
partners to apply the minimum resale prices that it fixed. There was a possibility 
to decrease the price only by a discount not exceeding 3%. Moreover, the company 
controlled these distributors who wanted to use lower rates. This conduct meant 
that furniture prices by Sofa could not be lower than the imposed ones. The 
information indicating the prohibited agreement was collected during the inspection 
with search at the premises of IMS Sofa, and also directly from the company which 
applied for the leniency in the course of proceedings. Due to the fact the company 
was the agreement’s initiator, it could not expect a full immunity from fine, but it 
was possible to have the sanction decreased. The undertaking provided the Office 
with a lot of evidence, such as the actual lifespan of the collusive agreement, 
which was not previously known by the Office and contributed significantly to 
issuance of the decision. For this reason the President of UOKiK decided to reduce 
by half the fine imposed on the company. As a result, the sanction amounted to 
nearly PLN 330 thousand279;
3. Makton was the participant of the agreement concluded between the manufacturer 
of meat and cold meat products — JBB and its distributors. The agreement contained 
anticompetitive resale price maintenance clauses which obliged all distributors 
of JBB products to maintain minimum prices. The evidence provided by Makton 
enabled the issuance of the decision. The undertaking was not the initiator of the 
collusion, ceased participation in it, and therefore the antimonopoly authority 
refrained from imposing a fine on Makton280;
278 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK-7/2009 of 8 December 2009, nyr.
279 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RBG-19/2012 of 30 August 2012, nyr.
280 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK-12/2011 of 28 December 2011, nyr.
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4. Inco-Veritas was fixing minimum resale prices of its products for 10 years with 
distributors of household chemicals and garden fertilisers. During the proceedings, 
the company actively cooperated with the antimonopoly authority under the 
leniency programme, and therefore it obtained a significant reduction of the 
financial penalty. Finally, the fine amounted to over PLN 2 million281;
5. Euromark Polska and its distributors concluded an agreement and obliged all 
distributors of Euromark products to maintain minimum prices. The undertaking 
is producing sports and tourist clothes and equipment. Euromark was the initiator 
of a prohibited agreement with its business partners. The undertaking decided to 
cooperate with the Office by submitting the leniency application, therefore the 
penalty was reduced by half. Finally, it amounted to over PLN 42 thousand282,
A particularity of the Polish leniency programme is that the vast majority of the applications 
concern anticompetitive vertical agreements. This may be perceived as an unexpected 
phenomenon, since the programme was initially designed to counteract the hardcore 
restrictions on a horizontal level.
6.5. Structural sanctions in merger cases
Apart from financial sanctions the antimonopoly authority may impose structural sanctions 
for infringements of competition rules on merger control. The antimonopoly act does no 
longer provide for structural sanctions to be applicable in antitrust cases283. a structural 
sanction may be imposed if:
1. a merger decision was based on unreliable information for which undertakings 
participating in the concentration were responsible;
2. the party did not comply with remedies agreed;
3. concentration has not been notified to the President of UOKiK;
4. prohibition decision to proceed with a merger decision has not been respected.
The structural sanction may be applied only if the concentration has been already 
implemented and the restoration of market competition is otherwise impossible. The 
antimonopoly authority enjoys the administrative discretion in determining the mode of 
implementation and the type of the structural sanction to be executed. The antimonopoly 
act provides only for the most typical categories of structural sanctions, such as: 
1. separation of the merged undertaking under conditions defined in the decision;
2. disposal of the entirety or part of the undertaking’s assets;
3. disposal of stocks or shares ensuring the control over the undertaking or 
undertakings, or dissolution of the company over which the undertakings have 
joint control.
The list of structural sanctions is open and it is for the antimonopoly authority to decide on 
the case by case basis which sanction would be the most appropriate in the given case.
Application of the structural sanction has one important limit. Structural sanctions may 
be imposed only within 5 years from the day the concentration was implemented. This 
limitation aims at providing legal certainty for undertakings. It should be highlighted that 
281 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK-10/2011 of 28 November 2011, nyr.
282 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. RKT-22/2011 of 12 August 2011, nyr.
283 M. Błachucki, S. Jóźwiak Sankcje strukturalne w prawie antymonopolowym jako sankcje administracyjnoprawne, 
[Structural sanctions in the antimonopoly law as administrative law sanctions], [in:] Sankcje administracyjne, 
[Administrative law sanctions], R. Lewicka, M. Lewicki, M. Stahl (red.), Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2011, p. 451.
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the expiration of 5-year-time limit does not preclude the antimonopoly authority from 
imposing financial sanctions. 
The antimonopoly act secures the implementation of the structural sanctions. Article 99 of 
the antimonopoly act empowers the antimonopoly authority, in case of non-execution of the 
decision imposing structural sanction, to order a compulsory division of the undertaking. 
During the separation process, the antimonopoly authority takes over the competence of 
managerial bodies of undertaking participating in the division. Finally, the President of 
UOKiK may apply to the court for the annulment of the agreement or for adopting other 
legal measures aimed at restoring the status before the merger.
To this date, no structural sanction has been applied by the Polish antimonopoly authority 
under the present antimonopoly act.
Chapter 7. Antimonopoly proceedings  
 – course of actions
7.1. Introduction
Procedural provisions of the present antimonopoly act are well-developed in comparison to 
previous statutes and they constitute 2/3 of all provisions. Pursuant to the antimonopoly 
act - antimonopoly procedure can take a form of proceedings in the cases of anticompetitive 
practices and of merger control. Formal antimonopoly proceedings may be preceded by the 
explanatory proceedings. There are some differences in regulation of each proceedings, 
though not of a great importance. Therefore, the general antimonopoly procedure is 
discussed and the exceptions are presented whenever it is necessary. 
7.2. Decision making process - overview
Decision-making process is rather typical of the Polish public administration. All cases are 
dealt by one or two case handlers – the latter concerns complex cases. The case handler is 
responsible for preparing all documents during the proceedings including draft decisions. 
The parties may contact the case handler directly, and if necessary, the head of unit or the 
director of the department. Holding meetings with the parties is not integral part of the 
standard rules of conduct – the authority decides on the case by case basis whether such 
meetings are from its perspective useful for the proceedings. 
All documents prepared by the case handler are verified by the head of unit and ultimately 
approved and signed by the director of the department or regional office. When preparing 
a decision, the legal department and department of market analyses (economic unit) are 
consulted. All draft decisions must be checked and approved by the President of the Office. 
As stated earlier, all decisions are issued on behalf of the President of UOKiK. If the decision 
is appealed against by the party, the case handler prepares the documents for the court 
proceedings and stands before the court to defend the case. During the court process the 
case handler is assisted by the legal counsel from the legal department.
7.3. Explanatory proceedings
The antimonopoly act establishes two types of proceedings taking place before the 
antimonopoly authority: 
a. explanatory investigation; 
b. antimonopoly proceedings.
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Those proceedings are independent of each other, although the explanatory investigation 
may precede the antimonopoly proceedings. Both types of proceedings are instituted 
only ex officio (with the exception of merger cases, where the parties’ request to initiate 
proceedings is required), by way of an order of the antimonopoly authority. Explanatory 
investigation is instituted where the circumstances indicate a possibility that the provisions 
of the antimonopoly act have been infringed, as to matters regarding a given branch of 
economy, or as to matters regarding the protection of consumer interests, and in any other 
cases as provided for by the antimonopoly act. There are five potential goals of explanatory 
procedure:
a. initial determination whether an infringement of the provisions of the antimonopoly 
act has occurred, such as may justify the institution of antimonopoly proceedings, 
including whether the case is of an antimonopoly nature;
b. initial determination whether an infringement of the provisions of the antimonopoly 
act has occurred, such as may justify the institution of proceedings regarding the 
use of practices violating the collective interests of consumers;
c. conducting market inquiry, including the determination of the structure and 
degree of concentration thereof;
d. initial determination whether an obligation exists to notify an intended merger;
e. determination whether an instance of the violation has occurred, of any consumer 
interest being protected by the law, such as may justify the undertaking of actions.
In practice explanatory proceedings are instituted to initially verify signals and notifications 
or information gathered by the antimonopoly authority about possible infringements of the 
antimonopoly act and to conduct sector inquires.
Regulation of the explanatory investigation is very limited (governed by only two articles). 
However, due to the ancillary character of this procedure, there is no need for more 
comprehensive regulation. The specific feature of the explanatory procedure is that there 
are no parties to these proceedings. Therefore no one except the authority has access to the 
files of the explanatory proceedings284 nor anybody has the right to question the outcome of 
these proceedings.
The explanatory proceedings should be concluded within 30 days in standard and within 
60 days in complex cases. Finding of the explanatory proceedings may give grounds for 
institution of the antimonopoly proceedings. It is important to remember that the result 
of explanatory proceedings is not conclusive and nobody’s rights nor obligations may be 
affected with the result of this procedure. 
7.4. Party to the proceedings
Only an undertaking may be a party to antimonopoly proceedings285. The antimonopoly act 
introduces two definitions of a party depending on the type of antimonopoly proceedings. 
Article 88 stipulates that in cases of anticompetitive practices the party to the proceedings 
is any person against whom the proceedings concerning the application of provisions 
prohibiting anticompetitive practices are instituted. The proceedings in those cases may be 
instituted only ex officio. Until 2007, there was a legal possibility to institute antimonopoly 
proceedings upon the motion of undertaking who suffered from the infringement of the 
antimonopoly act, but it was eliminated with the adoption of the present antimonopoly act. 
284 G. Materna, Ograniczenie prawa wglądu do materiału dowodowego w postępowaniach przed Prezesem UOKiK, 
[Limitation of the right to access the files during the antimonopoly proceedings before the President of UOKiK], 
Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2008, No. 4, p. 28.
285 The notion of ‘undertaking’ was analyzed in chapter 2.
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Regulation of the legal status of a party in cases of merger control is much more detailed. 
Article 94 of the antimonopoly act determines that every person who notifies the intention 
of concentration shall be a party to the proceedings. There is an enumerative list of persons 
who are both entitled and obliged to notify the intention of concentration:
a. merging undertakings jointly;
b. undertaking taking over the control;
c. jointly all undertakings participating in creation of a joint venture;
d. undertaking acquiring part of another undertaking’s property.
It is also noticeable that the legal concept of a party in concentration cases is more narrow in 
its scope than a concept of participant in such cases286. Contrary to the European competition 
law, in Polish antimonopoly proceedings, only the active party to the transaction is the 
party to the proceedings. Furthermore, neither competitors nor contractors or consumers 
are parties to the merger proceedings287. As a consequence, none of those entities has the 
right to access the case files or to challenge the merger decision.
7.5. Public interest intervenients
Polish administrative law provides for extensive possibilities for public interest interventions 
during the administrative proceedings. Such public interest intervenients are called persons 
vested with the rights of the party. Their legal position is very similar to the position of 
the party to the proceedings, although their rights are limited. This regulation applies 
to the antimonopoly proceedings, as well. There are three categories of public interest 
intervenients: Public Prosecutor, Ombudsman and social organization.
Administrative procedural code stipulates in Article 182 that the prosecutor is vested with 
the right to demand from the competent public administration authority the initiation of 
proceedings in order to eliminate the situation that is contrary to binding law. This provision 
applies to the antimonopoly proceedings. a prosecutor is not a party to the proceedings, but 
it is vested with all rights of a party. The Ombudsman holds a similar position. The difference 
is that the Ombudsman is entitled to execute his rights, in administrative proceedings, only 
if civil rights or liberties have been infringed288. 
A Prosecutor and the Ombudsman do not have a legal status of a party in administrative 
proceedings. They are characterized as persons vested with rights of a party. Their legal 
classification is very similar, though not identical, to a status of a party. The basic difference 
is that the said persons do not have individual legal interest in the proceedings but they 
act on behalf of public interest289. They are granted with the rights of a party but those 
are only procedural rights. Therefore such persons cannot e.g. conclude an administrative 
settlement290 or apply for commitment decision. 
There is one more entity vested with rights of a party – social organization. The social 
organization may demand initiation of proceedings or admittance to the pending proceedings 
if it is justified by the mission as specified in the organizational charter of the organization 
and by the social interest. Such demand of institution of proceedings may concern only the 
286 E. Modzelewska-Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, [Act on competition and 
consumer protection. Commentary], Twigger, Warsaw 2002, p. 309.
287 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 March 1991, XVII Amr 5/91, Wokanda 1992, No. 4, item 37.
288 Art. 14 of the Act of 15 July 1987 on the Commissioner of Civil Rights Protection, Journal of laws of 2001, No.14, 
item 147, with further amendments.
289 B. Adamiak, J. Borkowski, Polskie postępowanie administracyjne i sądowoadministracyjne, [Polish administrative 
procedure and administrative litigation], Wydawnictwa Prawnicze PWN, Warsaw 1997, p. 106.
290 W. Dawidowicz, Zarys procesu administracyjnego, [The outline of the administrative proceedings], PWN, Warsaw 
1989, p. 34.
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proceedings that may be initiated exclusively on ex officio291 basis. It is highly controversial 
whether social organizations are legitimated to initiate the proceedings where there is an 
enumerative list of authorized persons. It would be contrary to the prime objective of the 
antimonopoly act which is to limit the number of participants in the proceedings, and to 
protect the business secrecy in the proceedings292. The social organization may take part in 
the proceedings in another procedural role – it may present the opinion on the case. Such 
activity of social organization does not equalize its participation in proceedings as a person 
vested with rights of a party293.
In practice, public interest interventions are very rare. Under the present antimonopoly act 
there has never been a case where social organization was admitted to the proceedings, 
nor did Ombudsman intervene in any case. There was only one intervention of the Public 
Prosecutor who challenged one decision taken in an anticompetitive agreement case294. 
7.6. Initiation of the antimonopoly proceedings
The antimonopoly act stipulates that all antimonopoly proceedings may be initiated ex 
officio or upon a motion. General rule may be drawn, that proceedings aiming at sanctioning 
of infringements of the antimonopoly act are instituted ex officio and proceedings where 
the party applies for the authorization of the transaction may be instituted upon the motion. 
The first group concerns the antimonopoly proceedings in cases of anticompetitive practices 
or other infringement proceedings. As it was mentioned earlier until 2007, there was a legal 
possibility to institute antimonopoly proceedings upon the motion of undertaking who 
suffered from the infringement of the antimonopoly act but it was eliminated with the 
adoption of the present antimonopoly act. Merger proceedings may be instituted exclusively 
upon a motion of the undertaking. If the merger is implemented and the undertaking 
notifies the antimonopoly authority of such a merger, the notification is returned and the 
antimonopoly authority initiates proceedings to levy a fine for failure to notify the merger.
Even though no person may effectively demand to initiate antimonopoly proceedings in 
anticompetitive cases, the antimonopoly act provides for possibility of formally informing 
the antimonopoly authority of possible infringement of the competition rules. Article 86 
of the antimonopoly act stipulates that any person may submit to the President of UOKiK 
a written notification concerning a suspicion that anticompetitive practices have been 
applied. Such notification may include in particular:
1. indication of the undertaking which is accused of applying anticompetitive 
practices;
2. description of the facts being the basis of the notification;
3. indication of the provision of the antimonopoly act or the TFEU that is to be 
infringed;
4. making the infringement of the provisions of the TFEU plausible;
5. identification data of the notification submitter.
Furthermore, a person submitting notification may attach any evidence essential in assessing 
the facts indicated in the notification. The antimonopoly authority is obliged to verify the 
notification and inform the person submitting notification on the result of this verification. 
291 B. Adamiak, J. Borkowski, Polskie postępowanie …, op. cit, 108.
292 This tendency to limit the number of participants in the proceedings before the antimonopoly authority was 
criticized by J. Olszewski, Nowa ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów cz. I, [New act on competition and 
consumer protection. Part I], Monitor Prawniczy 2001, No. 14, p. 725.
293 The order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 7 December 1983, II SA 1605/83, Orzecznictwo Naczelnego Sądu 
Administracyjnego 1983, No. 2, item 104.
294 Decision of the President of UOKiK No. DOK-97/2007 of 12 December 2007, nyr. 
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The verification process should not take more than 2 months in complicated cases or 30 days 
in simple ones. Information provided by the antimonopoly authority does not constitute an 
administrative decision and it cannot be challenged by the person submitting notification295.
The antimonopoly act provides prescription periods for the possibility of instituting the 
proceedings in cases of practices restricting competition. The proceedings in those matters 
are not to be initiated where since the end of the year in which they have been abandoned 
one year has elapsed (Article 93 of the antimonopoly act). This time limit is perceived 
as an extremely short296. It is important to remember that the time limit concerns only 
the institution of proceedings and it does not preclude the President of the Office from 
adjudication if proceedings have been initiated before the limit elapsed. The time limit in 
other cases is 5 years since the end of the year when:
a. infringement of the provisions of the antimonopoly act took place;
b. decision about imposition of fine became legally binding (Article 76 of the 
antimonopoly act).
Merger proceedings are instituted upon the merger notification of the undertaking. Detailed 
conditions of the notification of intention of concentration are ascertained by the Regulation 
of the Council of Ministers297. The notification form is uniform – there is neither short nor 
complete version298. It is the result of the fact that Polish merger proceedings are uniformed 
and one-staged and there are no simplified or second phase procedures. One notification 
form applies to all types of concentrations. The merger notification is subject to a fee 
amounting to PLN 5,000299.
7.7.  Statutory duration of antimonopoly 
proceedings
Determining the time limits to finalize the proceedings depends on the type of proceedings 
in question. The antimonopoly act sets 5-month time limit for antitrust proceedings and 
2-month time limit for merger proceedings. The difference is consequence of the fact 
that antimonopoly cases are usually complex and that regular time limits proved to be 
inadequate. There is, however, more substantial difference between those time limits. 
Time limits prescribed in the antimonopoly act or administrative procedural code are set 
using regular days, not working days as it is in Regulation 1/2004 or in many national 
competition laws.
The time limit in the antitrust proceedings has an instructive character only. It means that 
the lapse of time limit does not deprive the antimonopoly authority of a competence to 
adjudicate the case and all actions undertaken later are legally binding300. Non-observance 
of time limit creates an obligation of the antimonopoly authority to notify a party of any case 
not being settled within the appropriate time limit. Such notification must state the reasons 
for not respecting the time limit and it must indicate a new time limit for settling the case. 
The antimonopoly authority is subject to identical obligation if the time limit is not observed 
295 The order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 12 July 2011, II GSK 1035/11, nyr
296 T. Skoczny, Konsekwencje przyszłego systemu stosowania art. 81 i 82 TWE dla prawa i orzecznictwa w zakresie 
ochrony konkurencji w Polsce (cz. II), [Consequences of the development of application of Articles 81 and 82 of TEC for 
the competition law and jurisprudence in Poland (Part II)], Prawo Unii Europejskiej 2001, No. 9-10, p. 4.
297 Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 July 2007 concerning the notification of the intention of concentration 
of undertakings, Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 134, item 936 and 937.
298 Detailed presentation analysis of the notification form, see Guidelines on the criteria and procedure of notifying 
the intention of concentration to the President of UOKiK, p. 3.4.
299 Around EUR 1,250.
300 The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 February 1987, IV SA 915/86, Orzecznictwo Naczelnego 
Sądu Administracyjnego 1987, No. 1, item 19.
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for reasons independent of such authority. There aren’t any provisions regulating this new 
time limit. Therefore the antimonopoly authority has a discretionary power to indicate the 
said limit. 
In merger proceedings, the time limits are of substantive character and if they lapse it 
creates a legal obstacle for the antimonopoly authority to adjudicate the case301. If a merger 
decision is not issued within the prescribed statutory time limit, it is presumed that the 
antimonopoly authority issued a positive merger decision. Although merger proceedings 
should be concluded within 2 months, in practice they may last longer, in particular in more 
complex cases. This is due to “stop the clock” provisions applicable in merger proceedings. 
The clock stops whenever the antimonopoly authority asks the party for additional information 
and supplementation of the notification form. In practice, simple merger cases are handled 
within 2 months and most complicated ones within 6–9 months302.
7.8. Evidence proceedings
7.8.1. Means of evidence
The antimonopoly procedure is a dedicated administrative procedure. Distinctiveness of 
these proceedings is particularly visible in relation to the rules on evidence. Pursuant to 
Article 84 to the matters concerning the evidence Articles 227-315 of the Civil procedural 
code apply to the matters concerning the evidence proceedings. The present antimonopoly 
act provides for a very formal model of evidence proceedings. It is necessary since the 
President of the Office is vested with far-reaching investigatory competences, even of police 
nature. Therefore to the matters on search and inspection, the provisions of the Penal 
procedural code apply accordingly.
There are several types of evidence usually produced in the antimonopoly proceedings:
a. documents;
b. testimony of witnesses;
c. opinions of experts or a scientific or scientific-research institutes;
d. interrogation of the parties;
e. other evidence.
The first three types of means of evidence are, to some extent, regulated by the antimonopoly 
act. To the rest relevant provisions of civil procedural code apply. The antimonopoly act 
introduced very strict rules in relation to documents. Only the documentary evidence, it 
may serve only the original document or its copy certified by a public administration body, 
notary, attorney at law, legal adviser or an authorised employee of the undertaking may 
serve as an evidence. Such formalism is contrary to the general principle of a discovery of 
objective truth and it miscomprehends that, in practice, it is very difficult to discover e.g. 
original or cartel agreements303. 
The next type of evidence is the testimonies of a witness. The party adducing witness 
evidence is obligated to precisely indicate facts subject to confirmation by the testimony of 
individual witnesses. This type of evidence is not common and it is produced only during the 
antirust proceedings.
301 The resolution of the Supreme Court of 26 November 1993, III CZP 63/93, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba 
Cywilna 1994, No. 4, item 13. See also the comment of T. Woś to this resolution, Państwo i Prawo 1995, No. 1.
302 In 2012, the average duration of merger proceedings was 58.3 days 
303 R. Janusz, M. Sachajko, T. Skoczny, Nowa ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, [New act on competition 
and consumer protection], Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 2001, No. 3, p. 204.
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The expert is a person having special information that is necessary for proper interpretation 
of facts. This is a basic difference between the institution of expert and witness. The former 
reports the facts, the later provides their interpretation. The subject of the opinion can only 
be facts, it can never be the law304. The opinion of an expert should contain its justification. 
The experts may submit their joint opinion. Apart from natural persons, a scientific or 
scientific-research institute may issue an opinion. 
Since the list of evidence is not exhaustive, the civil procedural code creates a wide 
margin of appreciation, for the antimonopoly authority, in relation to producing other 
types of evidence e.g. tapes, video tapes, drawings, plans or billings etc. The earlier 
evidence is primary evidence. The interrogation of the parties is an auxiliary evidence305. 
The antimonopoly authority uses it if there is no other evidence available or the available 
evidence is insufficient and there are still some important elements to indentify which are 
necessary to decide the case. If a party is a legal person – the persons working in the body 
entitled to represent the legal person are interrogated. 
7.8.2. Collecting evidence
There are three methods of collecting evidence:
a. request to provide all necessary information (Article 50 of the antimonopoly act);
b. inspection of each undertaking or association thereof (Article 105a of the 
antimonopoly act);
c. search of the premises or things (Article 105c of the antimonopoly act).
The basic method of collecting evidence is the request to provide all necessary information. 
The undertaking or the association thereof is obliged to follow the request. Such request 
indicates the scope of requested information and the relevant time period, the object of 
the request, time limit for providing information and the instruction about sanctions for 
non–compliance with the request. The scope of the request cannot be complained by the 
undertaking306. Such complaint may be contained within the appeal to the antimonopoly 
court. However, the antimonopoly authority cannot demand information unnecessary for the 
adjudication of the case307. Moreover, the antimonopoly authority cannot demand from the 
undertaking to perform special analyses or studies which are not required by the law, since 
such materials are to be done by the authority308. The undertaking has a duty to provide 
requested information. They may refuse by invoking provisions on the right of a party to 
refuse to make statements. Similarly, other public administration bodies are obliged to 
cooperate. They are under obligation to render accessible to UOKiK the files being in their 
possession as well as information relevant to the pending antimonopoly proceedings.
The second method of collecting evidence is an inspection of an undertaking or an association 
thereof. The inspector has several rights e.g. to enter the premises, buildings, to request 
to render accessible files, books and all kinds of documents or to request, to provide oral 
explanations relevant for the subject of inspection. The inspection has always a limited 
character - it concerns only selected activities of the undertaking. Finally, the antimonopoly 
authority may decide to search the premises or possessions of the undertaking or the 
association thereof. It is an extraordinary measure and therefore only the Antimonopoly 
Court may issue an order on conducting a search. The antimonopoly authority files a relevant 
304 J. Jodłowski, Z. Resich, J. Lapierre, T. Misiuk-Jodłowska, Postępowanie cywilne, [Civil procedure], LexisNexis, 
Warsaw 2005, p. 379–380.
305 Ibidem, p. 382.
306 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 16 December 1998, XVII Ama 62/98, Wokanda 2000, No. 4.
307 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 November 1992, XVII Amr 24/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 5.
308 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 September 1993, XVII Amr 22/93, Wokanda 1994, No. 2.
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motion to the court and the court has 48 hours to decide upon this motion. Moreover, in 
the course of the search the inspectors may be assisted by officials of other state control 
bodies or the Police. The inspected party is obliged to cooperate. They may refuse to provide 
information only in the event it would expose their undertakings or spouses, ascendants, 
descendants, siblings and related in the same line or degree as well as persons being with 
this party in the relation of adoption, custody or guardianship, to a penal liability.
7.8.3. Burden and quality of proof
The antimonopoly act does not regulate the problem of burden of proof comprehensively. 
There are some legal presumptions (such as presumption of market dominance when the 
market share of the undertaking equals or exceeds 40%) introduced by the antimonopoly 
act, but the act lacks general rules regulating this subject. The Antimonopoly Court states 
that before levying an antimonopoly fine, the undertaking must be proven guilty of infringing 
the antimonopoly act. The undertaking is not obliged to prove otherwise and it may remain 
silent throughout the whole process309. According to the Antimonopoly Court, the burden of 
proof rests upon the party initiating the antimonopoly proceedings i.e. UOKiK. Therefore, 
the antimonopoly authority may not shift the burden of proof upon the party and demand 
from it to present exculpatory evidence310. Even though the party is not obliged to actively 
participate in the antimonopoly proceedings, it is in its own best interest. The party may 
submit evidence or demand production of one by the antimonopoly authority. Furthermore, 
inactivity of the party will expose it to the risk that the authority will rely only on selected 
incriminatory evidence311. Administrative courts point that the authority conducting 
administrative investigation is not obliged to search for exculpatory evidence, especially 
when the party is passive and does not cooperate during the proceedings312. 
Particularity of antimonopoly proceedings is that the antimonopoly authority often does not 
have access to direct evidence. It is not disputable though, that in the event of lack of direct 
evidence, the conclusion of anticompetitive agreement may be proved with the application of 
indirect evidence by relying on economic evidence and factual presumptions313. When relying 
on factual presumption and economic evidence, it is necessary not only to demonstrate the 
resemblance of the parallel behavior of alleged participants of anticompetitive agreement, 
but the antimonopoly authority must show that there is no other rational economic 
explanation of such behavior314. Furthermore, when producing such evidence, it is necessary 
to show and analyze all relevant market circumstances to establish whether market behavior 
of the undertaking concerned was economically rational or resulted from the prior illegal 
cooperation315. 
7.9. Access to files
Right of the party to access the files is a fundament right in the antimonopoly proceedings. 
The antimonopoly proceedings are of inquisitorial character and public hearing takes place 
very rarely. Without access to files the party would not be able to present and defend 
their position and would be deprived of effective grounds for challenging the action of the 
authority. Therefore, it is so important to guarantee the access of the party to case files. If 
309 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 December 1994, XVII Amr 47/94, nyr.
310 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 September 1992, XVII Amr 15/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 2.
310 The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 20 May 1998, I SA/Ka 1605/96, nyr
312 The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 10 July 1996, SA/Ka 1171/95, nyr.
313 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 December 1996, XVII Ama 62/96, nyr.
314 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1993, XVII Amr 37/93, Orzecznictwo Gospodarcze 1993, 
No. 3, item 63. 
315 The judgment of the Supreme Court of 6 March 1997, I CKN 44/97, OSNCP 1997, No. 6-7, item 91.
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the authority fails to secure this right of the party, it is treated as a grave violation of the 
procedural rules and it may lead to invalidity of the proceedings316.
There is no legal definition of the case files. In practice, case files are understood as any 
materials showing the course of actions during the antimonopoly proceedings. They cover 
all evidence produced, as well as any other material that was collected during those 
proceedings317. The case files are the basis for establishing the relevant facts of the case. 
The right to access the files is laid down in Articles 72 and 73 of the administrative procedural 
code. It includes:
1. Right to examine the files – the antimonopoly authority is obliged to provide 
conditions under which the party may examine the files. Such examination may 
take place only in the building of the authority with the case handler present 
during the examination318.
2. Right to make notes and copies of the files – this right is interpreted broadly. Under 
this right, the party may reproduce the information contained in the files with 
any technical measure available. The only limit is that the reproduction may not 
interfere with physical condition of the material reproduced.
3. Right to certify notes and copies of the files – the party may ask the antimonopoly 
authority to certify the copies. Such certification proves that the reproduction is 
the true copy of the original contained in files. The certification applies exclusively 
to documentation contained in the files. The undertaking may not demand from 
the authority to certify copies of documents remaining in their possession. 
The right to access the files fully applies to the party and public interest intervenients. In 
practice, it is only the party who exercises this right. Sometimes, files may be presented 
to the expert in order to allow them to issue opinions. The above list of rights and persons 
entitled to access the files is exhaustive and no statutes provide for any additional rights of 
the parties with regard to access the files. However, there is a possibility to gain access to 
some information contained in case files under the Act of 6 September 2001 on the access 
to public information319. However, it should be stressed that the mentioned act does not 
provide access to all files but only to those materials that contain public information320.
The party may access the files at any time during the antimonopoly proceedings or at any time 
after the conclusion of the proceedings. The only condition regards the prior consultation 
with the case handler on technical conditions for presenting the files to the party. Should 
the files be transferred to the court – it is the court who is obliged to provide access to them 
to the party.
316 G. Rząsa, Nieważność postępowania sądowoadministracyjnego jako podstawa skargi kasacyjnej, [Invalidity of 
administrative court proceedings as a basis for the cassatory appeal], C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2011, p. 310.
317 M. Błachucki, Dostęp do akt sprawy administracyjnej na podstawie Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego 
a dostęp do informacji publicznej znajdującej się w aktach sprawy administracyjnej, [Acccess to files on the basis of 
the Administrative Procedural Code and the access to public information contained in the administrative files], [in:] 
Dostęp do informacji publicznej w Polsce i w Europie – wybrane zagadnienia prawne, [Access to public information in 
Poland and Europe – selected legal issues], E. Pierzchała, M. Woźniak (eds), Uniwersytet Opolski, Opole 2010, p. 139.
318 Z. Janowicz, Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego. Komentarz, [Administrative Procedural Code. Commentary], 
Wydawnictwo Prawnicze PWN, Warsaw 1995, p. 185.
319 Journal of Laws of 2001 No. 112, item 1198 with further amendments.
320 M. Błachucki, Dostęp do akt sprawy administracyjnej na podstawie Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego 
a dostęp do informacji publicznej znajdującej się w aktach sprawy administracyjnej, [Acccess to files on the basis of 
the Administrative Procedural Code and the access to public information contained in the administrative files], [in:] 
Dostęp do informacji publicznej w Polsce i w Europie – wybrane zagadnienia prawne, [Access to public information in 
Poland and Europe – selected legal issues], E. Pierzchała, M. Woźniak (eds), Uniwersytet Opolski, Opole 2010, p. 135.
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Special rules on the access to files regard documents received from the leniency applicants. 
Those documents are not accessible until the conclusion of the evidence proceedings. When 
all evidence is produced, parties may gain access to leniency documents under general rules. 
Nevertheless, leniency applicants may waive the right for protection and make all documents 
available to other undertakings. After conclusion of the antimonopoly proceedings, leniency 
documents my still be protected against any access of the third parties due to business 
secrets contained. The proposed amendment of the antimonopoly act provides for additional 
protection of the leniency documents, what may be regarded as a response to recent 
European court judgment in Pfleiderer case (C-360/09). 
7.10. Transparency of the antimonopoly 
proceedings
Access to files is important but this is only one of the means designed to guarantee the 
transparency of the antimonopoly proceedings. The other important means regard 
information flow between the antimonopoly authority and the party to the proceedings. It is 
especially important in two situations. First, when communicating the party which particular 
behavior of the undertaking gave grounds to institute antitrust proceedings. Second, when 
informing about the competition concerns identified during the merger investigation. On both 
occasions proper and accurate information should enable the party to explain the position 
and produce relevant evidence. It is noteworthy, that Polish antimonopoly act differs in this 
respect from the European regulations.
First of all, there is no formal Statement of Objections (the so-called “SO”) issued by the 
antimonopoly authority when instituting the proceedings. However, it does not mean that 
the party is not informed what behavior triggered formal actions of the antimonopoly 
authority. The order issued to initiate the antimonopoly proceedings plays the role similar 
to SO. This order contains indication of the legal basis of the proceedings together with 
description of the alleged anticompetitive behavior of the undertaking being the subject of 
the proceedings. In comparison to SO, it is shorter and more synthetic, but it usually serves 
the same purpose. 
As regards merger proceedings, the situation is more complex. Under the present 
antimonopoly act, there is no obligation to inform the party about the competition concerns 
identified. In practice, the party is informed about the competition problems when the 
antimonopoly authority proposes remedies. This situation is not comfortable neither to the 
antimonopoly authority nor to the parties. Therefore, the draft of the amendment of the 
antimonopoly act provides for the introduction of the obligation to inform the party about 
the identified market problems. Such information will be presented to the party whenever 
the antimonopoly authority decides to open a thorough investigation and initiate the second 
phase of the merger proceedings. 
Apart from this, the antimonopoly authority may organize informal meetings to discuss the 
status of the case with the party. The party itself may also ask for such an informal meeting. 
Such exchange of information and views on the case may speed up the process and allow for 
better understanding of the case. In principle, such informal meetings are organized when it 
is necessary to clarify issues that occurred during the antimonopoly proceedings.
Last but not least, the party is informed who is the case handler and may contact them at 
any time. It should be stressed that only informal contacts are possible via e-mail or phone. 
Any formal communication between the antimonopoly authority and the party and vice versa 
may only take place in writing.
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7.11. Protection of business secrets
During the antimonopoly proceedings business secrets are protected. The antimonopoly act 
relies on the existing definition of “business secret” as regulated in Article 11(4) of the Act on 
counteracting unfair competition. Business secret means the trade secret within the meaning 
of technical, technological, organizational information or other information of the economic 
value, undisclosed to the public, towards which the undertaking has taken necessary measures 
in order to keep their confidentiality. In practice of the antimonopoly authority, the following 
information is usually regarded as business secrets: market shares, data showing the volume 
of production and sales as well as sources of supply and sale, tax declarations, data contained 
in financial statements, information on discounts and pricing formulas.
The restriction of access to files may be different in relation to different entities. For 
example, such restriction may take place between the parties to the proceedings or even 
between the party to the proceedings and their mother company. 
Determination of the fact whether the document contains business secret depends on 
cooperation between the antimonopoly authority and the undertaking. Access to business 
secrets may be restricted upon the motion of the undertaking and ex officio. Restriction 
of access to the files takes place in a form of an order which may be appealed against. 
Undertaking should always indicate whether information provided to the antimonopoly 
authority contains bussiness secret. The effective motion of the undertaking to restrict 
access to business secrets requires the interested party to provide:
1. justification that information fulfills the definition of the business secret;
2. non-confidential version of the document which does not contain any protected 
information.
The motion of the undertaking is evaluated by the antimonopoly authority.
The President of UOKiK may also restrict the access to business secrets on the ex officio basis. 
It happens when the undertaking fails to submit a motion and the evaluation of documents 
leads to the conclusion that they contained business secrets. Moreover, the employees of the 
antimonopoly authority are under obligation to protect business secrecy and other secrets 
which they acquired during the proceedings (Article 71 of the antimonopoly act).
The information acquired in the course of the proceedings cannot be used for other 
proceedings conducted on the basis of separate provisions, excluding the following:
1. other proceedings conducted by the President of the Office;
2. the exchange of information with the European Commission and competition 
protection authorities of the European Union Member States pursuant to Regulation 
No. 1/2003/EC;
3. the exchange of information with the European Commission and competent 
authorities of the European Union Member States pursuant to Regulation No. 
2006/2004/EC;
4. providing competent authorities with information which may indicate the 
infringement of separate provisions.
7.12. Costs of antimonopoly proceedings
The costs of proceedings are the expenses of the antimonopoly authority and other participants 
of the proceedings borne by them in connection with the said proceedings. The general rule 
is that the payment of the costs depends on the result of the case. The undertaking who is 
found liable for the infringement of the antimonopoly act is obliged to bear the costs of the 
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proceedings. There are few exemptions from the above rules. In particularly justified cases, 
the antimonopoly authority may impose upon the losing party the obligation to reimburse 
only a part of the expenses or desist from charging the costs. Regardless of the result of 
proceedings, the President of the Office may impose upon a party the obligation to reimburse 
expenses due to its unreliable or clearly unfair behaviour. This will take place in relation 
to particular costs resulting from avoidance to give explanation or submitting untruthful 
explanation, concealment or delayed presentation of the evidence. Furthermore, in merger 
cases undertakings are obliged to bear the cost of issued expert opinions.
The antimonopoly authority decides upon the costs by way of order, which may be included 
in the decision terminating the proceedings. This order may not be appealed. 
7.13. Legal remedies and change of final decisions
The antimonopoly act guarantees that the party may challenge all decisions issued by 
the antimonopoly authority. An appeal is the basic legal remedy available to the party 
to challenge non-final decisions of the antimonopoly authority. Similarly, an order of the 
antimonopoly authority may be challenged with an objection by the party. However, the 
objection is available only when the antimonopoly act or the administrative procedural code 
provides so. In practice, most of orders may be objected. The appeal procedure is the same 
with relation to appeals and objections and takes place before the court and it is described 
in the next chapter.
When discussing legal remedies, the problem of changing final decisions of the antimonopoly 
authority may arise. Decisions of the antimonopoly authority are final when the time limit 
for appeal lapsed or the court upheld the decision321. One of the most important principles 
of administrative procedure is stability of administrative decisions. The administrative 
procedural code provides for guarantee that final decisions may not be changed except for 
extraordinary situations. Such extraordinary occasions are regulated in Articles 145–156 of the 
code. Those situations include possibility of resumption of proceedings, revocation, change 
or assessment of invalidity of final decisions issued by the public authority. The analyzed 
principle is even strengthened in relation to decisions of the antimonopoly authority. 
First, final decisions of the antimonopoly authority may not be changed by any other public 
authority except for the antimonopoly authority itself. Second, the party may not effectively 
demand from the antimonopoly authority to initiate proceedings regulated in Articles 145–
156 of the administrative procedural code in order to change the final decision. It is well 
established in the antimonopoly act (Article 82) and confirmed by the antimonopoly court322. 
The only exception is that party may demand to prolong validity of a merger decision. Such 
decisions are valid for two years but their validity may be extended by one year upon the 
motion of the party. The antimonopoly authority grants extension if the market conditions 
have not changed since the issuance of the decision.
Therefore, final decisions of the antimonopoly authority may be changed only ex officio 
exclusively by UOKiK. The grounds are provided in Articles 145–156 of the administrative 
procedural code and include possibility of resumption of antimonopoly proceedings, 
revocation, change or assessment of invalidity of final decisions issued by the antimonopoly 
authority. Change of final decision lies within discretion of the antimonopoly authority. If 
decision is changed it may be challenged by the party with an appeal. However, it should be 
noted that the antimonopoly authority hardly ever exercises this competence.
321 M. Szubiakowski, Pojęcie decyzji ostatecznej i charakter wniosku o ponowne rozpatrzenie sprawy, [The notion of 
final decision and the legal character of the motion to reconsider the case] [in:] Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego 
po zmianach w latach 2010-2011,[The administrative procedural code after amendments of 2010-2011], M. Błachucki, 
T. Górzyńska, G. Sibiga (eds.), NSA, Warsaw 2012, p. 94-97.
322 The judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 June 2001, XVII Ama 31/01, nyr.
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Chapter 8. Appeal proceedings  
 before the courts
8.1.  The course of actions before 
the antimonopoly court
There is no second administrative instance in the course of antimonopoly proceedings. 
Decisions and orders of the antimonopoly authority may be challenged before the court of 
competition and consumer protection. The party is obliged to respect time limits: 14 days 
to challenge the decision and 7 days to challenge the order. Non-observance of time limits 
will result in disregarding the appeal by the court. Time limits may not be extended either 
by the antimonopoly authority or by the court323. However, under certain circumstances they 
may be restored by the court324. The appeal may be based on the alleged defects in legal 
reasoning or in establishing on which the decision was made by the antimonopoly authority. 
The party may challenge the decision in whole or in part. Furthermore, the party may appeal 
against the operative part of the decision (the sentence of the decision) or just against the 
reasoning of the antimonopoly authority325. The reasoning may adversely affect reputation 
of the undertaking or may create an obstacle in conducting freely the business activity and 
the party may seek to challenge such opinion of the antimonopoly authority326. The appeal 
should respect all formal requirements set by the Civil procedural code for all party’s writing 
before the civil courts and the stamp fee should be paid, as well327.
Lodging an appeal (against the decision) or an objection (against the order) institutes 
proceedings before the antimonopoly court. Appeal and objection should not be lodged 
directly to court but through intermediary of the antimonopoly authority. Lodging the appeal 
directly to the court does not take any legal effect and the party may risk that time limit 
for lodging the appeal will elapse328. The proceedings before the antimonopoly court are 
governed by the Civil procedural code. Especially important are Articles 47928 - 47935. When 
the appeal is lodged to the antimonopoly authority, UOKiK should transmit it together with 
case files to the court without delay. However, the antimonopoly authority may find the 
appeal justified and change the decision on its own. In order to verify the grounds for appeal, 
the antimonopoly authority may conduct supplementary evidence proceedings. In case a new 
decision is issued, the party may challenge it, as well (Article 81 of the antimonopoly act). 
When handling and transmitting the appeal the antimonopoly authority may not disregard it 
or find inadmissible – it is the sole competence of the court.
Parties to the proceedings before the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection are 
the antimonopoly authority, a person being a party to the antimonopoly proceedings as 
well as a person lodging an appeal or an objection. Proceedings before the antimonopoly 
court are civil proceedings and follow civil law principles. Both parties are equally entitled 
to participate in the proceedings and lodge motions. It should be noted that the burden of 
proof lies on the claiming party. All evidence is produced upon the motion of the parties. The 
antimonopoly court does not conduct, by itself, evidence proceedings at this stage. Parties 
may produce new evidence – different from evidence produced during the proceedings 
before the antimonopoly authority. However, all evidence should be indicated in the appeal. 
323 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 4 April 2000, XVII Amo 5/99, nyr.
324 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 June 1997, XVII Ama 26/97, nyr.
325 The resolution of the Supreme Court of 7 April 1994, III CZP 35/94, Przegląd Sądowy 1998, No. 2, p. 111.
326 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 June 1994, XVII Amr 45/93, Wokanda 1995, No. 5.
327 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 September 1992, XVII Amr 25/92, Wokanda 1993, No. 2.
328 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 October 1997, XVII Ama 49/97, nyr.
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Subsequent evidence motions may not be admitted by the court. It is a discretionary power 
of the court to decide on the admissibility of such late motions. Civil procedural code allows 
admitting of all evidence that may be relevant to the case and are not contrary to law. The 
catalogue of evidence is open and there is no hierarchy of means of evidence. In practice, 
the court usually relies on evidence collected during the administrative proceedings. While 
surprising, antimonopoly court hardly ever calls for any expert opinions, e.g. on economics 
of the case. In most cases evidence proceedings before the antimonopoly court are limited 
to exchange of positions of parties in relation to the evidence already collected that served 
as the basis for the challenged decision.
Similarly to the antimonopoly proceedings, business secrecy is protected in the course 
of proceedings before the antimonopoly court. This issue is particularly important since 
proceedings before the court are generally open to the public. Parties may demand hearing 
in camera for fear of revealing their business secrets. The antimonopoly court may, by way 
of an order, disclose to the party to the proceedings the information that was protected in 
the proceedings before the antimonopoly authority as business secrecy of another party 
solely where:
1. circumstances giving grounds to issuance by the President of the Office of the 
resolution restricting the right to inquiry into evidence attached by the parties into 
the case files have changed significantly;
2. party whose business secrecy is protected has expressed its consent.
The court, upon request of the party or ex officio, may to the necessary extend restrict the 
remaining parties’ right to inquire into the evidence attached to the case files in the course 
of proceedings, where rendering this material accessible would threaten with a disclosure 
of the business secrecy. This restriction of the right to inquire into the evidence does not 
apply to the antimonopoly authority. The mentioned orders are not subject to complaint. 
The court of competition and consumer protection is obliged to assess the case to the merits 
to the same extent as the first instance authority. It has been confirmed that the court 
may not limit itself to a mere review of the challenged decision329. The appeal sets the 
limits of the adjudication of the court and the court is limited by the subject of appeal330. 
However, the appeal may not extend the subject of adjudication beyond matters settled in 
the challenged decision of the antimonopoly authority331. The antimonopoly court takes into 
consideration all changes of facts or law that was passed after the issuance of the challenged 
decision. Therefore the court is obliged to evaluate any new piece of evidence produced 
during court proceedings. After conducting proceedings, the antimonopoly court may reach 
three types of judgments:
1. disregard the appeal when it is inadmissible i.e. it was lodged after the lapse of 
the time limit or the appeal was lodged by the person who was not entitled to do 
so;
2. dismiss the appeal when it is not justified and the challenged decision was found 
to have been grounded;
3. quash the challenged decision and change it in its entirety or in part. In case 
where the court reaches different conclusions than the antimonopoly authority, 
it is obliged to rule on the merits and replace the challenged decision by the 
judgement. 
329 The judgment of the Court of Appeal of 21 June 2006, VI ACa 142/06, Journal of UOKiK of 2007, No. 1, item. 13.
330 The judgment of the Court of Appeal of 24 July 2008, VI ACa 12/08, Journal of UOKiK of 2008, No. 4, item. 41.
331 The order of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 January 2002, XVII Ama 11/01, nyr.
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When issuing the judgment, the court is obliged to rule ex officio whether the challenged 
decision was issued by the antimonopoly authority without any legal basis or with the 
manifest legal error. If the antimonopoly court finds such a defect of the challenged decision 
it serves as a ground for claiming compensation from the authority if any loss occurred as 
a result of this decision.
The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection provides the written reasoning of its 
judgments ex officio within 2 weeks from the day of the adjudication. The party receives 
a written copy of the judgment along with the reasoning, upon a motion that should be 
submitted within 1 week from the day when the judgment was announced. Judgments of the 
antimonopoly court are subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal. There is no specialized unit 
in this court to deal with the competition or regulatory matters. Furthermore, judgments 
of the Court of Appeal may be challenged before the Supreme Court with cassatory appeal. 
Cassatory appeal is an extraordinary remedy with strict and limited grounds. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court enjoys wide discretion when deciding on hearing the cassatory appeals.
The table below presents the statistics of civil court judgments in competition judgments 
delivered in 2011 and 2012332:
Court of 
Competition 
and Consumer 
Protection
Court of Appeal Supreme Court
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
total number of 
judgments issued in 
competition cases
58 60 30 29 3 2
vertical agreements 17 29 3 8 1 0
horizontal agreements 8 8 7 5 0 0
abuse of a dominant 
position
30 19 18 15 2 2
merger control 3 4 2 1 0 0
The majority of cases concern vertical agreements and abuse of dominance. On the other 
hand, merger cases are not common - hardly any reached the Supreme Court in 2011 and 
2012. 
When analyzing the substance of those judgments it turns out that in most cases courts 
uphold the decisions of the antimonopoly authority. Courts’ intervention ratio in competition 
cases in 2011 was as follows:
1. Overruling the decision of the President of UOKiK - 3
2. Changing the decision of the President of UOKiK - 11
3. Dismissing the appeal of an undertaking - 44
The situation has not changed substantially in the following year. Courts’ intervention ratio 
in competition cases in 2012 was as follows:
1. Overruling the decision of the President of UOKiK - 3
2. Changing the decision of the President of UOKiK - 10
3. Dismissing the appeal of an undertaking - 47
332 Data taken from the annual report of UOKiK’s activity. 
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The most important problem concerning proceedings before the antimonopoly court is their 
duration. Usually it takes about two years for the court to have the first hearing of the case. 
The proceedings before the Court of Appeal take usually 9-18 months. If the cassatory appeal 
is granted by the Supreme Court, it takes additional several months for the court to hear 
the case. Such a long waiting period adversely affects parties’ rights for an effective judicial 
protection. This problem is particularly serious in merger cases. Adjudicating on prohibition 
of merger by the antimonopoly court two years after the challenged decision was issued, 
is regarded by many as no real remedy for the party since in most merger transactions 
after such a long lapse of time the transaction will not be implemented for commercial 
reasons, even if the court eventually clears it. In the light of the above, it should be carefully 
considered how this issue could be properly addressed in the future in order to streamline 
the court review process, in particular in merger cases.
8.2. The course of actions before 
the administrative courts
In limited number of situations administrative courts may provide judicial protection for 
participants of antimonopoly proceedings. They are competent to hear complaints against 
the failure to act as well as extensive and long-lasting conduct of antimonopoly proceedings 
by the antimonopoly authority. By ‘extensive and long-lasting conduct of antimonopoly 
proceedings’ one understands a situation where the antimonopoly authority not only does 
not observe time limits for concluding the proceedings but also the actions undertaken 
seem to be illusionary and not demonstrating the real intention to efficiently close the case. 
Administrative court proceedings begin on the day when the complaint is lodged. Court 
proceedings are contradictory by nature and therefore two parties will be taking part in the 
process i.e. the complainant and the public authority whose act or activity is being contested. 
After conducting proceedings, the administrative court may oblige the authority to issue an 
act within specified time limit or to perform an action, or to declare or recognize the right 
or obligation resulting from provisions of law. When issuing a judgment, the administrative 
court is obliged to rule whether the failure to act or extensive and long-lasting conducting 
of antimonopoly proceedings constitutes a manifest legal error. If the court finds such error, 
it may serve as grounds for demanding compensation from the authority. The authority is 
bound by the final judgment of the administrative court. The judgment is final and valid if 
no appellate measure was lodged and the time limit for lodging such measure has elapsed.
In all such cases, complaints against action of the antimonopoly authority are heard by 
the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw. Judgments of this court may be appealed 
against to the Supreme Administrative Court. Administrative court proceedings are much 
more efficient in comparison to civil courts. It usually takes around 6 months to set the first 
hearing by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw and the next 12 months for the 
Supreme Administrative Court to adjudicate on cassatory appeal.
In 2012, administrative courts issued 4 judgments in cases related to the antimonopoly 
proceedings. One of them was delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court and three 
were issued by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw. Three of those judgments 
regarded access to files of the antimonopoly proceedings where the claims were based on 
the act on the access to public information333. One case regarded extensive and long-lasting 
conducting of antimonopoly proceedings by the antimonopoly authority. 
First case regarded the motion to access the notification form filed by the undertaking during 
a merger investigation. The antimonopoly authority denied such access to a third party 
333 Act of 6 September 2001 on the access to public information, Journal of Laws No. 112, item 1198 with further 
amendments.
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claiming that this was not a piece of public information since it had been produced by the 
private party, not by the public authority. The Voivodeship Administrative Court ruled against 
the decision of UOKiK claiming that files of the administrative case are covered by the notion 
of ‘public information’ irrespective of who produced particular documents being a part of 
the case files334. The antimonopoly authority appealed and the Supreme Administrative Court 
quashed the said judgment stating that the notification form is not a public document as 
a whole, even though it may contain pieces of public information. Therefore the Voivodeship 
Administrative Court should examine the notification form and decide which parts of the 
form could be accessible to third parties335. In 2011, there was a similar case but the third 
party asked for the contracts that were collected during the antimonopoly investigation in 
an antitrust case. In that case the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that any document 
collected during the administrative investigation and being part of case files is covered by 
the notion of ‘public information’336. The analysis of these judgments leads to the conclusion 
that administrative courts still do not have a standing line of case law in the discussed issue.
The other public information case regarded the motion of the third party to access the 
expert testimony being a part of case files. However, the antimonopoly authority denied the 
access pointing out that the case along with the files was at that time being adjudicated 
by the antimonopoly court. Therefore the authority did not have the information requested 
and the motion should have been directed to the court. The Voivodeship Administrative 
Court agreed with the antimonopoly authority and reminded the complainant that the public 
authority is obliged to give access to the public information that remains in its possession337.
The last case regarded the extensive and long-lasting conducting of antimonopoly proceedings 
by the antimonopoly authority. The Voivodeship Administrative Court ruled that conducting 
the antimonopoly investigation within the period exceeding 5 years violates the time limits 
foreseen in the antimonopoly act and in the administrative procedural act. Furthermore, 
handling the antimonopoly case by UOKiK for so long constitutes a manifest violation of 
procedural law338. The judgment is also important because it confirms the jurisdiction of 
administrative court in cases of failure to act of the antimonopoly authority, which was 
disputable before. 
Chapter 9. The future of the Polish  
 antimonopoly legislation
The present antimonopoly act was adopted in 2007. Five years is a good review period. 
Therefore the antimonopoly authority has publicized draft proposals for changes in May 
2012339. Those proposals reflect the experiences gained when enforcing the antimonopoly 
act and interactions with business entities during antimonopoly proceedings as well as tend 
to introduce some of experiences gained by foreign competition authorities. The first round 
of the consultation process ended in June 2012. Based on the outcome of the consultation, 
the amended draft was prepared in November 2012. The main objectives of the amendments 
proposed are: to simplify the merger control system and boost the effective detection of 
prohibited agreements in particular by modernizing the leniency programme. Those areas 
were identified by the antimonopoly authority as crucial for more effective competition 
protection.
334 The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 29 March 2012, II SAB/Wa 485/11, nyr.
335 The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 25 October 2012, I OSK 1696/12, nyr.
336 The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 11 June 2011, I OSK 490/11, nyr.
337 The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 11 October 2012, SAB/Wa 310/12, nyr.
338 The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 7 August 2012, VII SAB/Wa 134/12, nyr
339 Proposals are only in Polish and they are available at http://www.uokik.gov.pl/.
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In the area of mergers, UOKiK’s proposals seek to introduce a two-stage merger proceedings. 
At present merger proceedings are one-staged and should be concluded within two months 
regardless of the complexity of investigation. As clarified by UOKiK, this time limit proves to 
be too long for non-complex transactions and too short to examine cases of high complexity. 
For this reason the antimonopoly authority proposes that non-complex mergers should be 
cleared within 30 days and more complex cases would be reviewed within four months. 
Furthermore, UOKiK intends to improve the transparency of the merger investigation to the 
notifying parties. This could be achieved by introducing an obligation for the authority to 
provide the notifying party with a reasoned notice on competition concerns that the notified 
transaction raises. In consequence, during proceedings in complex cases UOKiK will inform 
undertakings on any reservations and doubts it has with regard to the transaction under 
scrutiny. As a consequence, undertakings will have an opportunity to express their view on 
the competitive assessment made by the authority prior to issuance of the final decision. 
Minor changes will concern formulation and publication of remedies. UOKiK proposes not to 
disclose in the decision the deadlines provided for the fulfillment of remedies. This proposal 
reflects the requests of undertakings, who emphasized the fact that providing the public 
with information on the deadline for divesting control over a dependent undertaking, or part 
of its assets, does significantly weaken the bargaining position of the seller, and consequently 
can be commercially detrimental to them.
The second area of changes concerns increasing the efficiency of eliminating prohibited 
agreements. New procedural tools are proposed, i.e. settlements procedure. The procedure is 
designed on the basis of similar regulations existing in antimonopoly law systems of particular 
EU Member States and the European Commission. Under this procedure the antimonopoly 
authority could offer settlement whenever the circumstances of a given case provide for this 
solution. An undertaking will be allowed to benefit from it in turn for receiving a 10% fine 
reduction. UOKiK aims at accelerating the antimonopoly proceedings. Furthermore, UOKiK’s 
proposals include possibility of imposing remedies in the decision concluding antimonopoly 
proceedings in the anticompetitive practices cases. In this decision, the President of UOKiK 
will have a chance to indicate to an undertaking what measures must be taken to eliminate 
the impacts of infringement or discontinue the prohibited practice. This will allow for 
effective restoration of competition.
The third area of amendments regards fining policy. UOKiK proposes introduction of the 
leniency plus institution. Under this procedure undertakings could obtain even more 
significant fine reductions for participation in anti-competitive agreement as long as they 
provide the authority with information on other undetected agreements. Furthermore, the 
antimonopoly authority proposes introduction of natural persons’ liability for infringement 
of selected substantive provisions of the antimonopoly act. In the opinion of UOKiK, these 
sanctions will perform both repressive and preventive functions and will provide the office 
with access to the new source of information. This will be possible through opening of the 
leniency programme also to natural persons.
The draft amendment proposes to prolong the time limit to lodge the appeal against the 
decision of the antimonopoly authority up to 30 days (14 days at present). It has been initially 
proposed and lobbied by numerous stakeholders claiming that the existing time limit is too 
short given the complexity of the antimonopoly decisions. Furthermore, the draft intends to 
amend the Civil procedural code in order to empower civil courts to provide universal control 
over all activities of the antimonopoly authority (administrative courts would be deprived of 
any competence to control UOKiK’s actions). 
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PART II CASE LAW
In order to give a full picture of the Polish competition law, a brief selection of the judicial 
case law is presented herein. Judgments outlined below were taken by various courts 
competent in antimonopoly matters i.e. Court of Competition and Consumer Protection 
(formerly the Antimonopoly Court), Court of Appeal, Supreme Court and Supreme 
Administrative Court. This presentation is limited to principal theses of judgments and is 
divided into eight groups:
● Application of the antimonopoly act;
● Anticompetitive agreements;
● Abuse of dominance;
● Merger control;
● Fines;
● Antimonopoly proceedings;
● Proceedings before the antimonopoly court;
● Proceedings before the administrative courts.
For the clarity reasons, references to particular antimonopoly acts and their official names 
were omitted and replaced with the general term ‘antimonopoly act’. Wherever possible, 
current numbering of provisions of the antimonopoly act was indicated in parallel to the 
numbering binding at the time when a particular judgment was delivered. All judgments 
are preceded by the tags in order to make them more accessible to the readers. Where 
necessary, judgments are accompanied by short commentaries explaining more complex 
issues of Polish law. In order to make presented judgments more comprehensible to 
foreign readers, the translation does not always follow completely the original Polish text. 
Furthermore, in many instances the necessary shortcuts were made.
1.  Application of the antimonopoly act
•	 Application	 of	 the	 antimonopoly	 act	 –	 extraterritorial	 application	 of	 the	
antimonopoly	act,	foreign	undertakings
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 May 2007, III SK 24/06, nyr
The antimonopoly act is applicable to all anticompetitive practices concluded outside the 
territory of Poland but affecting markets located under the jurisdiction of the Republic of 
Poland. 
•	 Application	 of	 the	 antimonopoly	 act	 –	 extraterritorial	 application	 of	 the	
antimonopoly	act,	foreign	undertakings
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 18 December 2002, 
XVII Ama 19/01, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2003, No. 2, item 260
Foreign undertaking affected by the anticompetitive practices of a domestic undertaking 
may demand the institution of antimonopoly proceedings [by the UOKiK] on the basis of the 
antimonopoly act.
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•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	scope	of	application,	foreign	undertakings
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 18 February 2010, III SK 28/09, nyr
Jurisdiction of the President of UOKiK is based on the premise that behavior of the company 
has an effect on the Polish market. This premise is self-evident and does not require to be 
proved when the Polish company is engaged in the anticompetitive behavior on the Polish 
market directed against other companies present on this market which adversely affect 
Polish consumers.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	division	of	competences	between	antimonopoly	
and	regulatory	authorities
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 18 February 2002, XVII Ama 46/01, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2002, No. 2, item 104
Regulatory proceedings conducted by the President of the Energy Regulatory Office are 
a specific form of competition protection procedure undertaken on the regular basis against 
natural monopolists. Therefore the President of UOKiK is precluded from fining company on the 
basis of the antimonopoly act if the Energy law finds the behavior of the company admissible. 
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	division	of	competences	between	antimonopoly	
and	 regulatory	 authority,	 parallel	 application	 of	 antimonopoly	 and	 regulatory	
rules
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 27 March 2008, VI ACa 957/07, Journal of Laws of 
UOKiK of 2008, No. 3, item 31
1.  The same circumstances may be examined both under the Energy law and the 
Antimonopoly act. The first is undertaken by the energy regulator, the second by the 
antimonopoly authority. 
2.  Consumer of energy may always seek protection based on the antimonopoly law against 
dominant energy company allegedly abusing its position.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	division	of	competences	between	antimonopoly	
and	regulatory	authorities
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 17 March 2010, III SK 41/09, OSNP 2011, No. 21-22, 
item 285
Prior decision of the President of the Office of Electronic Communications precludes the 
President of UOKiK from any intervention in matters covered by the previous decision.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	statutory	restrictions	of	competition
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 November 2001, XVII Ama 6/01, nyr 
It is inadmissible to prosecute energy company with accusation of charging excessive prices 
provided that those prices do not exceed tariffs approved by the energy regulator.
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•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	statutory	restrictions	of	competition,	limited	
scope	of	exemptions
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 October 2000, XVII Ama 10/00, Wokanda 
2002, No. 7-8, item 100
Article 4(3) of the Act of 29 July 1992 on games of chance and mutual bets regulates that 
organizing lotteries is a state monopoly and hence provisions of the antimonopoly act do not 
apply but it does not exclude application of the antimonopoly act to commercial relations 
between organizer of the lottery and its distributors (agents).
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	statutory	restrictions	of	competition
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, Wokanda 
1994, No. 5, item 56
Restrictions of the free competition resulting from the public authorization of certain 
commercial activities and related activities of public authorities are left outside of the 
application of the antimonopoly act.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	-	scope	of	application,	statutory	restrictions	
of	competition
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 27 May 2009, VI ACa 1404/08, Journal of Laws of 
UOKiK of 2009, No. 4, item 34
Antimonopoly act does not apply exclusively to those competition-restricting practices which 
are directly allowed by separate provisions. Those provisions are lex specialis in relation to 
the antimonopoly act. Therefore the President of UOKiK may not persecute anticompetitive 
activities resulting from public obligations imposed by separate statutes which do not leave 
any discretion to addressees of these obligations. Neither the antimonopoly authority nor 
the antimonopoly court is competent to assess whether the municipality fulfils its public 
obligations and whether this fulfillment is optimal from the point of view of inhabitants 
of this municipality. The jurisdiction of the President of UOKiK […] over activities of the 
municipality is limited to those activities where municipality enjoys discretionary power 
not constrained by the separate provisions. 
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	-	scope	of	application,	statutory	restrictions	
of	competition,	burden	of	proof
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 3 March 2010, III SK 37/09, OSNP 2011, No. 19-20, 
item 264
1.  Separate statutory provisions may limit jurisdiction of the President of UOKiK and justify 
certain anticompetitive behavior of undertakings.
2.  The antimonopoly act is applicable as long as the legislator does not limit the free market 
and enables undertakings to freely engage in economic activity. When the undertaking is 
organizing the market, the antimonopoly act is applicable in relation to those activities 
of the undertaking which lie within its discretion [activities of the company resulting 
from the statutory regulation of the market fall outside the application of the 
antimonopoly act]. The burden of proving the existence of anticompetitive practices 
during antimonopoly proceedings rests upon the President of UOKiK.
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•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	local	government
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 December 2000, XVII Ama 95/99, Wokanda 
2002, No. 9, item 50
1.  Article 40(1) of the Act of 8 March 1990 on the municipal self-government which authorizes 
the municipality to adopt local laws may not be a legal basis to adopt local laws contrary 
to the antimonopoly legislation. Therefore the said provision may not be a legal basis to 
adopt a regulation obliging all real estate owners to contract waste collection services 
exclusively with the municipal company, excluding all other companies.
2.  Municipality that enjoys a monopolistic position [with regard to certain commercial 
activities] may not disregard the antimonopoly act which prohibits anticompetitive 
behavior of any undertaking, including municipalities.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	organization	of	public	services,	possibility	of	
reviewing	administrative	decision	and	normative	acts	issued	by	local	government	
authorities
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 20 November 2008, III SK 12/08, Glosa 2009, No. 3, 
p. 102
1.  Organization of the public utility services, within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of the 
antimonopoly law, is the activity of the local government consisting in establishment 
of legal basis for offering such services by the other undertakings. This competence 
covers the possibility to adopt local laws regulating conditions for obtaining official 
authorization to perform such services and setting up detailed rules on conducting of 
such activities.
2.  Municipality, as an undertaking, is obliged to take into consideration all limitations of its 
discretion and competence to adopt local laws and issue administrative decisions with 
regard to organizing public utility services resulting from the antimonopoly act.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	relation	of	the	antimonopoly	act	with	other	
economic	regulations
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 January 1994, XVII Amr 40/93, nyr
The antimonopoly act [...] is a special statute which has primacy over the other statutes 
regulating commercial activity of undertakings, both private and public. Therefore, the 
competent competition authority may lawfully intervene against any anticompetitive 
commercial activity of undertakings.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	scope	of	application,	unfair	competition
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 September 1991, XVII Amr 9/91, nyr
The antimonopoly act is not designed to combat unfair competition practices [those 
practices are civil law delicts and may be challenged in regular civil proceedings].
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•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	competences	of	the	antimonopoly	authority,	
objective	of	public	enforcement
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 November 2001, XVII Ama 2/01, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2002, No. 1, item 47
1.  Any entity who suffered loss as a result of the anticompetitive behavior of undertaking 
may not seek damages during the antimonopoly proceedings. Polish competition 
authority is not competent to issue an administrative decision in this respect [the only 
possibility rests with the private enforcement].
2.  The antimonopoly legislation is aimed at protecting the public interest, not individual 
interest of any undertaking.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	competences	of	the	antimonopoly	authority
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 15 May 2002, XVII Ama 95/01, nyr
The President of UOKiK may not control decisions of the energy regulator on authorization 
of energy tariffs.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	competences	of	the	antimonopoly	authority
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 2 December 2002, XVII Ama 27/02, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2003, No. 2, item 259
The antimonopoly authority is not competent to determine the terms and conditions of 
contracts concluded between the dominant undertaking and the other undertakings.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	notion	of	public	interest,	prioritization
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 June 2008, III SK 40/07, OSNP 2009, No 19-20, 
item 272
1.  Any activity aimed at disturbing the mechanism of competition violates the public 
interest. 
2.  The premise of violation of public interest is the criterion for selecting of cases 
undertaken by the antimonopoly authority. Decision on institution, conducting and 
concluding antimonopoly proceedings should indicate and describe the public interest 
justifying the antimonopoly intervention. 
3.  Violation of public interest takes place when anticompetitive behavior affects “a wider 
circle of market participants” or when it resulted in the other adverse market effects.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	the	concept	of	competition
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 January 2010, III SK 16/08, OSNP 2010, No. 13-14, 
item 177
The public interest covers the protection of competition as a mechanism guarantying free 
entrance of undertakings to the market. 
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•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	private	enforcement
Resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 July 2008, III CZP 52/08, OSNC 2009, No. 7-8, 
item 107
Civil court may independently adjudicate on invalidity of any commercial contract due to 
violation of the antimonopoly act […] unless there is a prior final decision of the President 
of UOKiK finding the same violation of the antimonopoly act […].
•	 Application	 of	 the	 antimonopoly	 act	 –	 EU	 context,	 character	 of	 EU	 soft	 law	
documents	
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 3 September 2009, III SK 9/09, OSNP 2011, No. 11-12, 
item 168
Contrary to provisions of the antimonopoly act on the protection of collective consumer 
interests – stipulations concerning the prohibition of anticompetitive practices do not 
implement EU directives. Therefore, when interpreting provisions of the antimonopoly 
law as regards the prohibition of anticompetitive practices, the antimonopoly authority 
is not limited by the obligation of “pro-European” interpretation of domestic provisions. 
Consequently soft law documents issued by the European Commission in the field of 
competition law as well as the case law of the European courts have only subsidiary 
relevance and may be used to conduct comparative law analysis. 
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	notion	of	undertaking
Judgment of Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 12 January 2006, XVII 
Ama 105/04, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2006, No. 2, item 28
1. Undertakings, within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of the antimonopoly law, are entities 
directly performing services, as well as entities organizing performance of such services. 
2. The administrator of the cemetery enjoys the privileged position when confronted 
with undertakings offering cemetery services. Such administrator hinders the competition 
among the undertakings offering cemetery services when the one reserves certain cemetery 
services to oneself excluding other undertakings from performing those services. Such 
restriction limits the competition and results in securing of stable demand for certain 
cemetery services for the administrator and in violating of consumer interests by limiting 
their choice.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	 –	 liberal	profession	organization,	concerted	
practice
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 12 October 2005, 
XVII Ama 53/04, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2006, No. 1, item 14
1.  Activities of the chamber of commerce consisting of negotiating and then recommending 
to the members of the chamber basic conditions of the license agreements such as 
price and duration of licenses constitutes the anticompetitive behavior. Such behavior 
results in restricting competition in the market for paid television and thus having 
an adverse effect on undertaking and consumers. By recommending the framework 
license agreement, the chamber of commerce aims at introducing standardized license 
agreements concluded by the chamber members with other undertakings. As a result of 
such standardization the supply of licenses to potential buyers is significantly limited. 
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2.  Activities of the chamber of commerce did not take the shape of any formal act such 
as resolution or decision. Nonetheless, negotiating and then recommending to members 
of the chamber basic conditions of the license agreements, clearly aims at achieving 
anticompetitive results and as such is forbidden by the antimonopoly act.
•	 Application	of	antimonopoly	act	–	notion	of	undertaking
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 6 December 2007, III SK 16/07, Journal of Laws of 
UOKiK of 2008, No. 2, item 228
The characteristic feature of the antimonopoly legislation is the introduction of the 
autonomous meaning of legal concepts. The antimonopoly act invokes legal concepts taken 
from other statutes, but it redefines and adapts them for the purposes of the antimonopoly 
legislation […]. Such autonomous meaning of legal concepts is often clearly expressed in the 
provisions of the antimonopoly act. […] Article 4(1) of the antimonopoly act proclaims that 
the undertaking is any entity offering on an organized and long-lasting basis their products 
on their own behalf and account. […] Any such entity may influence the competition on the 
market by stimulating the demand or generating the supply.
•	 Application	 of	 the	 antimonopoly	 act	 –	 notion	 of	 undertaking,	 liberal	 profession	
organization	
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 14 May 1997, XVII Ama 11/97, nyr
The bar of advocates as an association of undertakings may be the party to the antimonopoly 
proceedings and may be charged with the infringement of the antimonopoly act. The bar 
limited the competition among advocates by adopting internal resolutions setting up the 
code of conduct of advocates which led to the violation of the public interest.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	liberal	profession	organizations,	architects	
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 18 September 
2007, XVII Ama 125/06, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2008, No. 1, item 7
1.  Liberal profession organizations should limit themselves to performing their statutory 
tasks. Any activities of such organizations exceeding their statutory competences 
resulting in anticompetitive effects are punishable under the antimonopoly act. The 
resolution of the chamber of architects prohibiting them to engage in public tenders 
for architectural designs, where the price is the only tender criterion, results in the 
restriction of competition on the market for architectural services. Such prohibition 
precludes architects from engaging in lawful contracts and has an adverse effect on 
competition.
2.  The antimonopoly act empowers the President of UOKiK to independently control 
commercial activities of undertakings in respect of their conformity with the competition 
law. The control of the antimonopoly authority is autonomous and separate from the 
control undertaken by other persons or public authorities, regardless of the criteria 
of their control. Therefore general supervision over the activities of the chamber of 
architects undertaken by the other authority does not preclude the President of UOKiK 
from controlling the chamber within the limits of the antimonopoly act. Consequently, 
any supervisory measures undertaken by the competent minister over the activities of 
the chamber neither influence nor determine the outcome of the control undertaken by 
the antimonopoly authority.
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3.  The chamber of architects is an association of undertakings within the meaning of the 
antimonopoly laws and resolutions of the chamber may be treated as agreements for the 
purposes of the antimonopoly act.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	-	relevant	market	–	definition	and	role
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 21 April 2010, VI ACa 1092/09, nyr
The correct definition of the relevant market determines the correctness of instituting and 
conducting of the antimonopoly proceedings. The relevant market delimits the arena of 
competition between specific products within specific geographic space. 
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	relevant	market,	product	market,	geographic	
market
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 18 January 2007, 
XVII Ama 101/05, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2007, No. 3, item 33
1.  Determining of the product market is of crucial importance for defining the relevant 
market. Specifying the product market allows for extracting products or services 
according to their unique features, such as their intended use, functions and price. This 
enables the authority to distinguish between products and services which are not easily 
interchangeable. Such products are seen as substitutes by their purchasers.
2.  When defining the relevant market, the authority should employ narrow segmentation 
criteria. Employment of wide segmentation criteria may lead to failure in establishing 
of any significant market position of a dominant undertaking. As a result, the provisions 
on the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position would be ineffective with detriment 
to consumers and other undertakings.
3.  A geographic market comprises the area in which the market conditions for all 
undertakings involved are the same with regard to barriers of entry, price differences, 
transport costs and other factors. 
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	relevant	market
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 8 August 2005, VI ACa 6/05, Glosa 2006, No. 2, p. 88
The tendency to employ narrow segmentation criteria, when defining the relevant market, 
should not lead to narrowing the relevant market comprising to one product and one 
producer. The art of defining the relevant market does not consist in defining it as narrow 
as possible. It is about defining the relevant market properly as such definition of relevant 
market is crucial for the correct analysis of commercial activities of undertakings.
•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	relevant	market,	geographic	market
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 24 July 2008, VI ACa 12/08, Journal of Laws of 
UOKiK of 2008, No. 4, item 41
It is not possible to uphold the concept that intensification of demand for certain products 
in one area of the country should be crucial for determining the geographical market. Such 
concept ignores the fact that the said demand may be detected nationwide, but for certain 
reasons such as migration or financial situation of consumers it is not uniform in all areas 
of the country.
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•	 Application	of	the	antimonopoly	act	–	relevant	market
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 28 November 2008, 
XVII Ama 107/07, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2009, No. 1, item 6
The relevant market delimits the area of competition between the undertakings concerned. 
The most important part of the relevant market is the product market. It comprises of 
products which are not easily interchangeable. Within such a market, all products are 
substitutes and may be easily replaced by other products by consumers. To define the product 
market one should find the proper differentiating criteria such as intended use, functions, 
price or quality. When defining the relevant market, the authority should employ narrow 
criteria of segmentation. Only such criteria allows for precise determination of geographical 
market and enable the authority to measure the market position of undertakings.
2.  Anticompetitive agreements
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	association	of	undertakings,	price	recommendations
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 28 January 2002, XVII Ama 33/01, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2002, No. 2, item 103
The resolution of the association of undertakings recommending the minimum prices for 
certain services […] should be regarded as anticompetitive agreement.
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	concerted	practices,	parallel	behavior
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 April 1996, I CRN 49/96, OSNC 1996, No. 9, item 124
When three independent undertakings producing the same products fix their prices several 
times on the same days, it is enough to presume that it was the result of their concerted 
and anticompetitive practice. 
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	vertical	agreements,	fines
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of  8 May 1996, XVII Amr 15/96, Wokanda 1997, 
No. 8, item 46
The anticompetitive vertical agreement may be concluded by undertakings operating on 
different level of distribution or production in the form of contract or concerted practice. 
The specific feature of the anticompetitive vertical agreement is that undertakings involved 
oblige themselves to undertake different activities specific to their level in distribution or 
production chain. Despite these differences anticompetitive behavior of all undertakings 
involved should be assessed on the same basis. Therefore there is no legal basis for different 
treatment of anticompetitive activities of undertakings performed on different level of 
distribution or production chain.
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	exchange	of	information,	parallel	behavior
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 20 September 1995, XVII Amr 15/95, Wokanda 
1996, No. 8, item 57
1. Any exchange of information between undertakings regarding costs of production or price 
increases is anticompetitive and illegal whenever it leads to or allows the coordination 
of commercial activities of competitors. This rule applies both to undertaking who 
communicates the piece of information and to undertaking who receives the piece of 
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information if such communication leads or aids to infringement of the antimonopoly act 
by unification or coordination of anticompetitive behavior between undertakings involved 
in exchanging of the information.
2. Following the price leader with regard to set the same prices among competitors is illegal 
if the price level is a result of compromise between the price leader and other competitors 
resulting from tacit or explicit collusion.
•	 Antimonopoly	agreements	–	exemptions,	public	policy	defense
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 May 1993, XVII Amr 9/93, nyr
When disorganization and malfunctioning of the market is the result of unsuccessful 
governmental policy, it should be regarded as a relevant factor in assessing of potentially 
anticompetitive commercial activities of undertakings [the authority should investigate to 
what extent anticompetitive commercial activities of undertakings are a rational economic 
response to distortive public policy].
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	 –	 notion	of	agreement,	parallel	behavior,	 concerted	
practice
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 5 October 2005, VI ACa 1146/04, Journal of Laws of 
UOKiK of 2006, No. 1, item 18
Coordination of commercial activities of undertakings may be treated as a concerted 
practice only if all undertakings are freely involved in this coordination. The antimonopoly 
act does not require any special form of agreement. Therefore all kinds of agreements 
are covered, including written and oral ones. The notion of ‘agreement’ is wider than the 
notion of ‘contract’. Consequently, any form of mutual consent, irrespective of legal or 
factual form may constitute an agreement. The heart of an agreement is the coordination 
of commercial activities which is not a result of binding contract but stems from the 
intentional cooperation restricting the competition by its object or effect. The coordination 
eliminates commercial uncertainty which is inherent to the free market and competition. 
To identify the existence of concerted practice, it is not enough to track parallel behavior. 
The analysis of such behavior should include all market conditions and prove that it is 
not a normal and adequate behavior in the given market conditions. Therefore concerted 
practices should be distinguished from pure parallel behavior. The latter consist of similar 
and simultaneous actions resulting from adaptation to changing market conditions and being 
a normal and adequate behavior under certain circumstances. Such adjustment to changing 
market conditions may not be a result of prior mutual consent and it should be treated as an 
agreement. When assessing parallel behavior, special attention should be given to activities 
of a market leader. a horizontal agreement is concluded by direct competitors acting on the 
same side of the market.
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	notion	of	agreement,	exemptions	from	the	prohibition	
of	the	anticompetitive	agreements
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 29 May 2006, XVII 
Ama 9/05, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2006, No. 4, item 58
1. Non-compete clause contained in agreements have an anticompetitive effect and is 
illegal due to violation of Article 5 [at present Article 6] of the antimonopoly act. The lack 
of intention to restrict competition of the parties to the agreement is legally irrelevant, as 
well as the lack of obligation to notify a merger resulting from such agreement.
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2. Non-compete clauses may be justifiable unless the same result may be achieved though 
detailed regulation of mutual rights and obligations resulting from the transfer of licenses, 
know-how and other intellectual property rights.
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	price	fixing,	parallel	behavior
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 9 August 2006, III SK 6/06, Journal of Laws of UOKiK 
of 2007, No. 3, item 39
1.  Price agreements constitute hardcore infringements of competition law. Such agreements 
extensively influence and deviate commercial behavior of undertakings. Detection of such 
anticompetitive agreements may be very difficult since they hardly ever take the form 
of formal agreements and are carefully secured from any disclosure. Therefore, when 
investigating hardcore restrictions, it is recommended to rely on factual presumptions 
which alter the burden of proof. To prove price fixing the antimonopoly act does not 
require revealing formal agreements. Identifying the existence of any informal and tacit 
coordination leading to the anticompetitive effect is enough. Price fixing agreements 
may be proven with the use of both direct and indirect evidence. 
2.  Price fixing agreements should be distinguished from conscious parallelism which is 
a standard commercial reaction of undertakings adapting to changing market conditions. 
It is a normal commercial reaction and it is not illegal to adapt to changing market 
conditions by changing the price offers. The difference between legitimate parallel 
behavior and the unlawful concerted practice is that the former is a rational imitation 
of competitors’ behavior and the latter is the effect of tacit collusion. However, if 
price imitation is preceded by any direct or indirect contact between competitors which 
have as their object or effect alteration of commercial behavior, it should be regarded 
as price fixing within the meaning of Article 5(1)(1) [at present Article 6(1)(1)] of the 
antimonopoly act. 
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	notion	of	agreement
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 12 July 2007, XVII 
Ama 64/06, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2007, No. 4, item 46
1.  The antimonopoly act presents a very flexible approach towards establishing the 
existence of an anticompetitive agreement. It only requires proving that any exchange 
of acts of will of undertakings took place, irrespective of their form. The subject of 
such act of will is devotion to take action contrary to binding competition rules. The 
authority is obliged to prove that such act of will was made in order to prove the 
existence of anticompetitive agreement.
2.  Anticompetitive agreements may take the form of a contract or any informal consent 
leading to elimination, restriction or impediment to competition. Therefore, if 
informal agreements are covered by the antimonopoly act, it is not necessary that such 
agreements were concluded by the official representative of an undertaking.
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•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	per	se	infringements,	direct	application	of	EU	Treaty	
rules	on	competition,	notion	of	impact	on	trade	between	MS
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 20 November 2008, VI ACa 384/08, Journal of Laws 
of UOKiK of 2009, No. 1, item 8
1.  It is not necessary to establish adverse market effects to prove the existence of an 
anticompetitive agreement. The wording of Articles 101(1)(1) and (2) [at present Article 
106(1)] of the antimonopoly act unequivocally enables the competition authority to fine 
the undertaking just for concluding the agreement violating Article 8 [at present Article 
9] of the antimonopoly act or Articles 81 or 82 [at present Article 101 or 102 of TFEU].
2.  When assessing if the anticompetitive practice affects the trade between member 
states, it is important to take into consideration that if the undertaking enjoys 
a dominant position on the national market, it may create a significant barrier of entry. 
It is enough to establish the possibility of adverse impact on trade between member 
states. Therefore, it is not necessary to prove that the anticompetitive agreement 
adversely affects the trade between member states.
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	notion	of	agreement,	indirect	evidence,	intentionality,	
bid	rigging
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 14 January 2009, III SK 26/08, OSNP 2010, No. 13-14, 
item 179
1.  Anticompetitive agreement is the agreement in which the parties intend to interfere 
with the mechanism of competition, as well as the agreement where the restriction of 
competition is an unavoidable effect of the agreement.
2.  Proving the conclusion of anticompetitive agreement, during the court proceedings, 
may be based on factual presumptions, as described in Article 231 of the civil procedural 
code.
3.  Awareness of infringing the provisions of antimonopoly act is irrelevant for establishing 
existence of an anticompetitive practice. Infringement of Article 5 par. 1 [at present 
Article 6(1)] of the antimonopoly act is independent of intentions of undertaking.
4.  Bid rigging aims at elimination of price competition, shaping the market structure and 
creating barriers of entry to potential competitors. Therefore any bid rigging should 
be considered as per se violation of the antimonopoly act unless there exist some 
extraordinary circumstances.
•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	notion	of	agreement,	indirect	evidence
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 7 November 2005, 
XVII Ama 26/04, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2006, No. 1, item 15 
Establishing the existence of an anticompetitive agreement is not necessary to prove any 
written or oral agreement between undertakings. The primary goal of the antimonopoly 
investigation is to establish the result or the goal of anticompetitive cooperation […] 
Therefore, irrespective of the form, any cooperation between undertakings directed 
against their competitors or consumers may constitute an anticompetitive agreement. To 
reveal the aim of the cooperation, it is enough to establish that cooperating undertakings 
intentionally limited their margin of discretion during negotiations with third parties. An 
anticompetitive agreement consists of mutual consent and parallel behavior irrespective of 
the fact if it really led to adverse market effects.
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•	 Anticompetitive	agreements	–	vertical	agreements,	market	definition
Judgment of the Court of Appeal 12 May 2010, VI ACa 983/09, nyr
It is possible to define the relevant market as a market for one specific book. Any agreement 
between the publisher and distributors regarding the minimum resale price maintenance 
may be treated as an anticompetitive vertical agreement. 
3.  Abuse of dominance
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	-	duopoly
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 July 2001, XVII Ama 96/00, nyr
Under the mature duopoly, market structure neither of the two active undertakings enjoys 
unilateral dominant position. Therefore, any ‘special price offers’ prepared by one of the 
undertakings may not be treated as unfair prices.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	onerous	contract	terms
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 November 2000, XVII Ama 72/00, nyr
Onerous contract terms have objective and subjective dimensions. Terms are subjectively 
onerous if they are perceived by the party to the agreement as onerous. Terms are 
objectively onerous if the party would not accept such terms under the competitive market 
conditions. Terms would be objectively onerous if there is not balance of obligations and 
the exchange of obligations is not equivalent.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 November 2000, XVII Ama 8/00, Wokanda 
2002, No. 7-8, item 104
Undertaking may lawfully enjoy the dominant position on the market. Such market position 
is legal. Any abuse of such position is prohibited. The reduction of commercial risk does not 
constitute by itself the abuse of a dominant position.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 26 January 2000, XVII Ama 56/99, nyr 
If the heating supplier threatens to terminate the supply of heating in the absence of 
unilateral acceptance of new prices by the recipient of the heating, such behavior 
constitutes the abuse of a dominant position.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	application	of	dissimilar	conditions
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 December 1999, XVII Ama 44/99, nyr
If the demand for certain goods exceeds the supply, the dominant undertaking should supply 
all contractors on equal terms, unless there exist special reasons for favoring one group of 
contractors.  
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 14 January 2000, XVII Ama 4/01, nyr 
Enforcing the lawful and binding contract may not be treated as an abuse of market 
dominance.
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•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	leaving	the	market,	freedom	of	enterprise
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 May 1999, XVII Ama 13/99, nyr
1. The undertaking may freely decide to leave the certain market and it should not be 
treated as an abuse of the market dominance. In principle, abandonment of the 
market may not be regarded as an exploitation of the market power of the dominant 
undertaking even if it puts their contractors in a difficult position. Such behavior of the 
dominant undertaking does not limit the freedom of other undertakings and is neutral 
for the future competition. Therefore, the antimonopoly act does not provide the legal 
basis to force the dominant undertaking to stay on the market. Otherwise, it would 
lead to results contrary to the goals of the antimonopoly act limiting the freedom of 
undertaking to freely decide on allocation of their resources and sustaining profitable 
commercial activity.
2. The antimonopoly law may not be approached as a legal instrument enabling one 
undertaking to coerce the other to act on the market which is of no interest for such.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	cross-subsidization
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 January 1999, XVII Ama 60/98, OSP 2000, 
No. 11, item 168
If the antimonopoly authority prohibited the dominant undertaking to cross-subsidize their 
commercial activity on the other competitive market, such undertaking may not justify the 
non-execution of this decision by indicating that it would not be possible for them to face 
competitors in the absence of cross-subsidization.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 October 1993, XVII Amr 25/93, Wokanda 
1994, No. 3, item 57
An undertaking is abusing their dominant position if they coerce the contractor to provide 
the dominant undertaking with the access to contractor’s financial books. Such access may 
allow the dominant undertaking to learn the business secrets of their competitors.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	refusal	to	deal
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 December 2001, XVII Ama 3/01, Wokanda 
2003, No. 6, item 53
Refusal to supply the good may be regarded as an abuse of the dominant position if it is of 
discriminatory nature.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	refusal	to	deal
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 9 October 2003, I CK 134/02, nyr
Every undertaking has a right not to sell goods to unreliable contractors or to debtors. 
However, the criteria for the refusal to sell should be objectively justified and be applicable 
to all contractors on equal terms. Furthermore, such refusal should not be permanent but 
it should depend on the meeting of the set criteria by the contractor. 
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•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 16 February 2005, IV CK 541/04, OSP 2006, No. 1, 
item 3
Refusal to renegotiate the contract for healthcare services may constitute an abuse of 
dominant position by the National Health Fund. The Fund enjoys the monopolist position on 
the market for publicly contracted healthcare services. 
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 1 September 2004, 
XVII Ama 90/03, Glosa 2005, No. 1, p. 89
The contracts concluded with farmers for the supply of future products should indicate 
the price for the crops. In the absence of the price indication, such contract transfers 
all commercial risk upon the farmer and puts in a privileged position the contracting 
undertaking. Under such a contract the contracting undertaking has a guarantee that 
certain amount of products will be delivered and the price will be established on the day of 
actual purchase. At the same time, the farmer is obliged to produce the goods at the risk 
that the actual price paid on the day of the purchase could be below their costs. For these 
reasons such contract terms may be regarded as onerous.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	refusal	to	deal
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 2 June 2004, XVII 
Ama 94/03, Wokanda 2005, No. 7-8, item 99
The refusal to deal is not  listed as prohibited practice constituting the abuse of a dominant 
position. Nevertheless, the list of practices is open and hence refusal to deal may be treated 
as a specific form of abuse of a dominant position. Refusal to deal may constitute an abuse of 
a dominant position if the contractor does not have alternative sources of supply or sale.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	excessive	pricing
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 14 June 2005, VI ACa 93/05, Journal of Laws of 
UOKiK of 2005, No. 3, item 49
When defining ‘excessive pricing’ two sets of criteria should be applied in order to avoid 
defective analysis. First group of criteria refers to the costs of the undertaking. Several 
costs should be mentioned: own cost barred by the undertaking during the production, 
the amount of profit gained per item sold, general profitability of undertaking being 
a relation between the profit and the incurred costs. The second group of criteria regards 
the comparison of prices listed on the market with the prices of potential competitors on 
the other markets. 
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	imposition	of	unfair	contract	terms
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 23 February 2006, III SK 6/05, OSNP 2007, No. 5-6, 
item 86
The abuse of the dominant position may take place when the dominant undertaking forces 
their agent to accept contract obligations which would not normally be accepted if not 
threatened with the termination of the agency agreement. 
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•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	onerous	contract	terms
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 14 September 2006, 
XVII Ama 71/05, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2006, No. 4, item 61
The notion of ‘onerous contract terms’ refers to the situation when the party to the 
agreement accepts terms which are more severe then usual contract terms applicable in 
similar commercial contracts. When evaluating whether the contract terms are onerous, 
the authority should use the counterfactual. The counterfactual would show whether it 
might be possible for the undertaking to accept similar contract terms in the absence of the 
dominant position of the other party to the agreement. 
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	imposition
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 January 2007, III SK 17/06, nyr
‘Imposition’ of the contract terms should not be identified with the psychological coercion. 
Such coercion may accompany the imposition of the contract provisions but is not the 
necessary element of this anticompetitive practice. ‘Imposition’ should be assessed through 
the objective criteria verifying whether the particular contract provisions result from 
unlawful pressure or the voluntary negotiations.
•	 Abuse	 of	 dominance	 –	 notion	 of	 abuse,	 preventing	 formation	 of	 conditions	 for	
competition	
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 29 June 2007, XVII 
Ama 14/06, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2007, No. 4, item 45
Counteracting the formation of conditions necessary for the emergence or development 
of the competition is a form of abuse of a dominant position. Under the existing economic 
conditions, this practice should be broadly interpreted so as to cover counteracting 
formation of competition on any market, not only on the market on which the undertaking 
enjoys the dominant position.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 20 November 2008, VI ACa 704/08, Journal of Laws 
of UOKiK of 2009, No. 2, item 16
Two factors are decisive for establishing the dominant position of the undertaking. First, the 
undertaking should be able to restrict effective competition. The second, the undertaking 
should be able to act independently of their competitors, contractors or consumers. The 
presumption of a dominant position inferred from the 40% market share is only a formal 
one and may be rebutted during the process. Therefore to establish a dominant position it 
is not enough to show a high market share of the undertaking. Market dominance should be 
constant and stable through a long period of time preventing any new successful entrants.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse,	objective	liability
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 28 November 2008, 
XVII Ama 107/07, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2009, No. 1, item 6
1.  The behavior of the undertaking may constitute an abuse of dominant position even 
if no adverse effects occurred in the market. The mere possibility of inducing such 
effects on competition is enough to establish that the behavior in question restricts the 
competition.
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2.  The liability of the undertaking under the antimonopoly act is of objective character. 
It means that the lack of intention (‘guilt’) of the dominant undertaking to abuse their 
market position does not serve as the exculpatory factor.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	unfair	prices
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 February 2009, III SK 29/08, OSNP 2010, No. 15-16, 
item 204
The notion of ‘unfair price’, as indicated in Article 8(2)(1) [at present Article 9(2)(1)] 
of the antimonopoly act, covers situations where the undertaking calculating the price 
includes costs which were not barred in relation to the production or distribution of the 
product. It is irrelevant whether the calculated price is at the same time an excessive price. 
The misleading method of calculation of the price is enough to establish that the price is 
‘unfair’.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	abrogation	of	anticompetitive	behavior,	limits	for	application	
of	rules	on	abuse	of	dominance,	burden	of	proof	
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 July 2009, III SK 10/09, OSNP 2011, No. 7-8, 
item 116
1. Strict determination of the prohibited anticompetitive behavior determines the proper 
execution of the decision of the antimonopoly authority. The proper execution of 
the decision takes place when the undertaking really ceases to engage in prohibited 
practices. 
2. If the undertaking losses a dominant position after imposing a fine for the abuse of 
a dominant position, such undertaking may still be fined for non-executing of the 
prohibition decision. However, the decision for non-execution of the decision should 
only cover the period between the date when the decision became final and the date 
of losing the dominant position by the undertaking concerned. Consequently, if the 
undertaking losses their dominant position after the day of issuance of the prohibition 
decision, but before the date of losing the dominant position by the undertaking 
concerned, the antimonopoly authority may not fine the undertaking for non-executing 
of the prohibition decision. Decisions prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position are 
valid as long as the undertaking enjoys the dominant position. The burden of proof in 
the presented scenarios rests upon the undertaking.
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	notion	of	abuse,	interpretation	of	the	catalogue	of	practices,	
differentiation	of	prices	
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09, OSNP 2011, No. 9-10, 
item 144
1.  The abuse of dominance takes place when the behavior of the dominant undertaking is 
objectively contrary to normal commercial behavior on the competitive market. Such 
behavior adversely affects the market structure or takes a form of competition based 
not on merits but on the strength of the undertaking. 
2.  The antimonopoly act provides for an open catalogue of prohibited unilateral behaviors. 
Consequently, it is not justified to broadly interpret Article 8(2) [at present Article 9(2)] 
of the antimonopoly act.
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3.  Application of different prices in not a per se infringement of the antimonopoly act, 
even if it is undertaken by the dominant undertaking. Price differentiation may have 
objective justification. Prices may differ across the given geographical area, being 
dependent on distinct variables like costs of transport or operative costs. Nonetheless, 
if the price differentiation is applied because of different level of wealth of consumers, 
it constitutes a price discrimination (purchasers of the same products have to pay 
different prices depending on the different place of purchase).
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	excessive	pricing,	concept	of	abuse
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 18 February 2010, III SK 24/09, OSNP 2011, No. 15-16, 
item 222
1.  The price is excessive if it is objectively too high in the given market conditions.
2.  The notion of ‘excessive price’ should not be identified with the amount of margin or 
the profitability of the undertaking. The excessive price could be the price bringing only 
a small profit but with overestimated costs of production.
3.  The notion of the ‘abuse of a dominant position’, as well as the notion of the 
‘anticompetitive agreement’ are based on the objective criteria. The subjective criteria 
may play a role in the substantive analysis of the market behavior, but they are irrelevant 
for the definition of the exploitative practices. 
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	tying
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 17 March 2010, III SK 41/09, OSNP 2011, No. 21-22, 
item 285
Tying is a form of the abuse of a dominant position. Tying takes place when the undertaking 
makes conclusion of the sale of one product subject to purchase of the other product 
serving other purposes [not related to the first one].
•	 Abuse	of	dominance	–	unfair	prices
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 17 December 2010, VI ACa 427/10, Apel.-W-wa 
2011, No. 2, item 19
The public interest is violated not only when the adverse effects of the anticompetitive 
behavior affect a wide group of market participants, but also when the behavior induces 
other distortive effects. Application of heterogeneous price conditions (regarding airport 
and navigation fees) favoring a specific group of flight carriers (carriers offering domestic 
flights) should be regarded as an abuse of a dominant position. The relevant market consists 
of services connected with departures and arrivals of airplanes within the area of particular 
airport.
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4.  Merger control
•	 Merger	control	–	merger	test
Judgment of Antimonopoly Court of 28 March 2001, XVII Ama 88/99, nyr
The creation or strengthening of the dominance of the undertaking precludes the 
antimonopoly authority from authorization of the notified merger.
•	 Merger	control	–	fines
Order of the Supreme Court of 7 July 1999, I CKN 184/99, OSNC 2000, No. 2, item 33
Imposition of the fine for failure to notify the merger […] lies within the administrative 
discretion of the antimonopoly authority and is independent of the substantive analysis of 
the potential pro- or anticompetitive effects of the merger.
•	 Merger	control	–	developing	markets,	prohibition	of	mergers
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 October 1997, XVII Ama 33/97, Wokanda 
1998, No. 2, item 46
The risk of potential anticompetitive effect of the merger is smaller if the merging 
undertakings operate on emerging markets. Therefore, it is usually not necessary to perform 
extensive substantive analysis of this type of mergers.
•	 Merger	control	 –	 time	 limit	 for	conducting	 the	proceedings,	 consequences	of	not	
observing	the	time	limit
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 March 1994, XVII Amr 45/92, nyr
The 2-month time limit to conduct the merger proceedings is of substantive and statutory 
character. The antimonopoly authority is precluded from issuing a merger decision if the 
time limit elapsed [such decision is invalid and the legal presumption applies that the 
antimonopoly authority authorized the merger].
•	 Merger	control	–	party	to	the	proceedings
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 March 1991, XVII Amr 5/91, Wokanda 1992, 
No. 4, item 37
Competitors of the merging undertakings cannot be parties to the merger proceedings [and 
are deprived of the right to challenge the merger decision].
•	 Merger	control	–	notion	of	notification	obligation,	ex	ante	control	of	transactions
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 12 November 2003, 
XVII Ama 129/02, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2004, No. 2, item 295
Undertakings are obliged to notify the antimonopoly authority of the intended not 
consummated merger [notification of the consummated merger is not legally effective and 
results in instituting sanctioning proceedings].
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5.  Fines
•	 Fines	–	legal	character	of	liability	under	the	antimonopoly	act
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 17 May 2012, VI ACa 1428/11, nyr
The liability of undertakings regulated in the antimonopoly act is of objective nature, 
which means that the guilt [intention] of the undertaking is not the necessary element for 
establishing the infringement of the antimonopoly act. Therefore, any subjective elements 
of the antimonopoly delict such as guilt [intention] are irrelevant for the substantive 
analysis. Subjective elements of the antimonopoly delict may be taken into consideration 
at the stage of determining the amount of the fine to be imposed.
•	 Fines	–	application	of	ECHR,	legal	character	of	liability	under	competition	law
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 April 2011, III SK 45/10, nyr
When the court reviews a decision of the antimonopoly authority imposing a fine for the 
infringement of the antimonopoly act, the court […] should follow the standard applicable 
to the criminal cases, as defined by the European Court of Human Rights. 
•	 Fines	–	function	of	fines,	exemptions	from	fines
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 28 October 2003, I CK 179/02, nyr
The competence of the antimonopoly authority to impose fines for infringements 
of competition rules is of crucial importance in achieving the fundamental goal of 
the antimonopoly act i.e. public protection of competition and consumers […]. This 
competence may not be limited by other actions or regulatory authorities conducting 
proceedings designed to protect competition in specific sectors of the economy [such as 
energy or telecommunications and post]. Limitation or derogation of the competence of 
the antimonopoly authority to impose fines in relation to undertakings active in a particular 
sector of the economy would need a legal basis in an unequivocal statutory provision. 
Polish law does not provide for any such provisions. Therefore, if the energy regulator 
is investigating the infringement of the energy law in parallel to the investigation of the 
antimonopoly authority, it does not limit the competence of the antimonopoly authority to 
fine the undertaking for violating the competition rules.
•	 Fines	–	function	of	fines
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 June 2000, I CKN 793/98, nyr
Financial sanction imposed for the infringement of competition rules should have 
a repressive and educational character. Therefore, such fine should be adjusted to the 
economic potential of the undertaking fined.
•	 Fines	–	functions	of	fines,	limits	for	fines
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 April 1997, XVII Ama 3/97, nyr
1.  When imposing a fine the antimonopoly authority should act in conformity with 
the functions of the fine and take into consideration the economy or proceedings. 
Consequently, the antimonopoly authority violates the general principles of 
administrative procedure […] when imposing a fine which is excessive as regards the 
function of the fine.
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2.  The decision imposing a fine is defective if the amount of the fine is disproportionate 
from the point of view of the level of intent of the undertaking.
•	 Fines	–	function	of	fines,	financing	of	fines,	local	government
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 7 April 2004, XVII 
Ama 48/03, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2004, No. 3, item 311
1.  The fine under Article 101(1)(1) [at present Article 106(1)(1)] of the antimonopoly act is 
the basic sanction for anticompetitive behavior imposed by the antimonopoly authority 
for the anticompetitive behavior […].
2.  It is legally irrelevant that the fined undertaking is the municipal company […] investing 
all the profits in municipal projects. Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the undertaking 
organizes the public utility services. These factors may not affect fixing the amount of 
fine since the antimonopoly act does not qualify them as mitigating circumstances.
•	 Fines	–	function	of	fines,	leniency
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 5 August 2010, VI ACa 116/10, nyr
Preventive function of the fine is not distorted by the leniency programme. The programme 
is open for any undertaking involved in anticompetitive agreement that follows the statutory 
conditions for fine reduction in exchange for cooperation with the antimonopoly authority. 
The leniency programme serves the public interest since it results in more efficient detection 
and elimination of anticompetitive agreements.
•	 Fines	–	legal	character	and	function	of	procedural	fines,	duty	to	cooperate
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 April 2004, III SK 31/04, nyr
Financial sanction for refusal to provide the information or supply of false or misleading 
information is not a criminal sanction. The character of this sanction is administrative 
and hence the interpretation rules of criminal law are not applicable in this situation. 
Not every antimonopoly sanction or fine is the criminal sanction. Procedural sanctions 
imposed by the antimonopoly authority are sanctions resulting from neglecting procedural 
duties of undertaking during the antimonopoly proceedings and they are of administrative 
character. Those sanctions may serve several goals. They are repressive – they are imposed 
for violation of statutory duty of every undertaking to cooperate with the antimonopoly 
authority. They are preventive – they prevent similar infringements from occurring in the 
future and encourage abiding by the law. They are disciplinary – awareness of the sanction 
discourages undertaking from non-obeying the law. Those goals are similar to goals of the 
criminal sanctions, however, they are not the same […].
•	 Fines	-	failure	to	notify	a	merger
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 December 1999, XVII Ama 67/99, nyr
Imposition of the fine […] for the failure to notify the merger lies within the administrative 
discretion of the antimonopoly authority. The lack of adverse effects on competition of 
not-notified merger may be a mitigating factor for determination of the amount of fine. 
•	 Fines	–	failure	to	execute	decision
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 12 February 2001, XVII Ama 42/00, nyr
Delay in execution of the final judgment of the antimonopoly court gives a ground for 
imposing the financial sanction.
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•	 Fines	–	failure	to	execute	decision,	fining	directives
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 2 December 1998, XVII Ama 55/98, Wokanda 
2000, No. 2, item 56
When determining the amount of the fine for non-executing of the decision or the judgment, 
the antimonopoly authority should take into the consideration the degree of intent of 
the undertaking, social detriment caused by the anticompetitive behavior and financial 
condition of the undertaking. 
•	 Fines	–	failure	to	execute	decision,	local	government
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 4 December 2003, 
XVII Ama 4/03, Wokanda 2004, No. 11, item 51
If the municipality refuses to desist from the anticompetitive practice, as ordered in 
the decision of the antimonopoly authority […], it creates a legal ground for fining the 
municipality for non-execution of the final decision in accordance with Article 102(1) [at 
present Article 107] of the antimonopoly act. 
•	 Fines	–	reduction	of	fines,	aggravating	circumstances
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 16 November 1994, XVII Amr 31/94, Wokanda 
1995, No. 9, item 52
[Decisions of the antimonopoly authority are not enforceable if challenged before the 
court] Except for extraordinary circumstances, the antimonopoly court does not reduce the 
amount of the fine imposed by the antimonopoly authority if the undertaking concerned 
does desist from the anticompetitive behavior during the court proceedings.
•	 Fines	–	procedural	fines,	duty	to	cooperate
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 9 July 2003, XVII 
Ama 98/02, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2004, No. 1, item 280 
When the undertaking refuses to provide the antimonopoly authority with the information 
requested it may be subject to a financial sanction.
•	 Fines	–	desistance	from	the	anticompetitive	behavior
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 2 June 2005, XVII 
Ama 65/04, nyr
Discontinuance of the anticompetitive behavior may not be a ground for desistence from 
imposing a fine on the undertaking. Such desistence would be contrary to the repressive 
function of the antimonopoly fines.
•	 Fines	–	due	process,	anticompetitive	practices
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 20 May 2005, VI ACa 87/05, Apel.-W-wa 2006, No. 
2, item 14
If the decision imprecisely defines what constituted the anticompetitive behavior of 
the undertaking, the undertaking concerned may not be fined for non-executing of such 
decision.
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•	 Fines	–	financing	of	fines,	local	government
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 January 2007, III SK 16/06, Glosa 2008, No. 1, 
p. 95
The source, the form and the method of financing the due fine by the undertaking is 
irrelevant […] from the point of view of the goals and functions of the fine. Therefore the 
local government should not be put in a privileged position only because its serves local 
community and organizes the public utility services [The antimonopoly authority should 
disregard the legal form of the undertaking when imposing a fine].
•	 Fines	–	application	of	fines,	lack	of	consistent	case	law
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 15 July 2009, III SK 34/08, OSNP 2011, No. 7-8, 
item 117
The lack of prior decisions or a case law finding a certain behavior of the undertakings as 
anticompetitive does not create a legal obstacle to sanction such behavior and fine the 
undertaking.
•	 Fines	–	strict	interpretation	of	rules	on	fines,	quasi–criminal	character	of	rules	on	
fines
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 2 February 2011, VI ACa 907/10, nyr
Interpretation of the provisions of the antimonopoly act on fines should be rigorous so as to 
avoid the risk of any mistake when imposing fines. Furthermore, when the court reviews the 
case where the fine was imposed, it should follow the judicial standard of review applicable 
in criminal cases.
6.  Antimonopoly proceedings
•	 Antimonopoly	 proceedings	 –	 legal	 character	 of	 notification	 of	 possible	
anticompetitive	behavior	
Order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 12 July 2011, II GSK 1035/11, nyr
[Everybody has the right to submit to the antimonopoly authority a formal written 
notification of possible anticompetitive practices being applied] The antimonopoly 
authority verifies the submitted notification in order to establish whether there is a need to 
institute the antimonopoly proceedings. […] If the information submitted is not sufficient, 
the antimonopoly authority may institute the explanatory proceedings that may precede the 
antimonopoly proceedings. The notifying individual [enjoys the right to official response 
to their notification but] is not entitled to challenge the position of the antimonopoly 
authority. The information refusing the institution of the antimonopoly proceedings should 
not be treated as an administrative decision. The response is of purely informative character 
and it is not a binding administrative act. The antimonopoly authority enjoys discretion as 
to how to respond to notification and whether to institute the antimonopoly proceedings. 
The only obligation of the antimonopoly authority is to transmit to the notifying individual 
the information concerning the reasoned and official assessment of the notification. The 
antimonopoly authority is not bound by the notification and enjoys full discretion whether 
to institute antimonopoly proceedings. 
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	party	to	the	proceedings,	limited	rights	of	competitors
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 April 1998, XVII Ama 81/97, Wokanda 1999, 
No. 4, item 61
1. During the merger proceedings the competitor is not the party to the merger proceedings 
[The party to the proceedings is the active party to the concentration].
2. The competitor to the party to the merger proceedings is precluded from demanding 
abrogation of the merger decision [Such demand is inadmissible as he has no right to appeal 
against the decision of the antimonopoly authority].
•	 Antimonopoly	 proceedings	 –	 procedural	 guarantees	 for	 parties,	 evidence	
proceedings	
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 September 1995, XVII Amr 40/95, Wokanda 
1996, No. 10, item 56
According to Article 7 of the administrative procedural code, the antimonopoly authority 
is obliged to follow the principle of legalism and to comprehensively investigate the case 
and reveal relevant facts. [The antimonopoly proceedings are the inquisitorial process] 
The character of antimonopoly proceedings determines that the antimonopoly authority 
is obliged to secure the public interest. Furthermore, it is the antimonopoly authority on 
whom rests the responsibility to lead the proceedings and actively collect evidence […].
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	procedural	guarantees
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 20 August 2001, XVII Ama 115/00, Journal of 
Laws of UOKiK of 2001, No. 3, item 124
The antimonopoly proceedings, as a special administrative proceedings, should follow the 
procedural standards as set out by the procedural administrative code.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	-	procedural	guarantees,	access	to	files,	right	to	reply
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 13 September 2000, XVII Ama 71/99, nyr
[The antimonopoly authority is obliged to inform the party about the conclusion of evidence 
proceedings and allow the party to gain access to the collected evidence and to take the 
stance in relation to the collected evidence. When informing about the conclusion of the 
evidence proceedings, the antimonopoly authority sets a time limit for the party to gain 
this access] If the antimonopoly authority issues the decision before the expiration of time 
limit set to scrutinize the case files by the party and to state its position, such decision is 
defective and should be set aside [The rule does not apply to merger proceedings].
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	access	to	public	information,	access	to	files
Judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 29 March 2012, II SAB/Wa 485/11, 
nyr
[The notion of ‘public information’ is very broad in Polish law] The notion of public 
information covers all documents, files and other materials produced by public authorities, 
as well as any other materials collected during and in connection with the proceedings. 
Therefore, even if the document was produced by the undertaking and submitted upon 
request of the antimonopoly authority, it is a piece of public information. Consequently, the 
notification form provided by the party to the antimonopoly proceedings is a piece of public 
information. This form is a part of case files which as a whole are covered by the notion of 
public information.
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	procedural	guarantees	for	the	parties
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 July 1999, XVII Ama 34/99, Wokanda 2000, 
No. 12, item 44
Decision of the antimonopoly authority is defective if it was issued in the proceedings 
conducted without the party [It may occur if the authority incorrectly identifies the parties 
or neglects to inform all parties about the proceedings].
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	protection	of	business	secrets
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 July 2002, XVII Ama 78/01, Journal of Laws 
of UOKiK of 2002, No. 5, item 224
Business secret remains a secret even if an undertaking does not actively secure it from 
disclosing. Therefore, even if the undertaking expresses the willingness to disclose the 
secret, it remains protected until the undertaking actually does so.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	protection	of	business	secrets
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 18 November 1998, XVII Amz 4/98, nyr
The antimonopoly authority may ex officio or upon the motion of the undertaking restrict 
access to case files to the other parties to the proceedings. The entity may do so, if the 
disclosure of the files would result in revealing business secrets to other undertakings, in 
particular its competitors.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	protection	of	business	secrets
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 15 May 1996, XVII Amz 2/96, nyr
According to the definition of the business secret, as defined in Article 11(4) of the Act of 
16 April 1993 on combating unfair competition, any data of the volume and value of sales or 
sources of sale and supply may be treated as business secret. If the undertaking is obliged 
to provide the antimonopoly authority with this sort of data, it may demand from the 
authority to restrict the access to this data to any third parties, especially competitors.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	protection	of	business	secrets
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 27 November 1996, XVII Amz 4/96, nyr
Tax declarations of the undertaking contain highly confidential information and may not be 
disclosed to other undertakings during the antimonopoly proceedings.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	protection	of	business	secrets
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 September 2001, I CKN 1159/2000, OSNC 2002, 
No. 5 item 67
Articles 11(1) and 11(4) of the Act of 16 April 1993 on combating unfair competition define 
the notion of ‘business secret’. In accordance with this definition, a piece of information 
that may be collected with the use of ordinary and lawful measures by anybody, may not 
be treated a business secret.
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	legal	character	of	explanatory	proceedings,	protection	
of	business	secrets	
Resolution of the Supreme Court of 8 April 2010, III SZP 1/10, OSNP 2011, No. 5-6, item 89
1.  [The explanatory proceedings are supplementary proceedings that may precede the 
antimonopoly proceedings] The explanatory proceedings are of internal administrative 
nature. Those proceedings do not affect any rights or obligations of any individual and 
there are no parties to such proceedings. The explanatory proceedings are concluded 
with administrative act. However, this act is very peculiar because it is not directed to 
any individual. This act is a measure allowing the antimonopoly authority to institute 
the antimonopoly proceedings.
2.  [There are no parties to the explanatory proceedings] Therefore, the antimonopoly 
authority is not competent to restrict access to files of these proceedings in relation 
to any individual. [In Polish law only the parties to the proceedings enjoy the right of 
access to the case files] The antimonopoly authority may restrict the access to the files 
only during the antimonopoly proceedings.
3.  The antimonopoly authority may restrict access to the files to any party to the proceedings 
in relation to particular protected information. The extent of such restriction depends 
on the character of protected information and on the party to which this restriction will 
be addressed.
4.  During the explanatory proceedings the antimonopoly authority collects information 
from the undertakings. Those undertakings may demand from the authority to 
restrict the provided information because it contains business secrets. Such motions 
are not relevant during the explanatory proceedings since there are no parties and 
no undertaking has access to files. However, if the information collected during the 
explanatory proceedings is used during the antimonopoly proceedings, the antimonopoly 
authority should follow demands of the undertakings and restrict access to files to the 
parties to the antimonopoly proceedings.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	evidence	proceedings,	duty	to	cooperate	
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 28 June 1995, XVII Amr 14/95, Wokanda 1996, 
No. 7, item 62
1. The antimonopoly authority may demand from undertaking to provide it with all necessary 
information concerning this undertaking. Such demand may be issued within the limits set 
by the competences of the antimonopoly authority and the subject of the antimonopoly 
proceedings.
2. Unjustified refusal to provide requested information may result in imposition of fines 
upon the undertaking or its CEO.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	obligations	of	party,	duty	to	cooperate
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 September 1993, XVII Amr 22/93, Wokanda 
1994, No. 2, item 54
The party to the antimonopoly proceedings is obliged to cooperate with the antimonopoly 
authority. Commercial secrets of the party may not be a legal ground for refusal to provide 
information requested by the antimonopoly authority.
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	services	during	the	proceedings
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1993, XVII Amr 37/92, Wokanda 1993, 
No. 8, item 33
Delivery of the decision by fax is not legally effective in view of Articles 9 and 49 of the 
administrative procedural code.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	standard	of	proof,	indirect	evidence
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1993, XVII Amr 37/92, Wokanda 1993, 
No. 8, item 33
The facts of the case may be established with the use of direct and indirect evidence. 
Existence of the anticompetitive agreement may be proven indirectly by showing parallel 
behavior of undertakings and proving that such behavior may be only the result of collusion 
in absence of any circumstantial or objective evidence justifying such behavior.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	expert	opinions,	rights	of	defense
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 April 2002, XVII Ama 41/01, nyr
If the party to the proceedings challenges the testimony of the expert, the antimonopoly 
authority is obliged to organize a hearing and allow the expert to supplement such 
testimonies. 
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	two	types	of	control	of	undertaking,	duty	to	cooperate
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 11 August 2003, XVII 
Ama 123/02, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2004, No. 1, item 281
[There are two kinds of inspections in the antimonopoly act: the simple inspection and 
the inspection connected with the search of premises or persons] The simple inspection, 
as laid down in Article 57 [at present Article 105a] of the antimonopoly act, differs from 
the inspection connected with search, as regulated in Article 58 [at present Article 105c] 
of the antimonopoly act, because it is based on the voluntary and conscious cooperation 
of the inspected undertaking. During the simple inspection the undertaking is obliged to 
provide any necessary information or access to books, documents, data storage, premises 
and means of transport. Lack of cooperation during the simple inspection may result in 
imposition of financial sanctions upon the undertaking. However, the antimonopoly authority 
may not force the undertaking to grant immediate access on the spot to demanded items. 
The inspection with search is authorized by the court and hence it may be conducted 
without the prior consent or knowledge of the inspected undertaking. The employees of the 
antimonopoly authority are entitled to enter any room belonging to the undertaking and 
have access to books, documents, data storage, premises and means of transport related 
to the subject of inspection.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	inspection	of	premises,	duty	to	cooperate
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 May 2004, III SK 35/04, OSNP 2005, No. 7, item 103
During the inspection of the premises of the undertaking the obligation of the undertaking 
to cooperate with the antimonopoly authority includes providing access to the employees of 
the authority to all documents related to the subject of the inspection or providing a copy 
of all such documents.
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	procedural	fines,	duty	to	cooperate
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 April 2004, III SK 31/04, OSNP 2005, No. 4, item 60
The fine under Article 101(2)(2)(b) [at present Article 106(2)(2)] of the antimonopoly act 
is imposed upon the undertaking for the lack of response to the formal request of the 
antimonopoly authority to present the necessary information. Such information is necessary 
for the proper and prompt conduct of the antimonopoly proceedings. Late response, after 
the institution of the fining procedure, does not preclude the antimonopoly authority from 
imposing the financial sanction. [The sanction is of punitive character and is designed 
to persuade undertaking to cooperate efficiently and it prevents obstruction of the 
antimonopoly proceedings because of the lack of cooperation of undertakings]
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	inspection	of	companies’	premises,	prior	information	
on	instituting	proceedings
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 16 December 1998, XVII Ama 62/98, Wokanda 
2000, No. 4, item 52
It is not compulsory to institute the antimonopoly proceedings against the undertaking and 
notify them of this fact in advance, in order to conduct the inspection of premises of the 
undertaking concerned.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	suspension	of	proceedings,	role	of	a	judgment	of	civil	
court
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 December 1997, XVII Amz 5/97, nyr
The judgment of the civil court adjudicating on the private lawsuit based on the possible 
infringement of the antimonopoly act is not binding for the antimonopoly authority. Any 
parallel civil law proceedings regarding the possible infringement of the antimonopoly act 
do not give any ground to suspend the antimonopoly proceedings.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	discontinuance	of	proceedings
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 28 June 1995, XVII Amr 24/95, Wokanda 1996, 
No. 8, item 53
When the antimonopoly authority discontinues the proceedings, it may neither present any 
substantive analysis of the case nor express any official standing of the authority as regards 
the possible infringement of the antimonopoly law [Discontinuance of the proceedings is 
a purely formal conclusion of the antimonopoly proceedings without any references to the 
merits of the case].
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	standard	of	decision	making,	limits	for	administrative	
adjudication	
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 31 May 1995, XVII Amr 1/95, nyr
If the antimonopoly authority finds the behavior of the undertaking anticompetitive, it 
is obliged to expressly forbid such behavior in the decision. However, the antimonopoly 
authority is limited in its adjudication and may not oblige the undertaking to undertake 
certain actions in order not to infringe the antimonopoly act.
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	standard	of	decision	making,	rights	of	defense	
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 January 1995, XVII Amr 45/94, Wokanda 
1995, No. 12, item 54
If the decision of the antimonopoly authority is vague and imprecise and gives grounds for 
contrary interpretations of its contents - such decision is defective and unenforceable.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	standard	of	decision	making,	rights	of	defense	
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 1 March 1995, XVII Amr 63/94, Wokanda 1996, 
No. 2, item 59
Decision of the antimonopoly authority imposing a fine upon the undertaking needs to 
present legal and factual reasoning. Lack of such presentation makes a decision defective 
and results in setting aside the challenged decision.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	appeal	against	decision
Resolution of the Supreme Court of 7 April 1994, III CZP 35/94, PS 1998, No. 2, p. 111
The party may challenge the decision of the antimonopoly authority in whole or in part, 
including challenging exclusively the factual and legal reasoning.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	appeal	against	decision
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 22 June 1994, XVII Amr 45/93, Wokanda 1995, 
No. 3, item 52
The party may challenge the decision with relation to the legal and factual reasoning 
presented in the decision without questioning the substance of the decision. Such situation 
may occur when the given reasoning is contrary to the basic principles of the administrative 
procedure such as legalism, discovery of objective truth or securing the justified interest 
of the party. This may also take place when the reasoning in question infringes the rights of 
the party, adversely affects the good name of the party or impedes the commercial activity 
of the party.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	 –	appeal	against	decision,	 time	 limit	 to	challenge	 the	
decision	of	the	antimonopoly	authority
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 14 May 1997, XVII Ama 25/97, nyr
The appeal lodged after the lapse of prescribed 14-day time limit to lodge the appeal 
results in disregarding the appeal by the antimonopoly court. 
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	 –	appeal	against	decision,	 time	 limit	 to	challenge	 the	
decision	of	the	antimonopoly	authority
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 4 January 2000, XVII Amo 5/99, nyr
The time limit to lodge the appeal is a statutory time limit. Therefore this time limit may 
not be prolonged neither by the party nor by the court.
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	 –	appeal	against	decision,	 time	 limit	 to	challenge	 the	
decision	of	the	antimonopoly	authority,	restitution	of	time	limit
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 4 February 1998, XVII Ama 65/97, nyr
1.  The court is competent to restore the time limit for lodging the appeal if the party 
presents probable exculpatory grounds and lodge the appeal at the same time. 
2.  Negative consequences for the party of entering into force the decision of the 
antimonopoly authority may not be regarded as an exculpatory ground for restoring the 
time limit for lodging the appeal.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	 –	appeal	against	decision,	 time	 limit	 to	challenge	 the	
decision	of	the	antimonopoly	authority,	restitution	of	time	limit
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 7 October 1998, XVII Ama 68/98 , nyr
If the time limit for lodging the appeal has lapsed, the party may request the court to 
restore the time limit. Along with lodging such demand, the party must lodge the appeal at 
the same time (Article 169(1) of the civil procedural code) [Such demand is admissible only 
if the non-observance of time limit was a result of external circumstances].
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	appeal	against	decision,	association	of	undertakings
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 December 2000, XVII Ama 85/99, Wokanda 2001, 
No. 11, item 52
If the association of undertakings did not take part in the proceedings before the 
antimonopoly authority, it is not competent to lodge the appeal on behalf of the member 
of this association who was the party to the proceedings.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	appeal	against	decision
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 October 1997, XVII Ama 49/97, Wokanda 1998, 
No. 11, item 62
The appeal must be lodged through the intermediary of the antimonopoly authority […]. 
The lodging of the appeal with the court directly is ineffective and may lead to the lapse of 
the time limit to lodge the appeal.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	appeal	against	decision,	scope	of	appeal
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 13 November 2000, XVII Ama 11/00, nyr
The appeal is limited by the subject of the decision. Therefore, the appeal may not 
challenge issues that were not the subject of the decision. Such appeal is inadmissible and 
should be disregarded by the court.   
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	appeal	against	decision,	scope	of	appeal
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 23 April 1997, XVII Ama 7/97, nyr
The appeal against non-existing decision is inadmissible.
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•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	appeal	against	decision,	self-control	procedure,	passage	
of	appeal,	limited	jurisdiction	of	the	court	over	the	antimonopoly	proceedings
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 10 April 2006, XVII 
Ama 89/05, nyr
1.  Article 78(4) [at present Article 91(3)] of the antimonopoly act empowers the President 
of UOKiK to set aside their decision whenever they find the appeal justified. However, 
the President enjoys a full discretion as to the essence of the new decision and therefore 
the substance of a new decision does not need to differ from the old one since the new 
decision may only provide for new factual and legal justification of the decision.
2.  The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection is not competent to control the 
course of proceedings before the antimonopoly authority. Therefore the court is 
precluded from controlling the duration of antimonopoly proceedings or timing of the 
transferring appeal and case files to the court.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	execution	of	court	judgment	abrogating	decision	of	the	
antimonopoly	authority
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 18 October 2000, XVII Ama 6/00, Wokanda 
2001, No. 12, item 51
After setting aside the challenged decision of the antimonopoly authority by the 
antimonopoly court – the antimonopoly authority enjoys full discretion on how to further 
proceed with the case. The authority may discontinue the antimonopoly proceedings. It may 
also proceed with the case and continue the antimonopoly proceedings. After conducting 
the proceedings and finding the infringement of the antimonopoly act, the authority may 
issue a new decision.
•	 Antimonopoly	proceedings	–	resumption	of	proceedings
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 June 2001, XVII Ama 31/01, nyr
The motion of the party for resumption of the antimonopoly proceedings concluded with 
the final decision is inadmissible.
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7.  Proceedings before 
the antimonopoly court
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	scope	of	judicial	review
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 5 January 2000, XVII Amo 1/00, nyr
The antimonopoly court is competent to hear appeals against decisions of the antimonopoly 
authority and appeals against decisions of the energy regulator. Therefore the antimonopoly 
court is not competent to adjudicate on the civil lawsuit of the energy consumer in which 
it demands to control whether the energy seller complies with provisions of the energy law, 
the antimonopoly law or the law on unfair competition.
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	scope	of	judicial	review
Judgment of Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 27 October 2009, XVII 
Ama 126/08, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2010, No. 1, item 5
The appeal against the decision of the antimonopoly authority may not be based on 
indicated procedural shortcomings that occurred during the antimonopoly proceedings. The 
court independently hears the case from the beginning and any procedural irregularities 
taking place during proceedings before the antimonopoly authority are irrelevant for the 
outcome of the court proceedings.
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	scope	of	judicial	review
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 July 2001, XVII Ama 96/00, nyr
The Antimonopoly Court adjudicates within the limits of the case as set by the challenged 
decision. 
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	scope	of	judicial	review
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 May 2004, III SK 44/04, OSNP 2005, No. 9, 
item 136
The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection may not limit its jurisdiction to control 
the challenged decision towards its legality. The court is obliged to adjudicate on the 
substance of the case and apply other criteria when reviewing the questioned decision.
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	scope	of	judicial	review
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 19 January 2011, VI ACa 1031/10, nyr VI ACa 
1031/10 
The control of administrative decisions is a competence of public authorities and 
administrative courts. Civil courts, such as the antimonopoly court, are obliged to investigate 
the case from the beginning and adjudicate on the substance of the case [and not limit 
itself to control the challenged decision].
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	scope	of	judicial	review
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 20 September 1995, XVII Amr 15/95, Wokanda 
1996, No. 8, item 57
When there are more then one addressee of the decision of the antimonopoly authority and 
only some of them appeal against the decision, the antimonopoly court is obliged to take ex 
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offcio into consideration the interests of other addressees if the challenged decision affects 
their rights or obligations, as well […].
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	 –	character	of	proceedings,	rights	of	
the	parties
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 14 September 2006, 
XVII Ama 71/05, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2006, No. 4, item 61
The proceedings before the antimonopoly court are the first instance proceedings. Lodging 
the appeal initiates regular civil proceedings. The court independently assesses the evidence 
and establishes the facts. During the court proceedings the parties are entitled to demand 
production of new pieces of evidence. The appeal sets the limits of courts adjudication in 
the given case.
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	rules	of	evidence	proceedings
Judgment of the Court of Appeals of 31 May 2012, VI ACa 1299/10 , nyr
The proceedings before the antimonopoly court are the first instance proceedings. Lodging 
the appeal initiates regular civil proceedings. The prior administrative proceedings before 
the antimonopoly authority is the necessary prerequisite before the initiation of the court 
proceedings. The antimonopoly court is obliged to investigate the case from the beginning. 
The court may not rely on facts established by the antimonopoly authority [and is obliged 
to make its independent conclusions].
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	rules	of	evidence	proceedings
Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 19 December 2006, 
XVII Ama 15/06, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2007, No. 2, item 21
When hearing the appeal against the decision of the antimonopoly authority the court 
applies rules on evidence applicable in civil not administrative proceedings. […] As 
a consequence the court is not bound by the principle of discovering objective truth and 
the burden of proof rests upon the party claiming the fact [In administrative proceedings 
public authorities are obliged to produce all necessary and available evidence in order to 
discover the ‘objective truth’. In civil proceedings the court relies on the facts established 
upon the evidence produced during the process and may rely on the ‘formal truth’].
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	rules	of	evidence	proceedings
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 21 September 2006, VI ACa 142/06 , Journal of Laws 
of UOKiK of 2007, No. 1, item 13
The proceedings before the antimonopoly court were and are the first instance proceedings. 
[…] Therefore, the antimonopoly court is competent and obliged to independently assess all 
the evidence and draw its own conclusions. Furthermore, the court is obliged to indicate 
the evidence on which it relied and explain why it disregarded opposing evidence [The court 
cannot limit its jurisdiction and rely on the facts established by the antimonopoly 
authority].
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•	 Proceedings	 before	 the	 antimonopoly	 court	 –	 evidence	 proceedings,	 expert	
opinions
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 April 2002, I CKN 92/00, nyr
Private expert opinions produced for the party may not be regarded as an evidence from 
the expert opinion, even if the expert is a registered court expert. [In Poland courts keep 
official registries of experts] Private expert opinions ordered by the party during or even 
before court proceedings may be regarded by the court as additional supporting statements 
of the party. However, if the court believes that there is a need to hear the expert – such 
expert should be summoned by the court in accordance with applicable rule on evidence in 
civil proceedings.
•	 Proceedings	 before	 the	 antimonopoly	 court	 –	 duties	 of	 the	 court,	 issuance	 of	
a	judgment,	commitment	decisions
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09, OSNP 2011, No. 9-10, 
item 144
1. When issuing a judgment, the antimonopoly court verifies the challenged decision 
of the antimonopoly authority. […] The antimonopoly court may change the challenged 
decision in part and abrogate the decision in the remaining scope. The court changes the 
challenged decision to remedy discovered defects of the decision. However, there are some 
shortcomings that may not be remedied during the court proceedings. Such defects give 
grounds for abrogation of the decision. [The challenged decision may also have defects 
which do not adversely affect the substance of the decision] Therefore, the court is not 
obliged to address all issues raised in the appeal. It is especially true when the appellant 
does not show that indicated defects of the challenged decision adversely affect the 
substance of the decision.
2. […] Commitment decisions are one of the possible types of decisions concluding the 
antimonopoly proceedings. They may be issued instead of decisions finding the infringement 
of competition rules. Therefore, the motion of the party to issue a commitment decision 
does not initiate new antimonopoly proceedings, but it is considered during the proceedings 
already initiated. 
•	 Proceedings	 before	 the	 antimonopoly	 court-duties	 of	 the	 court,	 issuance	 of	
a	judgment
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 05 April 2011, III SK 39/10, nyr
The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection and the Court of Appeal adjudicate 
on appeals from the regulatory authorities. Both courts review the substance of the case 
and they are obliged to take into consideration the state of law and fact as of the date of 
issuance of the court judgment.
•	 Proceedings	 before	 the	 antimonopoly	 court-duties	 of	 the	 court,	 issuance	 of	
a	judgment
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 May 2001, XVII Ame 36/00, nyr
Substantial change of the applicable law during the court proceedings may justify abrogation 
of the challenged decision. 
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•	 Proceedings	 before	 the	 antimonopoly	 court	 –	 duties	 of	 the	 court,	 issuance	 of	
a	judgment,	fines
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 13 February 2008, VI ACa 463/07, nyr
Financial sanction issued upon Article 101(2)(1) [at present Article 106(1)(1)] of the 
antimonopoly act is of subsidiary character. The primary (behavioral) sanction is the 
obligation to desist from the anticompetitive practice. When challenging the financial 
penalty, the party is obliged to prove that there were no grounds for issuing the fine. This 
may be proven by showing that there was no violation of Article 6 or 9 of the antimonopoly 
act [i.e. prohibition of anticompetitive practices]. Furthermore, the party may claim that 
issuing a financial sanction was not necessary for achieving the goal of the antimonopoly act 
and that the primary (behavioral) sanction fulfils that objective.
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	cassatory	appeal
Order of the Supreme Court of 12 September 2009, III SK 32/08 , nyr
[Cassatory appeals are extraordinary legal measures against final judgments of lower civil 
courts handled by the Supreme Court] During proceedings before the antimonopoly court 
and the court of appeal, a cassatory appeal is available to the party if the final judgment 
of the court of appeal was issued concluding proceedings in the competition case [starting 
with the antimonopoly authority and completed with the ruling of the court of appeal]. It 
means that the cassatory appeal is available if the competition case has been concluded 
with the final judgment of the court of appeal dismissing the appeal from the judgment of 
the antimonopoly court changing the challenged decision of the antimonopoly authority. 
[…] The cassatory appeal is available, as well, from the judgment of the court of appeal 
upholding the appeal from the judgment of the antimonopoly court changing the challenged 
judgment.
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	cassatory	appeal
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 January 2001, I CKN 1036/98, nyr
[Cassatory appeals are extraordinary legal measures against final judgments of lower 
civil courts handled by the Supreme Court] Cassatory appeal is inadmissible if it indicates 
the alleged infringement of the specific substantive provision of the antimonopoly act 
concerning the anticompetitive practice different from the practice established in the 
challenged judgment.
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	execution	of	the	court	judgment
Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 November 1991, XVII Amr 13/91, nyr
If the judgment of the court does not state otherwise it should be executed without undue 
delay. Execution without undue delay does not mean that the judgment must be executed 
immediately after it was issued. The time limit for execution of the judgment should be 
adjusted as to provide the addressee of the judgment with adequate time for preparing to 
execute such judgment.
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•	 Proceedings	 before	 the	 antimonopoly	 court	 –	 setting	 aside	 of	 administrative	
decision,	duties	of	the	antimonopoly	authority
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 18 October 2000, XVII Ama 6/00, Wokanda 2001, 
No. 12, item 51
After setting aside of the challenged decision of the antimonopoly authority by the 
antimonopoly court, the authority enjoys a full discretion as to its next steps (Article 
479(34)(2) of the Civil procedural code). The antimonopoly authority may discontinue the 
antimonopoly proceedings. The authority may also reopen antimonopoly proceedings and 
[…] issue a decision. 
•	 Proceedings	before	the	antimonopoly	court	–	costs	of	proceedings
Order of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 November 1995, XVII Amr 64/95, Wokanda 1997, 
No. 2, item 52
The antimonopoly authority may demand from the party which had withdrawn its appeal 
to cover the cost of appeal proceedings, even though the withdrawal took place before the 
transmission of appeal and case files to the antimonopoly court.
8.  Proceedings before   
the administrative courts
•	 Administrative	 court	 proceedings	 –	 complaint	 against	 the	 failure	 to	 act	 of	 the	
antimonopoly	authority
Order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 May 2012, II GSK 620/12, nyr
According to Article 3(2)(8) of the Act on proceedings before administrative courts, the 
administrative court is competent to hear complaints against the failure to act as well as 
extensive and long-lasting conducting of antimonopoly proceedings by the antimonopoly 
authority.
•	 Administrative	 court	 proceedings	 –	 territorial	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 administrative	
court
Order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 September 2009, II GZ 211/09, nyr
Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw is competent to review complaints against an 
act issued by the branch office of UOKiK in Gdansk. The jurisdiction of the voivodeship 
administrative court depends on the seat of the authority. The branch office of the 
antimonopoly authority issues decisions on behalf of the President of UOKiK and the seat 
of the President is in Warsaw. [Jurisdiction of administrative courts concerns the control 
of special acts and activities of the antimonopoly authority other then administrative 
decisions and orders]
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PART III BASIC LEGAL TEXTS
1. Introduction
Polish competition law consists of many acts of different legal nature. The pivotal role 
rests upon the Act on competition and consumer protection and implementing regulations. 
However, since the Act on competition and consumer protection contains many references 
to other statutes, those acts are also enlisted. Finally, to give the full picture of relevant 
legislation, soft law documents are presented as well. Soft law documents are not binding, 
but they provide official interpretations of the statutes in force and therefore cannot be 
ignored during application of the Polish competition law provisions. This book is devoted to 
the Polish competition law and hence binding European competition rules are not presented. 
Furthermore, the selection does not cover any binding international agreements since Poland 
is not a party to any bilateral or multilateral international agreements on competition 
law. The Polish competition authority has the right to cooperate with other antitrust 
authorities and conclude informal agreements, however, they are non-binding international 
agreements. Usually, they concern the development of international cooperation forums 
in the field of competition, such as the International Competition Network, the European 
Competition Authorities or other numerous arrangements regarding the cooperation within 
the European Competition Network. Those documents are well-known and easily accessible 
and hence they are omitted here.
Due to editorial restrictions, only selected acts are presented in this volume. The selection 
was made in accordance with the practical relevance of particular acts and frequency of 
their application. The majority of omitted acts are accessible on the website of UOKiK 
– www.uokik.gov.pl. Finally, there is a number of short clarifications and comments 
on particular problems issued by the antimonopoly authority. All of them are in Polish 
exclusively. Due to their temporal nature and limited application, they are not listed and 
have been omitted, as well.
General
Statutes and Regulations
1. Act of 27 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection, Journal of Laws No. 
50, item 331, with further amendments.
2. Act 16 April 1993 on combating unfair competition (consolidated act), Journal of Laws of 
2003 No. 153, item 1503, with further amendments. (not published in this volume)
3. Act of 14 June 1960 – Administrative Procedural Code, Journal of Laws of 2000 No. 98, 
item 1071, with further amendments. (not published in this volume)
4. Act of 17 June 1966 on administrative execution proceedings, Journal of Laws of 2005 
No. 229, item 1954, with further amendments. (not published in this volume)
5. Act of 6 June 1997 – Penal Procedural Code, Journal of Laws No. 89, item 555, with 
further amendments. (not published in this volume)
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6. Regulation of the Prime Minister of 1 July 2009 on determination of territorial and 
material jurisdiction of regional bureaus of the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection, Journal of Laws No. 107, item 887. (not published in this volume)
Policy acts
1. Competition Policy for 2011–2013. (not published in this volume)
Anticompetitive practices
Regulations
1. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 13 December 2011 on exemption from the 
prohibition of competition restricting agreements of certain specialization agreements 
and research – development agreements, Journal of Laws No. 288, item 1691. (not 
published in this volume)
2. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 March 2011 on exemption from the prohibition 
of competition restricting agreements of certain vertical agreements, Journal of Laws 
No. 81, item 441.
3. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 8 October 2010 on the exemption of certain 
vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector from the prohibition of competition-
restricting agreements, Journal of Laws of 2010, No. 198, item 1315. (not published in 
this volume)
4. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 July 2007 on exemption from the prohibition 
of competition restricting agreements of certain categories of agreements concerning 
transfer of technologies, Journal of Laws No. 137, item 963. (not published in this 
volume)
5. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 22 March 2011 on exemption from the prohibition 
of competition restricting agreements of certain categories of agreements concluded 
between the undertakings conducting insurance business activity, Journal of Laws No. 
67, item 355. (not published in this volume)
Soft Law
1. Clarifications on issuance of commitment decisions concerning anticompetitive practices 
and collective consumer interests cases, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2012, No. 1, item 2. 
(not published in this volume)
Merger control
Regulations
1. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 July 2007 concerning the notification of the 
intention of concentration of undertakings, Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 134, item 936 
and 937.
2. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 July 2007 concerning the method of 
calculation of the turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration, Journal 
of Laws of 2007, No. 134, item 934 and 935. (not published in this volume)
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Soft Law
1. Clarifications on the criteria and procedure of notifying the intention of concentration to 
the President of UOKiK, Journal of Laws of UOKiK of 2011, No. 1, item 1. (not published 
in this volume)
2. Clarifications on substantive analysis of merger notifications, Journal of Laws of UOKiK 
of 2012, No. 1, item 1. (not published in this volume)
3. Clarifications on the mode of calculating time limits in antimonopoly merger proceedings. 
(not published in this volume)
Fines
Regulations
1. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 26 January 2009 concerning the mode of 
proceeding in cases of enterprises applications to the President of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection for immunity from or reduction of fines, Journal 
of Laws of 2009, No. 20, item 109.
Soft Law
1. Guidelines of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection on 
the Leniency Programme (the procedure of submitting and handling applications for 
immunity from or reduction of a fine – “leniency applications”). (not published in this 
volume)
2. Guidelines on setting fines for competition-restricting practices, Journal of Laws of 
UOKiK of 2008, No. 4, item 4. (not published in this volume)
Appeal proceedings before the courts
Proceedings before antimonopoly court and civil courts
1. Act of 17 November 1964 – the Civil Procedural Code, Journal of Laws No. 43, item 296, 
with further amendments. (not published in this volume)
2. Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 30 December 1998 on the establishment of 
antimonopoly court, Journal of Laws No. 166, item 1254. (not published in this 
volume)
Proceedings before administrative courts
1. Act of 25 July 2002 - Law on the regime of administrative courts, Journal of Laws of 2002, 
No. 153, item 1269, with further amendments. (not published in this volume)
2. Act of 30 August 2002 - Law on proceedings before administrative courts, Journal of 
Laws of 2002, No. 153, item 1270, with further amendments. (not published in this 
volume)
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2.  Act of 16 February 2007 
on competition and consumer protection
Title I
General provisions
Article 1
1.  The Act determines the conditions for the development and protection of competition as 
well as the principles of protecting the interests of undertakings and consumers in the public 
interest.
2.  The Act regulates the principles and measures of counteracting competition-restricting 
practices and practices infringing collective consumer interests, as well as anti-competitive 
concentrations of undertakings and their associations, where such practices or concentrations 
have or may have impact in the territory of the Republic of Poland.
3.  The Act also indicates the authorities competent in matters related to competition and 
consumer protection.
Article 2
1.  The Act is without prejudice to any rights following from provisions concerning the protection 
of intellectual and industrial property, in particular the provisions on the protection of 
inventions, utility and industrial models, topography of integrated circuits, trademarks, 
geographical indications, copyright and neighbouring rights.
2.  The Act shall apply to:
1)  contracts between undertakings, in particular licences, as well as to practices other 
than contracts concerning exercising rights referred to in paragraph 1 herein;
2)  contracts between undertakings related to:
a)  technical or technological information,
b)  principles of organisation and management
 – which have not been disclosed to the general public and in relation to which 
measures have been taken to prevent their disclosure, where such contracts result 
in an unjustified limitation of the freedom of business activity of their parties or in 
a significant restriction of competition in the market.
Article 3
The provisions of the Act shall not apply to restrictions of competition allowed by virtue of 
separate provisions.
Article 4
For the purposes of this Act:
1)  “undertaking” shall mean an undertaking in the meaning of the provisions on freedom 
of business activity, as well as:
a)  natural and legal person as well as an organisational unit without a legal status 
to which legislation grants legal capacity, organising or rendering public utility 
services, which do not constitute business activity in the meaning of the provisions 
on freedom of business activity,
b)  natural person exercising a profession on its own behalf and account or carrying out 
an activity as part of exercising such a profession,
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c)  natural person having control, in the meaning of subparagraph 4 herein, over at 
least one undertaking, even if the person does not carry out business activity in the 
meaning of the provisions on freedom of business activity, if this person undertakes 
further actions subject to the control of concentrations, referred to in Article 13;
d)  associations of undertakings in the meaning of subparagraph 2 – for the purposes 
of the provisions on competition-restricting practices and practices infringing 
collective consumer interests;
2)  “associations of undertakings” shall mean chambers, associations and other organizations 
associating undertakings referred to in subparagraph 1, as well as associations of such 
organisations;
3)  “dominant undertaking” shall mean an undertaking having control, in the meaning of 
subparagraph 4, over another undertaking;
4)  “taking over control” shall mean any form of direct or indirect acquisition of powers 
by an undertaking, allowing the undertaking, to exert, individually or jointly, taking 
into account all legal or factual circumstances, a decisive influence upon another 
undertaking or other undertakings. Such powers follow in particular from:
a)  holding directly or indirectly a majority of votes in the meeting of company members 
or general shareholders’ meeting, also in the capacity of a pledgee or user, or in 
the management board of another undertaking (dependent undertaking), including 
based on agreements with other persons,
b)  the right to appoint or recall a majority of members of the management board 
or supervisory board of another undertaking (dependent undertaking), including 
based on agreements with other persons,
c)  members of the undertaking’s management board or supervisory board constituting 
more than half of the members of another undertaking’s (dependent undertaking’s) 
management board,
d)  holding directly or indirectly a majority of votes in a dependent partnership or in 
the general meeting of a dependent cooperative, including based on agreements 
with other persons,
e)  holding a title to the entire or a part of the property of another undertaking 
(dependent undertaking),
f)  contract which envisages managing another undertaking (dependent undertaking) 
or such undertaking transferring its profits;
5)  “agreements” shall mean:
a)  agreements concluded between undertakings, between associations thereof 
and between undertakings and their associations, or certain provisions of such 
agreements,
b)  concerted practices undertaken in any form by two or more undertakings or 
associations thereof,
c)  resolutions or other acts of associations of undertakings or their statutory organs;
6)  “distribution agreements” shall mean agreements concluded between undertakings 
acting at different levels of the economic process aimed at purchase of products for 
further resale;
7)  “goods” shall mean items as well as all forms of energy, securities and other property 
rights, services as well as construction works;
8)  “prices” shall mean prices, also charges in the nature of prices, trade margins, 
commissions and markups;
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9)  “relevant market” shall mean a market of goods, which by reason of their intended use, 
price and characteristics, including quality, are regarded by the buyers as substitutes, 
and are offered in the area in which, by reason of their nature and characteristics, the 
existence of market access barriers, consumer preferences, significant differences in 
prices and transport costs, the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous;
10)  “dominant position” shall mean an undertaking’s market position which allows it to 
prevent effective competition in a relevant market thus enabling it to act to a significant 
degree independently of its competitors, contracting parties and consumers; it 
is assumed that an undertaking holds a dominant position if its market share in the 
relevant market exceeds 40%;
11)  “competitors” shall mean undertakings which introduce or may introduce, purchase or 
may purchase goods in the relevant market at the same time;
12)  “consumer” shall mean a consumer as defined by the Act of 23 April 1964 – the Civil 
Code (Journal of Laws No. 16, item 93, as amended));
13)  “consumer organisations” shall mean social organisations independent of undertakings 
and of associations thereof, whose statutory tasks include the protection of consumer 
interests; consumer organisations may run business activity on general terms, provided 
that the income from the activity serves solely to finance the execution of the 
organisations’ statutory tasks;
14)  “capital group” shall mean all undertakings controlled directly or indirectly by a single 
undertaking, including that undertaking;
15)  “revenue” shall mean the revenue gained in the fiscal year preceding the day of 
instituting the proceedings by virtue of the present Act, within the meaning of income 
tax provisions binding the undertaking;
16)  “average remuneration” shall mean an average monthly remuneration in the business 
sector in the last month of the quarter preceding the day of issuance of a decision by 
the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, published by the 
President of the Central Statistical Office pursuant to separate provisions;
17)  “business secret” shall mean business secret as defined in Article 11 paragraph 4 of the 
Act of 16 April 1993 on combating unfair competition (Journal of Laws of 2003 No. 153, 
item 1503, of 2004, as amended));
18)  “President of the Office” shall mean the President of the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection;
19)  “EC Treaty” shall mean the Treaty establishing the European Community (Official 
Journal EC C 325 of 24.12.2002);
20) “Regulation No. 1/2003/EC” shall mean Council Regulation No. 1/2003/EC of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Official Journal EU L 1 of 4.01.2003, p. 1; Official Journal EU 
Polish special edition, chapter 08, volume 02, p. 205);
21)  “Regulation No. 139/2004/EC” shall mean Council Regulation No. 139/2004/EC of 20 
January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (Official Journal 
EU L 024 of 29.01.2004, p.1; Official Journal EU Polish special edition, chapter 08, 
volume 03, p. 40);
22) “Regulation No. 2006/2004/EC” shall mean European Parliament and Council 
RegulationNo. 2006/2004/EC of 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (“Regulation 
on consumer protection cooperation”) (Official Journal EU L 364 of 9.12.2004).
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Article 5
The value of euro referred to in the Act shall be converted into Polish zloty, according to the 
average rate of foreign currencies published by the National Bank of Poland on the last day of 
the calendar year preceding the year in which the intention of concentration is notified or a fine 
imposed.
Title II
Prohibition of competition-restricting practices
Chapter 1
Prohibition of competition-restricting agreements
Article 6
1.  Agreements which have as their object or effect elimination, restriction or any other
infringement of competition on the relevant market shall be prohibited, in particular those
consisting in:
1)  fixing, directly or indirectly, prices and other trading conditions;
2)  limiting or controlling production or sale as well as technical development or 
investments;
3) dividing markets of sale or purchase;
4)  applying to equivalent agreements with third parties onerous or not homogenous 
agreement terms and conditions, thus creating for these parties diversified conditions 
of competition;
5)  making conclusion of an agreement subject to acceptance or fulfilment by the other 
party of another performance, having neither substantial nor customary relation with 
the subject of such agreement;
6)  limiting access to the market or eliminating from the market undertakings which are 
not parties to the agreement;
7)  collusion between undertakings entering a tender, or by those undertakings and the 
undertaking being the tender organiser, of the terms and conditions of bids to be 
proposed, particularly as regards the scope of works and the price.
2.  The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall be in their entirety or in the respective part 
void, subject to Articles 7 and 8.
Article 7
1.  The prohibition referred to in Article 6 paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements concluded 
between:
1)  competitors whose combined market share in the calendar year preceding the conclusion 
of the agreement does not exceed 5%;
2)  undertakings which are not competitors, if the market share of any of them in the 
calendar year preceding the conclusion of the agreement does not exceed 10%.
2.  The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to cases specified in Article 6, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph 1 to 3 and subparagraph 7.
Article 8
1.  The prohibition referred to in Article 6, paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements which at 
the same time:
1)  contribute to improvement of the production, distribution of goods or to technical or 
economic progress;
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2)  allow the buyer or user a fair share of benefits resulting thereof;
3)  do not impose upon the undertakings concerned such impediments which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
4)  do not afford these undertakings the possibility to eliminate competition in the relevant 
market in respect of a substantial part of the goods in question.
2.  The burden of providing evidence to circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 shall rest upon 
the undertaking concerned.
3.  The Council of Ministers may, by way of a regulation, exempt from the prohibition referred 
to in Article 6, paragraph 1, certain types of agreements which meet the conditions referred 
to in paragraph 1 above, taking into consideration the benefits resulting from such types of 
agreements. In the regulation, the Council of Ministers shall specify:
1)  conditions which are to be satisfied for the agreement to be considered exempted from 
the prohibition;
2)  clauses, the existence of which in the agreement constitutes the infringement of Article 
6;
3)  a period during which the exemption shall apply and may specify clauses, the existence 
of which in the agreement is not considered the infringement of Article 6.
Chapter 2
Prohibition of abuse of a dominant position
Article 9
1.  The abuse of a dominant position in the relevant market by one or more undertakings shall 
be prohibited.
2.  The abuse of a dominant position may, in particular consist in:
1)  direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices, including excessive or predatory pricing, 
delayed payment terms or other trading conditions;
2)  limiting production, sale or technological progress to the prejudice of contracting 
parties or consumers;
3)  application to equivalent agreements with third parties onerous or not homogenous 
agreement terms and conditions, thus creating for these parties diversified conditions 
of competition;
4)  making conclusion of the agreement subject to acceptance or fulfilment by the other 
party of another performance having neither substantial nor customary relation with 
the subject of the agreement;
5)  counteracting formation of conditions necessary for the emergence or development of 
competition;
6)  imposition onerous agreement terms and conditions, yielding to this undertaking 
unjustified profits;
7)  dividing the market according to territorial, product, or entity-related criteria.
3.  Legal actions which constitute abuse of a dominant position shall be in their entirety or in 
the respective part void.
Chapter 3
Decisions concerning competition-restricting practices
Article 10
The President of the Office shall issue a decision recognizing the practice as restricting 
competition and ordering to refrain from it, if he finds an infringement of the prohibition 
specified in Article 6 or 9 of the Act, or in Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty.
>> POLISH COMPETITION LAW – COMMENTARY, CASE LAW AND TEXTS
130
>>  Mateusz Błachucki
131
Article 11
1.  The decision referred to in Article 10 shall not be issued if the market behaviour of 
theundertaking no longer infringes the prohibitions specified in Article 6 or 9 of the Act, or in 
Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty.
2.  In the case referred to in paragraph 1, the President of the Office shall issue a decision 
regarding the practice as restricting competition and shall declare it be discontinued.
3.  The burden of providing evidence to circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 shall rest upon 
the undertaking.
Article 12
1.  In the event that, in the course of antimonopoly proceedings, it has been rendered plausible 
– on the basis of the circumstances of a given case, information comprised in the notification 
or information forming the basis for instituting ex officio proceedings – that the prohibition 
referred to in Article 6 or Article 9 of the Act, or in Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty has 
been infringed, whereas the undertaking being charged with having infringed such prohibition 
has agreed to take or discontinue certain actions aiming at preventing those infringements, 
then the President of the Office may, by way of a decision, impose upon the undertaking an 
obligation to exercise the undertaken commitments.
2.  In the decision referred to in paragraph 1, the President of the Office may determine the final 
date for realisation of the commitments.
3.  In the decision referred to in paragraph 1, the President of the Office shall impose upon the 
undertaking an obligation to provide, within fixed date(s), information regarding the stage of 
implementation of the assumed commitments.
4.  In the event that a decision, referred to in paragraph 1 is issued, Articles 10 and 11 as well 
as Article 106, paragraph 1, subparagraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply, subject to paragraph 7.
5.  The President of the Office may, on an ex officio basis, revoke the decision referred to in 
paragraph 1, in the event that:
1) it has been issued on the basis of false, incomplete or misleading information or documents;
2)  the undertaking has not carried out commitments or obligations imposed thereupon in 
the decision referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3.
6.  The President of the Office may, upon consent of the undertaking, on an ex officio basis revoke 
the decision referred to in paragraph 1, in case that the circumstances having a significant 
impact on the issuance of the decision, have changed.
7.  In the event that the decision is revoked, the President of the Office shall adjudicate on the 
merits of the case.
Title III
Concentrations of undertakings
Chapter 1
Control of concentrations
Article 13
1.  The intention of concentration is subject to a notification submitted to the President of the 
Office in the case where:
1)  the combined worldwide turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration in 
the financial year preceding the year of the notification exceeds the equivalent of EUR 
1 000 000 000, or
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2)  the combined turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration in the territory 
of the Republic of Poland in the financial year preceding the year of the notification 
exceeds the equivalent of EUR 50 000 000.
2.  The obligation referred to in paragraph 1 concerns the intention of:
1)  merging two or more independent undertakings;
2)  taking over by acquiring or taking up stocks, other securities or shares, or in any 
other way, direct or indirect control over one or more undertakings by one or more 
undertakings;
3)  creation by undertakings of one joint undertaking;
4)  acquisition by the undertaking of a part of another undertaking’s property (the entirety 
or part of the undertaking) if the turnover achieved by the property in any of the two 
financial years preceding the notification exceeded in the territory of the Republic of 
Poland the equivalent of EUR 10 000 000.
Article 14
The obligation to notify the intention of concentration shall not apply where:
1)  the turnover of the undertaking over which the control is to be taken in accordance with 
Article 13, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2, did not exceed in the territory of the Republic of 
Poland in any of the two financial years preceding the notification, the equivalent of EUR 10 
000 000;
2)  the financial institution, the normal activities of which include investing in stocks and shares 
of other undertakings, for its own account or for the account of others, acquires or takes 
over, on a temporary basis, stocks and shares with a view to reselling them provided that 
such resale takes place within one year from the date of the acquisition or taking over, and 
that:
a)  this institution does not exercise the rights arising from these stocks or shares, except 
for the right to dividend, or
b)  exercises these rights solely in order to prepare the resale of the entirety or part of the 
undertaking, its assets, or these stocks and shares;
3)  the undertaking acquires or takes over, on a temporary basis, stocks and shares with a view 
to securing debts, provided that such undertaking does not exercise the rights arising from 
these stocks or shares, except for the right to sell;
4)  the concentration arises as an effect of insolvency proceedings, excluding the cases where 
the control is to be taken over by a competitor or a participant of the capital group to which 
the competitors of the to-be-taken undertaking belong;
5)  the concentration applies to undertakings participating in the same capital group.
Article 15
The concentration implemented by a dependent undertaking shall be considered as implemented 
by a dominant undertaking.
Article 16
1.  The turnover referred to in Article 13, paragraph 1 shall include the turnover of undertakings 
directly participating in the concentration as well as of the remaining undertakings 
participating in the capital groups to which undertakings directly taking part in the 
concentration belong.
2.  The turnover referred to in Article 14, paragraph 1 shall include the turnover of the to-be-
taken undertaking as well as of its dependent undertakings.
>> POLISH COMPETITION LAW – COMMENTARY, CASE LAW AND TEXTS
132
>>  Mateusz Błachucki
133
Article 17
The Council of Ministers shall specify, by way of a regulation, the method of calculating the 
turnover referred to in Article 13, and Article 14, subparagraph 1, taking into account the 
specificity of the activity conducted by undertakings, and in particular accountancy rules 
applicable to particular categories of undertakings, including banks, insurance companies and 
investment funds.
Chapter 2
Decisions concerning concentration
Article 18
The President of the Office shall, by way of decision, issue a consent to implement a concentration, 
which shall not result in significant impediments to competition in the market, in particular, by 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the market.
Article 19
1.  The President of the Office shall, by way of a decision, issue a consent to implement 
a concentration when, upon fulfilment of the conditions specified in paragraph 2 by 
undertakings intending to implement the concentration, competition in the market will 
not be significantly impeded, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position.
2.  The President of the Office may impose upon the undertaking or undertakings intending to 
implement a concentration an obligation, or accept their obligation, in particular:
1)  to dispose of the entirety or part of the assets of one or several undertakings,
2)  to divest control over an undertaking or undertakings, in particular by disposing of 
a bock of stocks or shares, or to dismiss one or several undertakings from the position 
in the management or supervisory board,
3)  to grant a competitor exclusive rights - determining in the decision referred to in 
paragraph 1 the time limit for meeting the requirements.
3.  In the decision referred to in paragraph 1, the President of the Office shall impose upon the 
ndertaking or undertakings an obligation to provide information about fulfilment of such 
equirements, in a time limit specified in the decision.
Article 20
1.  The President of the Office shall, by way of a decision, prohibit the implementation of the 
concentration, if it results in a significant impediment to competition in the market, in 
particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
2.  The President of the Office shall issue, by way of a decision, a consent for the implementation 
of the concentration as a result of which competition in the market will be significantly 
impeded, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, in any case 
that the desistance from banning concentration is justifiable, and in particular:
1)  the concentration is expected to contribute to economic development or technical 
progress;
2)  it may exert a positive impact on the national economy.
Article 21
1.  The President of the Office may revoke the decisions referred to in Article 18, Article 19, 
paragraph 1, and Article 20, paragraph 2, if they were based on unreliable information for 
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which undertakings participating in the concentration were responsible or where undertakings 
did not comply with the conditions referred to in Article 19, paragraphs 2 and 3. In the case 
of revoking the decision, the President of the Office shall adjudicate on the merits of the 
case.
2.  Where, in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, the concentration is already implemented 
and restoration of the competition in the market is otherwise impossible, the President of 
the Office may, by way of a decision, defining the time limit for its implementation under 
conditions specified in the decision, order in particular:
1)  separation of the merged undertaking under conditions defined in the decision;
2)  disposal of the entirety or part of the undertaking’s assets;
3)  disposal of stocks or shares ensuring the control over the undertaking or undertakings, 
or dissolution of the company over which the undertakings have joint control;
3.  The decision referred to in paragraph 2 cannot be issued after the lapse of 5 years from the 
day the concentration was implemented.
4.  The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply accordingly in cases whereby the intention 
of concentration has not been notified to the President of the Office, as stipulated in Article 
13, paragraph 1, and when the decision banning the concentration has not been executed.
Article 22
1.  Decisions referred to in Article 18 and Article 19, paragraph 1, or in Article 20, paragraph 
2 shall expire, if within 2 years from their issuance date, the concentration has not been 
implemented.
2.  The President of the Office may, upon request of an undertaking participating in 
a concentration, extend, by way of a resolution, the date, referred to in paragraph 1, by one 
year, if the undertaking has proved that no change has occurred as to the circumstance as 
a result of which the concentration may cause a significant impediment to competition in the 
market.
3.  Before taking a resolution on the extension of the date referred to in paragraph 1, the 
President of the Office may carry out explanatory proceedings.
4.  In the event that a resolution has been issued refusing an extension of the date referred to in 
paragraph 1, implementing a concentration upon the lapse of the time limit concerned shall 
require that the intent to implement the concentration be notified to the President of the 
Office, and that a consent be obtained for implementing thereof, under the rules and by the 
procedure as determined in the Act.
Article 23
The President of the Office, upon request of a financial institution, may extend, by way of 
a decision, the time limit referred to in Article 14, subparagraph 2, if the institution proves that 
resale of stocks or shares was not possible or economically justified before the lapse of one year 
from the date of their acquisition.
Title IV
Prohibition of practices infringing collective consumer interests
Chapter 1
Practices infringing collective consumer interests
Article 24
1.  Practices infringing collective consumer interests shall be prohibited.
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2.  A practice infringing collective consumer interests shall mean any unlawful activity of an 
undertaking detrimental to these interests, in particular:
1)  application of clauses of standard forms of agreements entered in the register of 
prohibited clauses of standard forms of agreements, as referred to in Article 47945 of 
the Act of 17 November 1964 – the Code of Civil Procedure (Journal of Laws of 1964 No. 
43, item 296, as amended));
2)  a breach of the duty to provide consumers with reliable, truthful and complete 
information;
3)  unfair market practice or other acts of unfair competition.
3.  The sum total of individual consumer interests shall not be a collective consumer interest.
Article 25
The protection of collective consumer interests provided for in this Act shall be without prejudice 
to protection under other acts, in particular, including the provisions on counteracting unfair 
market practices and unfair competition. The provisions of this Act shall not apply to cases 
concerning recognizing the clauses of a standard form of an agreement as inadmissible.
Chapter 2
Decisions on practices violating collective consumer interests
Article 26
1.  The President of the Office shall issue a decision on pronouncing a practice as violating 
collective consumer interests and ordering that the same be discontinued, if he identifies 
a breach of the prohibition specified in Article 24.
2.  The President of the Office may identify, in the decision referred to in paragraph 1, measures 
for removing lasting effects of the violation of collective consumer interests with a view to 
ensuring compliance with the order, in particular commit the undertaking to issue a single 
or recurring declaration with such contents and in such form as may be prescribed in the 
decision. The President of the Office may also order the decision to be published in whole or 
in part at the expense of the undertaking.
Article 27
1.  A decision referred to in Article 26 shall not be issued if the undertaking concerned has 
ceased to use the practice referred to in Article 24.
2.  In a case as determined in paragraph 1, the President of the Office shall issue a decision 
assessing the practice as violating collective interests of consumers, and shall declare it be 
discontinued.
3.  The burden of providing evidence to circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 shall rest upon 
the undertaking concerned.
4.  The provision of Article 26, paragraph 2 shall be applied accordingly.
Article 28
1.  If, in the course of proceedings regarding practices violating collective interests of 
consumers, it has been rendered plausible – on the basis of the circumstances of a given 
case, Information comprised in the notification referred to in Article 100, paragraph 1, or 
information forming the basis for instituting proceedings – that the undertaking concerned 
uses the practice referred to in Article 24, whereas the undertaking charged with infringing 
such provision, has undertaken to take or discontinue certain actions aiming at preventing 
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those infringements, then the President of the Office may, by way of a decision, impose an 
obligation to exercise the undertaken commitments.
2.  In the decision referred to in paragraph 1, the President of the Office may determine the final 
date(s) for implementing the undertaken commitments.
3.  In the decision referred to in paragraph 1, the President of the Office shall impose upon the 
undertaking an obligation to provide, within the fixed date(s), information regarding the 
stage of implementation of the assumed commitments.
4.  In the event that a decision referred to in paragraph 1 is issued, Articles 26 and 27 and Article 
106, paragraph 1, subparagraph 4 shall not apply, subject to paragraph 7.
5.  The President of the Office may, on an ex officio basis, revoke the decision referred to in 
paragraph 1, in the event that:
1)  it has been issued on the basis of false, incomplete or misleading information or 
documents;
2)  the undertaking has not fulfilled commitments or obligations imposed thereupon in the 
decision referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3.
6.  The President of the Office may, upon consent of the undertaking concerned, revoke the 
decision referred to in paragraph 1, if the circumstances that may have a significant impact 
on the issuance of such decision, have changed.
7.  In the event that the decision is revoked, the President of the Office shall adjudicate on 
the merits of the case.
Title V
Organisation of competition and consumer protection
Chapter 1
The President of the Office
Article 29
1.  The President of the Office shall be the central government administration body competent 
in the protection of competition and consumers. The Prime Minister shall supervise activities 
of the President of the Office.
2.  The President of the Office is:
1)  an authority performing tasks imposed upon the authorities of the Member States of 
the European Union, pursuant to Articles 84 and 85 of the EC Treaty. In particular, the 
President of the Office shall be the competent competition authority within the meaning 
of Article 35 of Regulation No. 1/2003/EC;
2)  a single liaison office within the meaning of the provisions of Regulation No.2006/2004/
EC and, in the scope of his statutory competences, shall be the competent authority 
referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1 of Regulation No. 2006/2004/EC;
3.  The Prime Minister shall nominate the President of the Office from among the persons 
selected as a result of an open and competitive recruitment process.
3a. The position of the President of the Office may be occupied by a person who:
1)  holds a Master’s or equivalent degree;
2)  is a citizen of Poland;
3)  enjoys full public rights;
4)  has not been sentenced with a valid verdict for a deliberate crime or a deliberate 
fiscal crime;
5)  possesses managerial abilities;
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6)  holds minimum 6 years of employment track record, including minimum 3 years on 
managerial positions;
7) possesses education and knowledge in the fields for which the President of the 
Office is responsible.
3b. Information on recruitment to the position of the President of the Office shall be 
announced by way of publication in an easily accessible place in the Office and in the 
Public Information Bulletin of the Office and the Public Information Bulletin of the 
Chancellery of the Prime Minister. The announcement shall specify:
1)  the name and address of the Office;
2)  the position;
3)  requirements related to the position as specified in the applicable regulations;
4)  scope of duties to be performed in the position;
5)  the required documents;
6)  deadline and place to file documents;
7)  information on recruitment methods and techniques.
3c.  The deadline referred to in paragraph 3b, subparagraph 6 may not be shorter than 10 
days from the publication day of the announcement in the Public Information Bulletin 
of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.
3d.  Recruitment to the position of the President of the Office shall be performed by a team 
nominated by the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister by authority of the 
Prime Minister. The team shall be composed of minimum 3 persons whose knowledge and 
experience will assure that the best candidates are selected. During the recruitment 
process, the assessment shall be focused on the candidate’s professional experience, 
knowledge required to perform the tasks in the position and managerial skills.
3e.  The assessment of the knowledge and managerial skills referred to in paragraph 3d, on 
commission of the team, may be performed by a person who is not a team member and 
who holds qualifications adequate to perform the assessment.
3f.  Team members or the person referred to in paragraph 3e shall be obliged to keep 
confidential all information on the persons applying for the position that may be 
acquired during the recruitment process.
3g.  The recruitment process shall result in selection of maximum 3 candidates who will be 
presented to the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.
3h.  The team shall draw up a report from the recruitment process specifying:
1)  the name and address of the Office;
2)  the position for which the recruitment process was performed and the number of 
candidates;
3)  first and last names, addresses of maximum 3 best candidates in the order of the 
extent they meet the requirements specified in the announcement on recruitment;
4)  information on the applied recruitment methods and techniques;
5)  justification of the selection or reasons for not selecting a candidate;
6)  members of the team.
3i.  Results of the recruitment process shall be published without delay in the Public 
Information Bulletin of the Office and the Public Information Bulletin of the Chancellery 
of the Prime Minister. Information on the results of the recruitment shall specify:
1)  the name and address of the Office;
2)  the position for which the recruitment process was performed;
3)  first and last names of the selected candidates and their places of residence within 
the meaning of the provisions of the Civil Code or information of failure to select 
a candidate.
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3j.  The publication of the announcement on recruitment and results thereof in the Public 
Information Bulletin of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister is free of charge.
4.  The Prime Minister shall dismiss the President of the Office. The President of the Office shall 
perform his duties until the date of appointing his successor.
5.  [Repealed]
6.  The President of the Office shall perform his tasks supported by the Office of Competition 
and Consumer Protection, hereinafter referred to as “the Office”.
7.  [Repealed]
8.  [Repealed]
Article 30
1.  The Prime Minister shall nominate Vice Presidents of the Office from among the personsselected 
by way of an open and competitive recruitment process. The Prime Minister shall dismiss the 
Vice Presidents of the Office upon the request of the President of the Office.
2.  The team performing recruitment to the positions referred to in paragraph 1 shall nominate 
the President of the Office.
3.  The provisions of Article 29, paragraphs 3a to 3j shall apply accordingly to the recruitment 
to the positions referred to in paragraph 1.
Article 31
The scope of the activities of the President of the Office shall include:
1)  controlling undertakings’ compliance with the Act;
2)  issuing decisions in cases concerning counteracting competition-restricting practices, 
concentrations of undertakings, infringements of collective consumer interests, as well as 
other decisions stipulated in the Act;
3)  analysing the level of concentration in the economy and on the market behaviour of 
undertakings;
4)  preparing the draft government programmes for the development of competition and the 
draft government consumer protection policy;
5)  co-operating with foreign and international consumer and competition protection authorities 
and organisations;
6)  performing tasks and exercising competences of a competition protection authority of the 
European Union Member State, as determined in Regulation No. 1/2003/EC and Regulation 
No. 139/2004/EC,
7)  performing tasks and exercising competences of the competent authority and of the 
single liaison office of the European Union Member State, as determined in Regulation No. 
2006/2004/EC;
8)  preparing and submitting to the Council of Ministers draft legal acts concerning the protection 
of competition and consumers;
9)  submitting to the Council of Ministers periodical reports on the implementation of the 
government programmes for competition development and consumer policy;
10)  co-operating with the territorial self-government authorities in the scope resulting from the 
government consumer policy;
11)  initiating inspections of products and services to be performed by consumer organisations;
12) preparing and editing publications and educational programmes promoting awareness of 
competition and consumer protection;
13) addressing undertakings in matters concerning the protection of rights and interests of 
consumers;
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14)  fulfilling the international obligations of the Republic of Poland in the scope of cooperation 
and exchange of information in the field of consumer and competition protection and state 
aid;
15) collecting and disseminating judgements passed in cases concerning competition and 
consumer protection, in particular posting the decisions issued by the President of the Office 
on the Office’s website;
16)  co-operating with the Head of the National Crime Information Centre in the scope essential 
for the fulfilment of his statutory tasks;
17)  performing other tasks defined by the present Act or by separate acts.
Article 32
1.  The President of the Office shall issue the Official Journal of the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection.
2.  The following information may be published in the Official Journal of the Office of Competition 
and Consumer Protection, in its entirety or part:
1)  decisions and resolutions of the President of the Office,
2)  judgements of the Regional Court in Warsaw- the Court of Competition and Consumer 
Protection, hereinafter referred to as “the Court of Competition and Consumer 
Protection”,
3)  judgement of the Court of Appeal in appeal cases concerning the judgements of the 
Court of Competition and Consumer Protection,
4)  judgments of the Supreme Court concerning cassation of the judgements of the Court 
of Appeal, - or their conclusions.
3.  The publications referred to in paragraph 2 shall be made with the omission of information 
constituting a business secret and other secret protected under separate provisions.
4.  Information, communications, notices, explanations and interpretations of high significance 
to the application of provisions regarding the scope of activities of the President of the 
Office, shall be also published in the Official Journal of the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection.
Article 33
1.  The Office shall be composed of the Central Office in Warszawa and Branch Offices in 
Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Kraków, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Warszawa and Wrocław.
2.  The Branch Offices shall be managed by their directors.
3.  The Prime Minister shall determine, by way of a regulation, the territorial and material 
competence of the Branch Offices for cases falling within the scope of the activities of the 
President of the Office, taking into consideration the nature and number of cases occurring 
in the relevant territory.
4.  In addition to the cases falling within their competence, the Branch Offices may deal with 
other cases entrusted to them by the President of the Office.
5.  In particularly justified circumstances, the President of the Office may take over a case 
falling within the competence of a given Branch Office or refer it to be dealt with by another 
Branch Office, or refer a case falling within his own competence to be dealt with by an 
indicated Branch Office.
6.  Decisions and resolutions in cases falling within the competence of the Branch Offices and in 
cases referred by the President of the Office pursuant to paragraph 5 above, shall be issued 
by the directors of the Branch Offices on behalf of the President of the Office.
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Article 34
The organisation of the Office shall be defined by the statutes granted by the Prime Minister, by 
way of a regulation.
Article 35
1.  [Repealed]
2.  [Repealed]
3.  The President of the Office may order the Trade Inspection to proceed with the inspection or 
to perform other tasks included in the scope of his activities.
4.  [Repealed]
Article 36
[Repealed]
Chapter 2
Local government and consumer organisations
Article 37
The tasks in the field of the protection of consumer interests in the scope determined by the Act 
and by separate provisions shall be performed also by local government as well as by consumer 
organisations and other institutions, the statutory tasks of which include the protection of 
consumer interests.
Article 38
The task of the local government in the field of consumer protection shall consist in promoting 
consumer education, in particular by way of introducing elements of consumer awareness into 
educational programmes in the public schools.
Article 39.
1.  The tasks of the local government at poviat level concerning the protection of consumer 
rights shall be performed by poviat (municipal) consumer ombudsmen, hereinafter referred 
to as “consumer ombudsmen”.
2.  Poviats may, by way of an agreement, appoint a single consumer ombudsman.
Article 40
1.  The consumer ombudsman shall be employed by the starost or city mayor in towns with 
poviat rights.
2.  The consumer ombudsman shall be a person holding a university degree, in particular in law 
or economics and possessing minimum five years of professional experience.
3.  The consumer ombudsman shall be directly subordinated to the starost (city mayor).
4.  The organisational status of the consumer ombudsman shall be determined by the poviat 
statutes or regulations. In poviats populated by over 100 thousand inhabitants and in towns 
with poviat rights, the consumer ombudsman may perform his tasks with the help of an 
individual office.
5.  For the remaining matters related to the legal status of the consumer ombudsman, the 
provisions of Act of 21 November 2008 on local government workers (Journal of Laws No. 223, 
item 1458) shall apply accordingly.
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Article 41
[Repealed]
Article 42
1. The tasks of consumer ombudsman shall, in particular, include the following:
1)  providing free of charge consumer advice and legal information in the scope of 
protection of consumer interests;
2)  submitting requests for proclaiming and amending local regulations in the scope of 
protection of consumer interests;
3)  addressing undertakings in cases concerning protection of consumer rights and interests;
4)  co-operating with the territorially competent Office branches, bodies of Trade Inspection 
and consumer organisations;
5)  performing other tasks prescribed by the present Act and by separate provisions.
2.  Consumer ombudsman may in particular bring an action on consumers’ behalf and, with their 
consent, join lawsuits in cases concerning protection of consumer interests.
3.  In cases concerning petty offences to the detriment of consumers, consumer ombudsman 
shall act as a public prosecutor within the meaning of the provisions of the Act of 24 August 
2001 – the Code of Procedure in Cases Prosecuted as Petty Offence (Journal of Laws No. 106, 
item 1148, as amended)).
4.  Undertaking addressed by a consumer ombudsman acting pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph 1, subparagraph 3, is under an obligation to provide the ombudsman with 
requested explanations and information and to take a stance in relation to comments and 
opinions of the ombudsman.
5.  The provisions of Article 63 of the Act of 17 November 1964 – the Code of Civil Procedure shall 
apply accordingly, to consumer ombudsman.
Article 43
1.  The consumer ombudsman shall submit for approval an annual activity report to the starost 
(city mayor) by 31 March each year which contains information on their activity in the 
preceding year as well as submit the report to the relevant local Branch Office.
2.  [Repealed]
3.  The consumer ombudsman shall be obliged to continually present to the Branch Offices the 
relevant conclusions and inform them about problems concerning consumer protection which 
require taking measures at the government administration level.
Article 44
1.  The National Council of Consumer Ombudsmen, hereinafter referred to as “the Council” shall 
assist the President of the Office.
2.  The Council shall be a standing opinion-giving and advisory body of the President of the 
Office in the scope of the matters related to protection of consumer rights at the poviat 
government level.
3.  The tasks of the Council shall include, in particular:
1)  submitting proposals on directions of legislative changes in provisions pertaining to 
protection of consumer rights;
2)  giving opinions on matters related to draft legal acts or directions of the government 
consumer policy;
3)  giving opinions on such other matters falling within the scope of protection of consumers 
as the President of the Office may refer to the Council;
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4)  conveying information concerning protection of consumers to the extent as indicated by 
the President of the Office.
4.  The Council shall comprise nine consumer ombudsmen, one from each area of local competence 
of the branches of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection.
5.  The members of the Council shall be appointed and dismissed by the President of the Office. 
Appointments shall be granted upon a request of the directors of the branches referred to in 
paragraph 4, subject to a written consent of the recommended consumer ombudsmen. The 
recalling from the function of a consumer ombudsman shall result in the expiry of his or her 
membership in the Council.
6.  The Office shall provide administrative support for the Council.
7.  The Office shall refund to the members of the Council the costs of commuting to meetings 
of the Council in accordance with the provisions on dues to which a person employed in 
a state or local government unit of the budget sector is entitled in connection with domestic 
business travel.
8.  The work practices of the Council shall be laid down in the regulations established by the 
President of the Office.
Article 45
1.  The consumer organisations shall represent consumer interests towards the bodies of 
central and local government and may participate in the implementation of the government 
consumer policy.
2.  The organisations referred to in paragraph 1 are, in particular, entitled to:
1)  expressing opinions on the draft legal acts and other documents concerning rights and 
interests of consumers;
2)  elaborating and disseminating consumer educational programmes;
3)  performing tests of products and services and publishing their results;
4)  editing periodicals, research studies, folders and leaflets;
5)  providing free-of-charge consumer advisory services and free-of-charge assistance in 
handling consumer claims, unless the statutes of the organisation provide otherwise;
6)  participating in the work on standardisation;
7)  implementing government tasks in the field of consumer protection, commissioned to 
them by the central and local government administration bodies;
8)  applying for allocation of public funds for the implementation of the tasks referred to 
in subparagraph 7.
3.  The central and local government administration bodies shall be obliged to consult consumer 
organisations on the issues concerning the directions of activities aimed at protection of 
consumer interests.
Article 46
The amount of annual closed-end grants, within the meaning of the Act of 30 June 2005 on 
Public Finance (Journal of Laws No. 249, item 2104, as amended7)), allocated from the state 
budget for the implementation of the tasks referred to in Article 45, paragraph 2, subparagraph 
7 shall be determined in the Budget Act in the part of the state budget, the administrator of 
which is the President of the Office.
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Title VI
Proceedings before the President of the Office
Chapter 1
General Provisions
Article 47
1. The proceedings before the President of the Office shall be conducted as explanatory proceedings, 
antimonopoly proceedings or proceedings concerning practices violating collective consumer 
interests.
2. The explanatory proceedings may precede instituting the antimonopoly proceedings or 
proceedings concerning practices violating collective consumer interests.
Article 48
1.  The President of the Office may institute, on an ex officio basis, and by way of a resolution, 
explanatory proceedings, if the circumstances indicate a possibility that the provisions of the 
Act have been infringed, as to matters regarding a given branch of economy, or as to matters 
regarding protection of consumer interests, and in any other cases as provided for by the Act.
2.  The explanatory proceedings may in particular aim at:
1)  initially determining whether an infringement of the provisions of this Act has occurred, 
such as may justify the institution of antimonopoly proceedings, including whether the 
case is of an antimonopoly nature;
2)  initially determining whether an infringement of the provisions of this Act has occurred, 
such as may justify the institution of proceedings regarding the use of practices violating 
the collective interests of consumers;
3)  a study of the market, including the determination of the structure and degree of 
concentration thereof; 
4)  initially determining whether an obligation exists to submit a notification of an intended 
concentration;
5)  determining whether an instance of the violation has occurred, of any consumer interest 
being protected by the law, such as may justify the undertaking of actions specified in 
the relevant separate acts.
3.  The explanatory proceedings shall be concluded by way of a resolution.
4.  The explanatory proceedings should not last in excess of 30 days, and as regards particularly 
complex issues, not longer than 60 days from the date of the institution thereof.
5.  In the case as referred to in paragraph 2, subparagraph 3, the provision of paragraph 4 and 
Article 35 of the Act of 14 June 1960 – the Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws 
of 2000 No. 98, item. 1071, as amended)) shall not apply.
Article 49
1.  The antimonopoly proceedings in the cases of competition-restricting practices, proceedings 
concerning practices violating collective consumer interests and in cases involving imposition 
of fines shall be instituted on ex officio basis.
2.  The antimonopoly proceedings concerning concentrations shall be instituted upon a request 
or on an ex officio basis.
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Article 50
1.  Undertakings shall be obliged to provide all necessary information and documents upon 
request of the President of the Office.
2.  The request referred to in paragraph 1 should include:
1)  indicating the scope of such information;
2)  indicating the objective of the request;
3)  the time limit for providing information;
4)  an instruction about sanctions for non-delivery of information or for providing false or 
misleading information.
3.  Everyone shall be entitled to submit, in a written form, on their own initiative or upon 
request of the President of the Office, explanations concerning essential circumstances of 
a given case.
Article 51
1.  Only the original document or its copy certified by a public administration body, notary, 
attorney at law, legal adviser or authorised employee of the undertaking may serve as the 
documentary evidence in the proceedings before the President of the Office.
2.  The evidence in the proceedings before the President of the Office shall constitute the 
document drawn up in the Polish language, subject to paragraph 3.
3.  Where such document has been drawn up in a foreign language also the translation into 
Polish of this document or of its part intended to serve as the evidence in the proceedings 
should be submitted, certified by a sworn translator.
Article 52
1.  The party adducing witness evidence shall be obliged to precisely indicate facts subject 
to confirmation by the testimony of individual witnesses and to indicate the data to allow 
proper summons of the witnesses.
2.  The President of the Office, when summoning a witness, shall indicate in his summons the 
name, surname and domicile of the summoned, the place and date of giving the explanation, 
the parties and subject of the case as well as the provisions on penal sanctions for false 
testimony.
Article 53
1.  The testimony of a witness, after its entry into the protocol, shall be read out before a witness 
and, depending on circumstances, completed or verified based on his/her comments.
2.  The protocol of the hearings of a witness shall be signed by the witness and by the employee 
of the Office carrying out the hearings.
Article 54
1.  In cases requiring special information, the President of the Office having heard requests of 
the parties concerning the number of experts and their selection, may summon one or more 
experts in order to seek their opinion.
2.  The expert, within the meaning of paragraph 1, may be also a legal person specialised in the 
relevant field.
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Article 55
Until the termination of the activities of an expert each party may request him/her to be 
excluded from the proceedings for the same reasons as may be requested to exclude the 
employee of the Office. The party lodging a request to exclude an expert after activities have 
been initiated by the expert, has an obligation to render plausible that the reason justifying the 
exclusion arose thereafter or was unknown to the party beforehand.
Article 56
The President of the Office may order to present to an expert the case records and the subject 
of inspection. The provisions of Article 71, paragraph 1 shall apply accordingly.
Article 57
1.  The opinion of an expert should contain its justification.
2.  The experts may submit their joint opinion.
Article 58
1.  The President of the Office shall award an expert the remuneration in accordance with 
the provisions on costs of obtaining expert’s evidence in court proceedings, subject to 
paragraph 3.
2.  The President of the Office may impose upon a party which has filed a request for obtaining 
expert’s evidence, the obligation to pay an advance on account of the expert’s expenses.
3.  If no decision is issued, stating that the practice restricting competition has been applied, 
or collective consumer interests have been violated, the costs of the expert’s remuneration 
shall be borne by the State Treasury.
Article 59
1.  The President of the Office may address a scientific institute, within the meaning of the 
provisions on science financing rules, to issue an opinion.
2.  In its opinion, the institute shall indicate a person or persons who carried the research and 
issued the opinion.
3.  The provisions of Articles 54 to 58 shall apply accordingly.
Article 60
1.  During the proceedings the President of the Office may hold a hearing.
2.  The hearing referred to in paragraph 1 shall be an open session , subject to paragraph 4.
3.  The President of the Office may summon for the hearing, and examine parties, witnesses as 
well as ask for an expert opinion.
4.  The hearing referred to in paragraph 1 is a closed session, if during its course, the information 
considered is subject to business secrecy or other secrecy protected under separate 
provisions. The provisions of Articles 153 and 154 of the Act of 17 November 1964 – the Code 
of Civil Procedure, shall apply accordingly.
Article 61
The President of the Office may address a territorially competent regional court to examine
witnesses and obtain an expert opinion, where it is supported by the nature of the evidence or
consideration of significant inconvenience or significant costs of obtaining the evidence. When 
addressing the court for providing evidence, the President of the Office shall issue a resolution 
which shall define:
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1)  the court which is to provide evidence,
2)  means of evidence,
3)  facts to be established.
Article 62-68
[Repealed]
Article 69
1.  The President of the Office may, upon a request or on an ex officio basis, and by way of 
a resolution, limit to an extent indispensable the right to have access to evidence being 
attached to the case files, in the case that rendering such evidence accessible would entail 
a risk that the business secret, or any other secrets being liable to protection under the 
relevant separate provisions, may be revealed.
2.  The restriction referred to in paragraph 1 shall also apply to evidence included in the 
proceedings pursuant to Article 73 paragraph 5.
3.  The resolution issued pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be subject to a complaint.
4.  The party filing a request for a limited right of access to evidence shall also submit to the 
President of the Office a version of the document that does not comprise any information 
subject to a limitation referred to in paragraph 1, as furnished with a relevant annotation.
5.  A version of the document not comprising any information being liable to a limitation referred 
to in paragraph 1 shall be rendered accessible to the parties concerned, as furnished with 
a relevant annotation.
Article 70
1.  Any information and evidence received by the President of the Office under the procedure 
of Article 109, including information on the undertaking’s request for renouncement from 
imposing a fine or reducing thereof (leniency), shall not be rendered accessible, subject to 
paragraphs 2 and 3.
2.  The President of the Office shall provide the parties concerned with access to information 
and evidence referred to in paragraph 1, prior to issuing a decision.
3.  The provision of paragraph 1 shall not apply in the event the undertaking moving for 
leniency agrees in writing to render the information and evidence referred to in paragraph 1 
accessible.
Article 71
1.  The employees of the Office shall protect company secrets as well as other information, 
protected subject to other applicable regulations, that they may have acquired during 
proceedings.
2.  The provision of Article 71, paragraph 1 does not apply to publicly available information, 
information on initiating proceedings and information on decisions closing such proceedings 
and the content thereof.
3.  The provisions of Article 71, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply also to the employees of 
Trade Inspection and other persons involved in the inspections referred to in Article 105a 
paragraph  2.
Article 72
The public administration bodies are under obligation to render accessible to the President of 
the Office the files being in their possession as well as information relevant to the proceedings 
before the President of the Office.
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Article 73
1.  Information received in the course of the proceedings may not be used in any other 
proceedings based on separate provisions, subject to paragraphs 2 to 4.
2.  The provision of paragraph 1 shall not apply to:
1)  penal proceedings exercised by a public-complaint procedure, or fiscal penal 
proceedings;
2)  other proceedings exercised by the President of the Office;
3)  sharing information with the European Commission and competition authorities of the 
European Union Member States, under Regulation No. 1/2003/EC;
4)  sharing information with the European Commission and competent authorities of the 
European Union Member States, pursuant to Regulation No. 2006/2004/EC;
5)  providing competent authorities with information which may indicate that any separate 
provisions have been infringed.
3.  The President of the Office shall provide regulatory authorities involved in the market 
of telecommunications and postal services, as well as management of fuels and energy, 
hereinafter referred to as “regulatory authorities” with information, including results of 
research and market analyses required in proceedings conducted by these authorities, save 
for information:
1)  for which the confidentiality obligation results from international commitments, in 
particular information obtained in the course of proceedings instituted pursuant to 
Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty;
2)  obtained from the undertaking in connection with the application of Article 109 of the Act.
4.  The regulatory authorities shall be obliged to protect the information obtained pursuant to 
paragraph 3, in particular the information may not be used in other proceedings than those 
conducted by the regulatory authorities. The provisions of Articles 69 and 71 shall apply 
accordingly.
5.  Information received in the course of proceedings from a competition authority of a Member 
State of the European Union may be used in the course of the said proceedings under the 
terms upon which such information has been provided by that authority, including not using 
the information to impose sanctions upon certain persons..
6.  The President of the Office shall notify the parties concerned, of having included in the pool 
of evidence the information obtained in the course of any other proceedings exercised by him.
Article 74
When issuing the decision terminating the proceedings, the President of the Office shall take 
into consideration only the charges to which the parties concerned could assume their position.
Article 75
1.  The President of the Office shall discontinue proceedings, by way of a resolution, in the 
event that:
1)  the notification on intended concentration of undertakings has been withdrawn;
2)  the fine referred to in Article 106, paragraph 2, and Articles 107 and 108, has not been 
imposed;
3)  the case has been taken over by the European Commission under the relevant provisions 
of the Community law.
2.  The President of the Office may, by way of a resolution, discontinue proceedings if the case 
concerned has been resolved by a competent competition authority of a Member State of the 
European Union.
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Article 76
Subject to Articles 93 and 105, proceedings shall not be instituted if 5 years elapsed from the 
end of the year when:
1)  the infringement of the provisions of the Act took place;
2)  a decision about imposition of a fine became legally binding.
Article 77
1.  If the proceedings result in the assessment by the President of the Office that the provisions 
of the Act have been infringed, the undertaking which has committed this infringement shall 
be obliged to bear the costs of the proceedings.
2.  In the cases particularly justified the President of the Office may impose upon a party the 
obligation to reimburse only part of the expenses or desist from charging costs.
Article 78
Regardless of the result of the proceedings, the President of the Office may impose upon a party 
the obligation to reimburse expenses due to its unreliable or clearly unfair behaviour, in particular 
costs resulting from avoidance to give explanation or submitting untruthfulexplanation, 
concealment or delayed presentation of the evidence.
Article 79
The costs of necessary opinions of experts and scientific institutes within the meaning of the 
provisions on science financing rules in cases related to concentrations shall be borne by the 
undertakings participating in the concentration.
Article 80
The President of the Office shall decide upon the costs by way of a resolution, which may be
included in the decision terminating the proceedings.
Article 81
1.  The decision of the President of the Office shall be subject to an appeal to the Court of 
Competition and Consumer Protection, lodged within two weeks from the date of delivering 
the decision.
2.  In the case where the appeal against the decision is lodged, the President of the Office shall 
without delay remit it to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection together with 
the case files.
3.  Where the President of the Office considers the appeal to be justified, he/she may – without 
remitting the files to the court – revoke or change the decision in its entirety or in part, 
about which, without delay, the party is informed by sending a new decision, which may be 
appealed against.
4.  Prior to the remittance of the appeal to the court or the revocation or the change of the 
decision pursuant to paragraph 3, the President of the Office may also, in justified cases, 
perform additional activities aimed at clarification of objections contained in the appeal.
5.  The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply, accordingly, to the resolutions of the President 
of the Office which are subject to complaints, however a complaint is to be lodged within 
one week from the day of delivering the resolution.
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Article 82
1.  Legal means for refuting the decision foreseen in the Code of Administrative Procedure and 
concerning the resumption of proceedings, revocation, change or assessment of invalidity of 
decisions shall not apply to the decision of the President of the Office.
2.  The provision of paragraph 1 shall apply accordingly to the resolutions of the President of the 
Office.
Article 83
The matters not governed by the present Act, as regards the proceedings before the President 
of the Office, shall be subject to the provisions of the Act of 14 June 1960 – the Code of 
Administrative Procedure, subject to Article 84.
Article 84
To the matters concerning the evidence in the proceedings before the President of the Office in 
the scope not regulated in the present chapter, Articles 227 to 315 of the Act of 17 November 
1964 – the Code of Civil Procedure, shall apply accordingly.
Article 85
The provisions of this chapter shall apply accordingly to the cases regarding imposition of fines 
for infringement of provisions laid down in the Act.
Chapter 2
Antimonopoly proceedings concerning competition-restricting practices
Article 86
1.  Everybody may submit to the President of the Office a written notification concerning 
a suspicion that competition-restricting practices have been applied, together with 
a justification.
2.  The notification referred to in paragraph 1 may include in particular:
1)  indication of the undertaking which is accused of applying competition-restricting 
practices;
2)  description of the actual state being the basis of the notification;
3)  indication of the provision of the Act or the EC Treaty, the infringement of which is 
objected against by the notification submitter;
4)  making the infringement of the provisions of the Act or the EC Treaty plausible;
5)  identification data of the notification submitter.
3.  Any documents that may constitute the evidence of infringing the provisions of the Act shall 
be attached to the notification.
4.  The President of the Office shall provide the notification submitter, within the time period 
specified in Articles 35 to 37 of the Act of 14 June 1960 – the Code of Administrative Procedure, 
with information in writing about the way of considering the notification together with its 
justification.
Article 87
1.  The President of the Office shall, in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 6 of Regulation 
No. 1/2003/EC, refuse to institute antimonopoly proceedings in the event that:
1)  the European Commission is exercising proceedings regarding the same case;
2)  the case has been resolved by the European Commission.
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2.  The President of the Office may, pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation No. 1/2003/EC, refuse 
to institute antimonopoly proceedings in the event that:
1)  the competent competition authority of another Member State of the European Union 
is conducting proceedings regarding the same case;
2)  the case has been resolved by the competent competition authority of another Member 
State of the European Union.
3.  If in the case referred to in paragraph 2, subparagraph 1, the President of the Office has 
instituted antimonopoly proceedings concerning a given case, he/she may suspend the 
proceedings, by way of a resolution, until the competent competition authority of another 
Member State of the European Union resolves the case.
Article 88
1.  The party to the proceedings shall be every person against whom the proceedings concerning 
the application of competition-restricting practices are instituted.
2.  The President of the Office shall issue a resolution about the instituted antimonopoly 
proceedings and shall notify the parties concerned of this fact.
Article 89
1.  If, in the course of antimonopoly proceedings, it has been rendered plausible that any 
further application of the practice being objected against may cause serious and hard-to-
remove threats to competition, the President of the Office may, prior to the conclusion of 
the antimonopoly proceedings, and by way of a decision, impose on the undertaking being 
alleged to be using a given practice, an obligation to omit acting in a certain manner, in order 
to prevent those threats. Lodging of an appeal shall not stay execution of the said decision. 
Prior to issuing the decision, no right shall be vested in the party concerned to express itself 
as to the evidence and materials gathered, or demands submitted, as referred to in Article 
10 of the Act of 14 June 1960 – the Code of Administrative Procedure.
2.  In the decision referred to in paragraph 1, the President of the Office shall determine the 
period for which it is due to be binding. The decision shall be binding for no longer than until 
a decision is issued concluding the proceedings regarding the case.
3.  The President of the Office may extend, by way of a decision, the validity period of the 
decision referred to in paragraph 1. The provision of paragraph 2, the second sentence, shall 
apply accordingly.
4. In the event that a decision is issued, as referred to in paragraph 1, Article 106, paragraph 1, 
subparagraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply.
Article 90
The President of the Office may rule that the decision be immediately enforceable in whole or in 
part, where it is necessary for the protection of competition or important interest of consumers.
Article 91
1.  If there are grounds to suppose that any objects, files, books, documents and other data 
carriers within the meaning of the regulations on informatisation of operations of entities 
performing public tasks are stored in residential premises or any other premises, building 
or means of transportation and such storage may affect the findings which are material to 
pending proceedings, the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, upon the request 
of the President of the Office, may consent to perform a search in such premises by the 
Police, including seizure of objects that may be used as evidence in the proceedings. The 
provisions of Article 105c, paragraphs 2 to 4 shall apply accordingly.
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2.  The search referred to in paragraph 1 shall be also attended by an authorised employee of 
the Office and other persons referred to in Article 105a, paragraph 2.
3.  On instruction of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, the police shall perform 
the actions referred to in paragraph 1.
Article 92
The antimonopoly proceedings concerning competition-restricting practices shall be completed 
no later than 5 months from the date of their institution. The provisions of Articles 35 to 38 of 
the Act of 14 June 1960 – the Code of Administrative Procedure, shall apply accordingly.
Article 93
Proceedings concerning application of competition-restricting practices shall not be instituted
where since the end of the year in which they were abandoned one year has elapsed.
Chapter 3
Antimonopoly proceedings concerning concentration
Article 94
1.  Every person who notifies, in conformity with paragraph 2, the intention of concentration 
shall be a party to the proceedings.
2.  The intention of concentration shall be notified by:
1)  merging undertakings jointly – in the case referred to in Article 13, paragraph 2, 
subparagraph 1;
2)  an undertaking taking over the control – in the case referred to in Article 13, paragraph 
2, subparagraph 2;
3)  jointly all undertakings participating in creation of a joint undertaking – in the case 
referred to in Article 13, paragraph 2, subpaagraph 3;
4)  an undertaking acquiring part of another undertaking’s property – in the case referred 
to in Article 13, paragraph 2, subparagraph 4.
3. In the case where a concentration is implemented by a dominant undertaking by intermediary 
of at least two dependent undertakings, the notification of intention of concentration shall 
be submitted by a dominant undertaking.
4. For the requests for instituting the antimonopoly proceedings in concentration cases the 
undertakings shall pay fees. If the request has been submitted but no fee has been paid, 
the President of the Office shall summon the applicant to pay the fee within 7 days with the 
instruction that if the fee is not paid, the request will not be considered.
5.  The fees referred to in paragraph 4 shall constitute the state budget income.
6.  The Council of Ministers shall determine, by way of a regulation:
1)  the detailed conditions to be met by the notification of the intention of concentration, 
including a list of information and documents which this notification should contain, taking 
into consideration the specificity of activities conducted by different types of undertakings 
and, in particular by financial institutions;
2)  the rate of fees referred to in subparagraph 4 as well as the procedure of payment, making 
sure that they do not constitute a barrier for the undertakings as regards implementing the 
concentration.
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Article 95
1.  The President of the Office:
1)  shall return the notification of the intention of concentration, if the intention of 
concentration is not subject to a notification pursuant to Article 13 in connection with 
Article 14;
2)  may return within 14 days the notification of the intention of concentration, if the 
intention of concentration fails to meet the requirements with which it should comply;
3)  may summon the party notifying the intention of concentration to eliminate the 
indicated errors in the notification or to supplement necessary information, in the 
appointed time limit;
4)  may return the notification of the intention of concentration, if despite the summons 
pursuant to subparagraph 3, the party notifying the intention of concentration fails to 
eliminate the indicated errors or supplement necessary information, in the appointed 
time limit.
2.  The President of the Office may present to the undertaking or undertakings participating in 
the concentration the requirements referred to in Article 19, paragraph 2, appointing the 
time limit for the undertaking(s) to respond to the proposal; failure to reply or a negative 
answer shall result in the issuance of the decision referred to in Article 20, paragraph 1.
Article 96
1.  The antimonopoly proceedings in concentration cases should be terminated not later than 
within 2 months from their institution.
2.  In the event that the undertaking has presented the conditions determined in Article 19, 
paragraph 2, the final date referred to in paragraph 1 shall be extended by additional 14 
days.
3.  The time limits as established in paragraphs 1 and 2, do not include the time periods of 
waiting for a notification from other participants of the concentration, or the time periods 
necessary to eliminate errors or supplement necessary information, as referred to in Article 
95, paragraph 1, subparagraph 3, or to respond to the measures proposed by the President of 
the Office, referred to in Article 19, paragraph 2, as well as the time period of waiting until 
the fee is paid, as referred to in Article 94, paragraph 4.
Article 97
1.  The undertakings whose intention of concentration is subject to a notification shall be under 
obligation to refrain from implementing the concentration until the issuance of the decision 
by the President of the Office or the lapse of the time limit in which such a decision should 
be issued.
2.  The legal action pursuant to which the concentration is to be implemented may be performed 
under condition of the issuance by the President of the Office, by way of a decision, of the 
approval for implementing the concentration, or after the lapse of the time limit referred to 
in Article 96.
Article 98
The realisation of the public offer to purchase or exchange of stocks, notified to the President of 
the Office under the procedure stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 1, shall not be considered as 
an infringement of the obligation referred to in Article 97, paragraph 1, provided that the buyer 
does not exercise the voting rights arising from the acquired stocks or exercises them solely in 
order to maintain the full value of his capital investment or to prevent the substantial damage 
which might affect the undertakings participating in the concentration.
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Article 99
In the case of non-compliance with the decision referred to in Article 21, paragraph 1 or 4, the 
President of the Office may, by way of a decision, accomplish a division of the undertaking. To 
the division of a company, the provisions of Articles 528 to 550 of the Act of 15 September 2000 
– the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies (Journal of Laws No. 94, item 1037, as 
amended) shall apply accordingly. The President of the Office has the competence of the bodies 
of companies participating in the division. Moreover, the President of the Office may apply to the 
court for the annulment of the agreement or for undertaking other legal means aimed at restoring 
the previous status.
Chapter 4
Proceedings concerning practices violating collective consumer interests
Article 100
1.  Every person may submit a notification in writing to the President of the Office about 
a suspicion of applying practices violating collective consumer interests.
2.  The notification referred to in paragraph 1 may be also submitted by a foreign organisation 
entered in the list published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, of 
organisations entitled in the European Union Member States to file a request for instituting 
proceedings, where the object of its activity warrants its submitting a notification concerning 
an infringement resulting from unlawful omissions or such acts performed in the Republic 
of Poland, which jeopardise collective consumer interests in the Member State where the 
organisation is seated.
3.  The provisions of Article 86, paragraphs 2 to 4 shall apply accordingly.
Article 101
1.  The party to the proceedings shall be every person against whom the proceedings concerning 
the application of practises violating collective consumer interests are instituted.
2.  The President of the Office shall issue a resolution instituting proceedings concerning the 
application of practises violating collective consumer interests and he/she shall notify the 
parties of this fact.
Article 102
A settlement may be made in proceedings concerning practices violating collective consumer 
interests where the nature of the case warrants this and the settlement is not intended to 
circumvent the law or is not contrary to public interest or a legitimate consumer interest.
Article 103
The President of the Office may rule that the decision be immediately enforceable in whole or 
in part where an important consumer interest so warrants.
Article 104
The proceedings concerning practices violating collective consumer interests shall be concluded 
no later than within two months, and in particularly complicated cases no later than within 
three months from the date of their institution. The provisions of Articles 35 to 38 of the Act of 
14 June 1960 – the Code of Administrative Procedure, shall apply accordingly.
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Article 105
No proceedings concerning practices violating collective consumer interests shall be instituted
where a year has elapsed from the end of the year in which such practices were discontinued.
Chapter 5
Inspection in the course of proceedings before the President of the Office
Article 105a.
1.  During proceedings before the President of the Office, an inspection may be held at each 
undertaking involved, hereinafter referred to as the “inspected party”, with reference to the 
proceedings; such inspection shall be performed by an authorised employee of the Office or 
Trade Inspection, hereinafter referred to as the “inspecting party”.
2.  The President of the Office may authorise the following persons to participate in the 
inspection:
1)  an employee of a competition protection authority of a Member State, referred to in 
Article 22 of Regulation No. 1/2003/EC;
2)  an employee of the applicant authority within the meaning Article 3, subparagraph f of 
Regulation No. 2006/2004/WE in instances referred to in Article 6, paragraph 3 thereof;
3)  persons holding specific information if such information is required to perform the 
inspection.
3.  With respect to matters falling within the competencies of branch offices or with respect 
to matters entrusted to branch offices by the President of the Office pursuant to Article 33, 
paragraphs 4 and 5, the employees of the branch offices shall perform inspections on the 
basis of authority of the director of the branch offices issued on behalf of the President of 
the Office.
4.  The authority to perform inspection shall specify:
1)  identification of the inspecting authority;
2)  providing the legal basis;
3)  date and place of issue;
4)  first and last name and position of the inspecting person and number of his/her official 
ID; if persons referred to in paragraph 2 are authorised to participate in the inspection 
– first and last names of such persons, number of their passport or another ID document;
5)  identification of the inspected party;
6)  identification of the subject and scope of inspection;
7)  identification of commencement date of the inspection and the anticipated completion 
date thereof;
8)  signature of the authorising person with details of his/her position or function;
9)  instruction of the rights and obligations of the inspected entity.
5.  The authority to perform inspection, referred to in paragraph 1 may be issued by the 
President of the Office as well as voivodeship inspectors of the Trade Inspection upon the 
proposal of the Chief Inspector of the Trade Inspection.
6.  The inspecting persons shall deliver the authority to hold the inspection to the inspected 
party or the person authorized thereof and present their official IDs whereas the persons 
authorised to participate in the inspection, referred to in paragraph 3 – their ID cards, 
passport or other document confirming their identity.
7.  If the inspected party or persons authorised thereby are absent, the authority to perform 
the inspection or official IDs, ID cards, passport or other documents confirming the identity 
shall be presented to another employee of the inspected party who may be recognised to be 
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the person referred to in Article 97 of the Act of 23 April 1964 – Civil Code, or to a witness 
who shall be a public official while not being an employee of the inspecting authority. In 
such circumstances, the authority shall be delivered to the inspected party without delay, 
however not later than on the third day from initiating the inspection.
Article 105b.
1.  The inspecting persons shall be authorised to:
1)  access the site and the buildings, other premises and means of transportation held by 
the inspected party;
2)  request presentation of files, books, all kinds of documents and data carriers related to 
the subject of the inspection as well as true copies and extracts thereof and to make 
notes of their content;
3)  request the persons referred to in Article 105d, paragraph 1 to provide oral explanations 
on the subject of the inspection.
2.  Persons authorized to participate in inspections pursuant to Article 105a, paragraph 2 shall 
hold the same authority as the inspecting person with respect to access to the site and 
the buildings, other premises and means of transportation held by the inspected party and 
access to files, books, all kinds of documents and data carriers related to the subject of the 
inspection as well as true copies and extracts thereof and to make notes of their content 
as well as shall be entitled to participate jointly with the inspecting person in the search 
referred to in Article 91 and 105c.
3.  During the inspection, the inspecting party may be assisted by functionaries of other State 
inspection authorities or the Police. State inspection authorities and the Police shall perform 
operations on instructions of the inspecting person.
4.  In justified instances, the proceedings of inspections or any specific operations thereof 
may be recorded with video and audio equipment subject to the prior notification thereof 
to the inspected party. Electronic data carriers within the meaning of the regulations on 
informatisation of operations of entities carrying out public tasks, on which the proceedings 
of inspections or any specific operations thereof have been registered, shall be attached to 
the inspection protocol.
Article 105c.
1.  During the inspection, the inspecting persons may search the premises or objects subject to 
the consent of the court of competition and consumer protection, provided upon the request 
of the President of the Office.
2.  If there is a justified suspicion of a serious breach of the Act, in particular when evidence 
could be obliterated, the request referred to in paragraph 1 may be filed by the President of 
the Office before antimonopoly proceedings are initiated.
3.  The court of competition and consumer protection shall issue its decision with respect to the 
matter referred to in paragraph 1 within 48 hours. Decisions of the court of competition and 
consumer protection may not be appealed.
4.  In all matters not provided for in the Act, the provisions of the Act of 6 June 1997 – Criminal 
Procedure Code relating to search shall apply accordingly.
Article 105d.
1.  The inspected party, the person authorised thereby, the holder of apartments, premises, 
buildings or means of transportation referred to in Article 91, paragraph 1 shall be obliged to:
1)  provide the requested information;
2)  provide access to the site and buildings or other premises and means of transportation;
3)  provide access to files, books and all kinds of documents or other data carriers.
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2.  The persons referred to in paragraph 1 may refuse to provide information or collaborate only 
when that could lead to criminal responsibility for themselves or their spouses, ascendants, 
descendants, brothers and sisters as well as relatives in the same line or degree and co-
habiting persons as well as persons who have been adopted, stay under the guardianship or 
care thereof. Such right to refuse information or collaboration shall survive the marriage or 
the relationship of adoption, guardianship or care.
Article 105e.
1.  The inspected party shall provide the inspecting persons and other persons authorised to 
participate in the inspection with conditions and facilities required for efficient performance 
of the inspection, in particular the inspected party shall:
1)  make copies of documents, including printouts from data carriers requested by the 
inspecting persons;
2)  provide if possible a lockable separate room if this is required to perform the inspection;
3)  provide a separate place to store documents and secured objects;
4) provide available means of telecommunications to the extent required to perform the 
inspection.
2.  The inspected party shall certify the copies of documents and printouts for compliance with 
original. If this is refused, the documents shall be certified by the inspecting persons with 
a record in the inspection protocol.
Article 105f.
1.  The inspecting persons or the persons authorised to participate in the inspection shall 
ascertain facts on the basis of evidence collected during the inspection, in particular 
documents, objects, site inspections as well as oral or written explanations and statements 
and other data carriers.
2. The evidence referred to in paragraph 1 may be secured by way of:
1)  storing such evidence in a separate, locked and sealed premises with the inspected 
party;
2)  deposit against receipt to the inspecting persons in the premises of the Office or 
a voivodeship branch of Trade Inspection.
Article 105g.
1.  During the inspection referred to in Article 105a, paragraph 1, the President of the Office 
may issue a decision on seizing files, books, all kinds of documents or data carriers within the 
meaning of the regulations on informatisation of operations of entities carrying out public 
tasks and of other entities that may be used as evidence in the matter, for the duration of 
the inspection, however not longer than 7 days.
2.  The person holding the objects referred to in paragraph 1 shall be requested by the inspecting 
persons to deliver the objects voluntarily and if this is refused, the objects may be seized 
pursuant to the regulations on enforcement procedure in administration.
3.  The decision on seizing the objects may be appealed by persons whose rights have been 
violated. The appeal, if any, does not stop the enforcement of the decision.
4.  The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to the securing at the inspection site, with 
the purpose of performing inspection operations, of files, books, all other documents or data 
carriers and other objects that may be used as evidence in the matter and to the premises 
of the inspected entity where the documents or objects are stored.
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Article 105h.
1.  The objects that are subject to the seizure referred to in Article 105g, paragraph 1, released, 
seized or found during the inspection, after visual inspection and drafting a seizure protocol, 
shall be taken away or left on deposit with a trustworthy person with an obligation to deliver 
them upon each request of the authority carrying out the proceedings.
2.  The seizure protocol shall identify the case to which the seizure of objects or search is 
related, and the exact time of commencing and closing the operations, the precise list of 
seized objects and, to the extent required a description thereof as well as reference to the 
decision of the President of the Office on the seizure. The protocol shall be signed by the 
person performing the seizure and a representative of the inspected party.
3.  The person seizing the objects referred to in paragraph 1 shall be obliged to deliver to the 
interest parties a receipt specifying the objects that were seized and by whom and to notify 
without delay the undertaking whose objects were seized.
4.  The seized objects shall be returned as soon as they are found unnecessary to the carried 
out proceedings or by annulling by the court of competition and consumer protection of the 
decision to seize such objects, however not later than after expiry of the period referred to 
in Article 105g, paragraph 1.
Article 105i.
Without initiating separate proceedings, the President of the Office may carry out an inspection, 
including a search pursuant to Article 91 or Article 105c:
1)  upon the request of the European Commission if the undertaking or a person authorised 
to represent the undertaking or holder of apartments, premises, buildings or means of 
transportation referred to in Article 91, paragraph 1, object to holding an inspection 
by the European Commission during proceedings held pursuant to the provisions of 
Regulation No. 1/2003/EC or Regulation No. 139/2004/EC;
2)  upon the request of the European Commission or the competition authority of a Members 
State in the situation specified in Article 22 of Regulation No. 1/2003/EC or Article 12 
of Regulation No. 139/2004/EC.
Article 105j
1.  The operations performed during the inspection shall be recorded by the inspecting persons 
in an inspection protocol.
2.  The inspection protocol shall specify in particular:
1)  identification of the name or first and last name and address of the inspected party;
2)  date of commencement and end of the inspection;
3)  first and last name and position of the inspecting persons;
4)  identification of the subject and scope of inspection;
5)  description of facts ascertained during the inspection;
6)  description of attachments;
7)  instruction given to the inspected party on their rights to make reservations to the 
protocol and a right to refuse to sign the protocol.
3.  The evidence collected during the inspection shall be attached to the inspection protocol.
Article 105k
1.  The inspection protocol shall be signed by the inspecting person and the inspected party.
2.  Being presented the protocol within 7 days prior to the signature thereof, the inspected 
party may submit written reservations to the protocol.
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3.  If reservations referred to in paragraph 2 are submitted, the inspecting person shall make an 
analysis thereof and, if required, take additional inspection actions; if the reservations are 
found justified, the inspecting person shall amend or make additions to the relevant part of 
the protocol in the form of an annex to the protocol.
4.  If the reservations are not found to be justified in whole or in part, the inspecting person 
shall notify the inspected party thereof in writing.
5.  Refusal to sign the protocol shall be mentioned in the protocol by the inspecting person.
6.  The protocol shall be made in two counterparts one of which shall be delivered to the 
inspected party with the exception of the evidence kept by the inspecting person.
Article 105l
Inspection of business operations of an undertaking shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 
5 of the Act of 2 July 2004 on freedom of business operations (Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 155, 
item 1095, as amended).
Title VII
Fines
Article 106
1.  The President of the Office may impose upon the undertaking, by way of a decision, 
a maximum fine of 10% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding the year 
within which the fine is imposed, if the undertaking, even if unintentionally:
1)  has committed an infringement of the ban determined in Article 6, as regards the 
nonexcluded scope under Articles 7 and 8, or an infringement of the ban determined in 
Article 9;
2)  has committed an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the EC Treaty;
3)  has implemented a concentration without a consent of the President of the Office;
4)  has committed the application of a practise violating collective consumer interests 
within the meaning of Article 24.
2.  The President of the Office may further impose by way of a decision a fine of the equivalent 
of EUR 50 000 000 on an undertaking if the undertaking, even unintentionally:
1)  provided incorrect data in the application referred to in Article 23 or in the notification 
referred to in Article 94, paragraph 2;
2)  failed to provide information requested by the President of the Office pursuant to 
Article 12, paragraph 3, Article 19, paragraph 3 or Article 50 or provided incorrect or 
misleading information;
3)  does not collaborate during the inspection performed within proceedings pursuant to 
Article 105a subject to Article 105d, paragraph 2.
3.  In the case the undertaking was created by way of merger or transformation of other 
undertakings, when calculating the revenue referred to in paragraph 1, the revenue gained 
by these undertakings in the accounting year preceding the year when the fine was imoposed 
should be taken into account.
4.  In the case the undertaking failed to obtain the revenue in the accounting year preceding 
the year when the fine was imposed, the President of the Office may establish the fine in the 
equivalent of two hundred-fold the average remuneration.
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Article 107
The President of the Office may impose by way of a decision a fine of equivalent of up to EUR 
10,000 on an undertaking for each day of delay in execution of the decisions issued pursuant 
to Article 10, Article 12, paragraph 1, Article 19, paragraph 1, Article 20, paragraph 1, Article 
21, paragraphs 2 and 4, Article 26, Article 28, paragraph 1 and Article 89, paragraphs 1 and 3, 
decisions issued pursuant to Article 105g, paragraph 1 or court judgements in cases concerning 
competition-restricting practices, practices violating collective interests of consumers and 
concentration; the fine shall be imposed as of the date specified in the decision.
Article 108
1.  The President of the Office may, by way of a decision, impose on a person holding a managerial 
post or being a member of a managing authority of the undertaking, a maximum fine of fifty-
fold the average remuneration, should such a person, intentionally or unintentionally, have 
not:
1)  executed any of the decisions, resolutions or judgements referred to in Article 107;
2)  notified an intention of concentration referred to in Article 13;
3)  provided information, or have provided unreliable or misleading information, as 
required by the President of the Office pursuant to Article 50.
2.  The President of the Office may impose the fine referred to in Article paragraph 1 on:
1)  persons authorised by the inspected party referred to in Article 105a, paragraph 6, 
holders of apartments, premises, buildings or means of transportation referred to in 
Article 91, paragraph 1 and the persons referred to in Article 105a, paragraph 7 for:
a)  failure to provide information or providing incorrect or misleading information 
requested by the President of the Office,
b)  failure to collaborate during an inspection held within proceedings pursuant to 
Article 105a;
2)  witnesses for refusal to make testimony without valid reason.
Article 109
1.  Subject to paragraph 4, the President of the Office shall refrain from imposing a fine referred 
to in Article 106, paragraph 1, subparagraphs 1 or 2, upon an undertaking taking part in an 
agreement referred to in Article 6, paragraph 1 or Article 81 of the EC Treaty, should this 
undertaking have jointly fulfilled the following conditions:
1)  it has been the first, amongst the participants of the agreement, to:
a)  provide the President of the Office with information concerning the existence 
of such a prohibited agreement, as may suffice for instituting antimonopoly 
proceedings, or
b)  present to the President of the Office, upon its own initiative, a proof rendering 
it possible to issue a decision referred to in Article 10 or 11 - providing that the 
President of the Office did not have at that time any information or pieces of 
evidence proving sufficient for instituting antimonopoly proceedings or issuing 
a decision referred to in Article 10 or 11;
2)  it is fully co-operating with the President of the Office in the course of the proceedings, 
providing him with any and all proofs or pieces of evidence that it has at its disposal, 
or the ones it may have at its disposal, and promptly giving any information relating to 
the case, upon its own initiative or upon demand of the President of the Office,
3)  it has ceased participating in the agreement not later than as of the day on which 
it notified the President of the Office, the existence of an agreement or presented 
evidence referred to in subparagraph 1, point b;
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4)  it was not the initiator of the agreement and did not induce other undertakings to 
participate in the agreement.
2.  In the event that an undertaking participating in an agreement referred to in Article 6, 
paragraph 1 or in Article 81 of the EC Treaty, appears not to be meeting the conditions 
referred to in paragraph 1, then the President of the Office shall decrease the fine referred 
to in Article 106, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 or 2, being imposed on that undertaking, 
should the latter have jointly fulfilled the following conditions:
1)  it has presented to the President of the Office, upon his own initiative, evidence which 
to an essential extent will contribute to issuing a decision referred to in Article 10 or 11;
2)  it has ceased participating in the agreement not later than as of the day on which it 
presented the evidence referred to in subparagraph 1.
3.  In the case referred to in paragraph 2, subject to Article 110, the President of the Office shall 
impose a fine:
1)  being not in excess of 5% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding the 
year within which the fine is imposed – upon the undertaking which has first met the 
conditions referred to in paragraph 2;
2)  being not in excess of 7% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding the 
year within which the fine is imposed – upon the undertaking proving to be the second 
to have met the conditions referred to in paragraph 2;
3)  being not in excess of 8% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding the 
year within which the fine is imposed – upon other undertakings which have met the 
conditions referred to in paragraph 2.
4.  In case that an undertaking has fulfilled the conditions determined in paragraph 1, 
subparagraph 1, point b and subparagraphs 2 to 4, the President of the Office shall impose 
a fine in the amount as determined in paragraph 3, subparagraph 1, provided that another 
undertaking participating in the agreement had prior thereto met the conditions determined 
in paragraph 1, subparagraph 1, point a and subparagraphs 2 to 4.
5.  The Council of Ministers shall determine, by way of a regulation, the procedure to be 
followed in the event when undertakings have applied for renouncement or reduction of 
a fine, including in particular:
1)  the method of accepting and considering undertakings’ requests for renouncement or 
reduction of a fine,
2)  the method of notifying the undertakings of the position assumed by the President of 
the Office - having regard to a necessity for ensuring the option for producing a reliable 
assessment of whether the undertakings have fulfilled the conditions referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2, and for classifying the requests appropriately.
Article 110
1.  In case whereby an undertaking has been established by way of merging or transformation of 
other undertakings, when calculating its turnover, as referred to in Article 109 paragraph 3, 
the revenue earned by such undertakings in the accounting year preceding the year within 
which the fine is imposed, shall be considered.
2.  In case whereby an undertaking has not gained any revenue in the accounting year preceding 
the year within which the fine is imposed, the President of the Office may impose a fine 
amounting up to:
1)  fifty-fold the average remuneration, imposed on the undertaking which has first met the 
conditions, referred to in Article 109, paragraph 2;
2)  seventy-fold the average remuneration, imposed on the undertaking which has second 
met the conditions, referred to in Article 109, paragraph 2;
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3)  eighty-fold the average remuneration, imposed on other undertakings which have met 
the conditions, referred to in Article 109, paragraph 2.
Article 111
When fixing the amount of the fines referred to in Articles 106 to 108, the duration, gravity and 
circumstances of the infringement of the provisions of the Act, as well as the previous
infringement, should be particularly taken into account.
Article 112
1.  The fines referred to in Articles 106 to 108 are to be paid out of the income after taxation or 
out of another form of the surplus of income over expenses decreased by the taxes.
2.  Financial resources originating from the fines referred to in Articles 106 to 108 shall constitute 
the state budget income.
3.  The fine is to be paid within 14 days from the validation of the decision issued by the 
President of the Office.
4.  In the case of the ineffective lapse of the time limit referred to in paragraph 3, the fine 
shall be subject to collection on the basis of the provisions on administrative execution 
proceedings.
5.  In case of delay in the payment of a fine, the interest shall not be collected.
Article 113
1.  Upon a request of the undertaking or persons referred to in Article 108, the President of the 
Office may, by way of a resolution which is not subject to a complaint, defer the payment 
of the fine or establish an instalment plan, taking into account important interests of the 
applicant.
2. The President of the Office may abrogate, by way of a resolution which is not subject to 
a complaint, the deferment of payment of the fine, or the payment on the instalment 
plan, where new or previously unknown circumstances, substantial for the settlement, are 
disclosed.
Title VIII
Penal provision
Article 114
1.  Whoever, acting against the provision of Article 42, paragraph 4, has breached the obligation 
of providing the Consumer Ombudsman with explanations and information being the subject 
of the Ombudsman’s approach, or the obligation to take a stance on the Ombudsman’s 
comments and opinions, shall be liable to a fine of at least PLN 2000.
2.  Deciding and adjudging as regards cases involving acts determined in paragraph 1 shall be 
effectuated pursuant to the provisions of the Act of 24 August 2001 – the Code of Procedure 
in Cases Prosecuted as Petty Offence.
Title IX
Amending, transitional and final provisions
(omitted here)
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3. Regulation of the Council of Ministers 
of 30 March 2011 
 on the exemption of certain types of vertical 
agreements from the prohibition on competition 
restricting agreements 
Pursuant to Article 8 paragraph 3 of the Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer 
protection (Journal of Laws No. 50, item 331, as amended1), it is hereby ordained as follows:
§ 1. 
The regulation specifies:
1)  requirements to be fulfilled so that a vertical agreement could be considered exempted 
from the prohibition referred to in Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Act of 16 February 2007 
on competition and consumer protection, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”;
2)  clauses whose presence in a vertical agreement infringes Article 6 paragraph 1 of the 
Act;
3)  clauses whose presence in a vertical agreement is not regarded as an infringement of 
Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Act;
4)  duration of the exemption.
§ 2. 
The provisions of the regulation shall not apply to vertical agreements covered by the scope of 
other regulation issued pursuant to Article 8 paragraph 3 of the Act.
§ 3. 
For the purposes of this regulation:
1)  exemption – shall mean the exemption of vertical agreements from the prohibition 
referred to in Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Act;
2)  vertical agreements – shall mean agreements concluded between two or more 
undertakings of which each operates – as part of such an agreement – at a different 
level of trade, and whose subject are the conditions of purchase, sale or resale of 
goods;
3)  exclusive purchasing obligations – shall mean clauses included in vertical agreements 
pursuant to which a buyer, directly or indirectly, commits himself to purchase goods 
covered by a vertical agreement exclusively from one supplier;
4)  exclusive supply obligations – shall mean clauses included in vertical agreements 
pursuant to which a supplier, directly or indirectly, commits himself to sell goods 
covered by a vertical agreement exclusively to one buyer and a buyer commits himself 
to use or resell those goods in a way specified by a supplier;
5)  selective distribution system – shall mean the distribution system where a supplier, 
directly or indirectly, commits himself to sell goods covered by a vertical agreement 
exclusively to distributors selected according to criteria specified in that agreement 
and distributors commit themselves not to resell those goods to distributors not 
belonging to that system in the territory where a supplier conducts business activity or 
has taken measures proving that this entity intends to conduct business activity within 
this system;
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6)  franchise distribution system – shall mean the distribution system where a distributor, 
directly or indirectly, commits himself to resell goods purchased from a supplier and 
covered by a vertical agreement, using intellectual and industrial property rights or 
know-how made available by a supplier against a remuneration;
7)  supplier – shall mean an undertaking selling to a buyer goods covered by a vertical 
agreement;
8)  buyer – shall mean an undertaking purchasing goods covered by a vertical agreement;
9)  distributor – shall mean an undertaking purchasing goods covered by a vertical agreement 
with an intention to resell them at the wholesale level (wholesale distributor) or retail 
level (retail distributor) as well as an undertaking concluding with a supplier a vertical 
agreement pursuant to which it sells goods covered by a vertical agreement on behalf 
of a supplier;
10)  intellectual and industrial property rights – shall mean rights vested pursuant to the 
provisions on the protection of intellectual and industrial property;
11)  know-how – shall mean non-patented, undisclosed to the public technical or technological 
information or organisational and administrative rules as for which measures were taken 
aimed at preventing their disclosure if they constitute a whole or a part of specific 
practical information resulting from experiences of a supplier, performed research or 
tests relevant to a buyer in terms of use, sale or resale of goods covered by a vertical 
agreement;
12) non-compete obligation – shall mean resulting directly or indirectly from a vertical 
agreement:
a)  exclusion of a buyer’s rights to manufacture, purchase, sell or resell goods which, 
due to their purpose, price and properties, including the quality, are regarded by 
their buyers as substitutes for goods covered by a vertical agreement;
b)  obligation of a buyer to make, at a specific supplier or undertakings indicated by 
it, more than 80% of all purchases of goods covered by a vertical agreement and of 
goods which, due to their purpose, price and properties, including the quality, are 
regarded by their buyers as substitutes for those goods, calculated on a basis of the 
value or, should it be accepted in the specific relevant market – of the volume of 
purchases made by a buyer in a previous calendar year;
13)  end-user – shall mean a consumer or undertaking purchasing goods covered by a vertical 
agreement in connection with a conducted business activity other than a distribution 
business activity;
14)  buyer’s customer – shall mean an undertaking not being a party to a vertical agreement, 
purchasing goods covered by a vertical agreement from a buyer being a party to that 
agreement for the purpose of their resale;
15)  active sale – shall mean active operations of a seller taken for the purpose of increasing 
sales or acquiring new customers, consisting in particular in carrying out advertising or 
promotional activities, establishing branches or organising distribution centres in the 
specific territory.
§ 4. 
The exemption covers vertical agreements, in particular those including exclusive purchasing 
obligations or exclusive supply obligations or establishing selective distribution systems or 
franchise distribution systems, provided that those agreements fulfil the exemption conditions 
laid down in the regulation.
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§ 5. 
The exemption covers vertical agreements concluded between associations of undertakings and 
their members and between associations of undertakings and their suppliers if:
1)  all association members are retail sellers of goods not being services and
2)  turnover of each association member, including the turnover of undertakings belonging 
to its capital group, did not exceed the equivalent of EUR 50 million in a previous 
calendar year.
§ 6. 
The exemption covers non-reciprocal vertical agreements concluded between competitors if:
1)  a supplier is a manufacturer and distributor of goods not being services and a buyer is 
a distributor and is not a competitor at the manufacturing level or
2)  a supplier provides services at several levels of trade and a buyer supplies goods or 
provides services at the retail level and is not a competitor at this level of trade at 
which it purchases services covered by a vertical agreement.
§ 7.
1.  The exemption covers vertical agreements containing provisions which refer to transferring 
to a buyer or using by it intellectual and industrial property rights or know-how if those 
provisions are not a primary subject-matter of such agreements and are directly related to 
use, sale or resale of goods covered by an agreement by a buyer or its customers.
2.  The exemption is applied when, with respect to goods covered by a vertical agreement, 
the provisions, referred to in paragraph 1, do not contain, at the same time, restrictions of 
competition having the same objective as clauses and agreements which are not exempted 
pursuant to the regulation.
§ 8.
1.  Vertical agreements are subject to the exemption if:
1)  share of a supplier and capital group to which a supplier belongs in the relevant market 
of sale of goods covered by such an agreement does not exceed 30%,
2)  share of a buyer and capital group to which a buyer belongs in the relevant market of 
sale of goods covered by such an agreement does not exceed 30% - subject to § 9.
2.  If under a multilateral vertical agreement an undertaking purchases goods covered by that 
agreement from an undertaking being a party to that agreement and sells those goods to 
another undertaking also being a party to that agreement, the exemption is applied when its 
share in the market, both as a buyer and as a supplier, does not exceed 30%.
§ 9.
1.  If the share referred to in § 8:
1)  does not exceed 30%, but, upon concluding a vertical agreement rises above this value, 
not exceeding, however, 35%, the exemption is applied also for the period of two 
calendar years following the year in which the threshold of 30% was exceeded for the 
first time;
2)  does not exceed 30%, but, upon concluding a vertical agreement rises above 35%, the 
exemption is applied also for the period of one calendar year following the year in 
which the threshold of 35% was exceeded for the first time.
2.  The exemption period, referred to in paragraph 1, may not last, in total, longer than two 
consecutive calendar years following the year in which the threshold of 30% was exceeded 
for the first time.
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§ 10. 
1.  The share, referred to in § 8, in case of:
1)  a supplier – is calculated on a basis of the selling value of goods covered by a vertical 
agreement and of the selling value of other goods which, due to their purpose, price 
and properties, including the quality, are regarded by their buyers as substitutes for 
those goods;
2) a buyer – is calculated on a basis of the purchase value of goods covered by a vertical 
agreement and of the purchase value of other goods which, due to their purpose, price 
and properties, including the quality, are regarded by their buyers as substitutes for 
those goods.
2.  If the data regarding the selling value or the purchase value are not available, the market 
share is calculated on a basis of other reliable market information, including information on 
the sales or purchase volume.
3.  The market share is calculated on a basis of data regarding a previous calendar year.
4.  In calculating the market share, sale between undertakings belonging to one capital group is 
not included.
5.  In calculating the market share of a supplier, goods sold to distributors being parties to 
a vertical agreement concluded with this supplier for the purpose of their resale are included.
§ 11. 
The exemption does not cover vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, independently 
or in relation with other circumstances dependent on parties to those agreements are aimed 
at restricting:
1)  right of a supplier to fix a selling price by imposing on a buyer minimum or fixed selling 
prices for goods covered by a vertical agreement;
2)  territory or group of customers, where or to which a buyer may sell goods covered by 
a vertical agreement, exclusive of restriction:
a)  regarding the premises or area where a buyer conducts its business activity,
b)  of active sale to a specific territory or a specific group of customers reserved for 
a supplier or assigned by a supplier to another buyer, if those restrictions do not 
prevent buyer’s customers from selling goods covered by a vertical agreement,
c)  of sale to end-users by a wholesale distributor,
d)  with regard to distributors operating under the selective distribution system – of 
resale of goods covered by a vertical agreement to distributors not belonging to 
that system, in a territory where a supplier conducts its business activity or has 
taken measures proving that it intends to conduct a business activity under that 
system,
e)  of the right of a buyer to resell components covered by a vertical agreement to 
other undertakings which would use them to manufacture goods which, due to 
their purpose, price and properties, including the quality, are regarded by their 
buyers as substitutes for goods being sold by a supplier;
3)  with regard to retail distributors operating under the selective distribution system – 
a possibility to sell to end-users, exclusive of restriction of a possibility to sell by them 
in the premises not fulfilling criteria laid down in a vertical agreement being a basis for 
establishing the selective distribution system;
4)  cross-supplies between distributors operating under the selective distribution system, 
including distributors operating at various levels of trade;
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5)  the right of a supplier to sell components covered by a vertical agreement – as spare 
parts – to end-users, repair shops or other service providers to which a buyer did not 
entrust repairing or servicing goods manufactured using those components.
§ 12. 
Clauses, whose presence in a vertical agreement infringes Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Act, are 
clauses which directly or indirectly prohibit:
1)  to compete for a specified time of more than five years or for an unspecified time unless 
a buyer sells goods covered by a vertical agreement in the premises or in a territory 
whose owner, perpetual user, lessee or leaseholder is a supplier or which a supplier 
rents or leases from third parties not related to a buyer and the duration of such 
a commitment does not exceed the period of occupying those premises or that territory; 
the non-compete obligation which is renewed tacitly after five years is regarded as 
concluded for an unspecified time;
2)  distributors operating under the selective distribution system – to sell goods of only 
certain competitors of a supplier;
3)  buyers – to manufacture, purchase, sell or resell goods after the termination of a vertical 
agreement unless the validity of such clauses:
a)  refers to goods which, due to their purpose, price and properties, including the 
quality, are regarded by their buyers as substitutes for goods covered by a vertical 
agreement and
b)  is limited to the premises or territory where a buyer conducts its business activity 
during the validity of a vertical agreement and
c)  is required for the protection of know-how provided to a buyer by a supplier – 
and the duration of their validity is limited to one year after the termination of 
a vertical agreement, exclusive of a possibility to impose restriction which has no 
time limit on the use and disclosure of know-how.
§ 13. 
The exemption is not applied to vertical agreements if clauses, referred to in § 12 and whose 
presence in a vertical agreement infringes Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Act, may not be separated 
from a vertical agreement as a whole.
§ 14. 
To vertical agreements subject to the exemption pursuant to the regulation of the Council of 
Ministers of 19 November 2007 on the exemption of certain types of vertical agreements from 
the prohibition on competition restricting agreements (Journal of Laws No. 230, item 1691) 
nonfulfilling the exemption conditions laid down in this regulation, the existing provisions shall 
apply, pending the adjustment of those agreements to the provisions of this regulation, not 
longer however, than until 30 November 2011.
§ 15. 
The regulation remains valid until 31 May 2023.
§ 16. 
The regulation enters into force on 1 June 2011.
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4. Regulation of the Council of Ministers 
dated 17 July 2007 
 concerning the notification of the intention 
of concentration of undertakings 
Pursuant to art. 94 item 6 of the act dated 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer 
protection (Journal of Laws No. 50, item 331 and No. 99, item 660) the following is ordered: 
§1.
1.  This regulation specifies: 
1)  detailed conditions to be met by the notification of intention of concentration of 
undertakings, including a list of information and documents, hereinafter referred to as 
the “list”, to be included in such a notification; 
2)  amount of fees for requests to initiate antimonopoly proceeding in case of concentration 
and method of their payment. 
2.  The list referred to in item 1 point 1 is included in the appendix to the regulation.
§ 2. 
Each time the regulation refers to: 
1)  act - this shall mean the act dated 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer 
protection; 
2)  concentration - this shall mean factual conditions referred to in art. 13 item 2 of the 
act; 
3)  notification - this shall mean the notification of intention of concentration of 
undertakings; 
4) notifying undertakings - this shall mean the undertakings directly taking part in the 
concentration, obligated to make the notification in the meaning of art. 94 item 2 and 
3 of the act; 
5)  President of the Office or the Office - this shall mean the President of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection or the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection. 
6)  KRS – it shall mean the National Court of Registration. 
§ 3. 
The notification constitutes a request to initiate the antimonopoly proceeding on concentration, 
referred to in art. 49 item 2 of the act. 
§ 4. 
The notifying undertaking presents complete information and documents compliant with the 
factual conditions according to the list, with reservation of § 5 and 6.
 
§ 5. 
1.  The President of the Office may, upon request of the notifying undertaking included in the 
notification, consider it as meeting the requirements specified in § 4, despite a lack of 
information or documents included in the list, if at the same time: 
1)  the notifying undertaking does not have access to the whole or part of the information 
or documents; 
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2)  the activities undertaken by him did not give any results; 
3)  this undertaking demonstrated the due diligence in undertaking activities aimed to 
obtain this information or documents. 
2.  In the cases referred to in item 1, the notifying undertaking must provide the estimate 
data and indicate the sources and grounds of estimates made. If during the proceeding 
the undertaking receives such information or documents referred to in item 1, it shall 
immediately provide them to the President of the Office. 
3.  The notifying undertaking may not make reference to unavailability of information or 
documents relating to the capital group it belongs to. 
§ 6. 
1.  The President of the Office may, upon request of the notifying undertaking included in 
the notification, consider it as meeting the requirements specified in § 4, despite a lack 
of information or documents included in the list, if the notifying undertaking renders it 
plausible that this information or documents are not objectively necessary for the issuance 
of the decision concerning the notified intention of concentration. 
2.  The provision of item 1 does not apply to the notification of intention of concentration which 
refers to undertakings which are competitors in the meaning of art. 4 point 11 of the act. 
3.  Acknowledgment of the notification referred to in item 1 as meeting the requirements 
specified in § 4 does not free the notifying undertaking from obligation to present, upon 
demand of the President of the Office, information or documents, if in the course of 
the proceeding they become necessary to issue the decision concerning the intention of 
concentration that has been notified. 
§ 7. 
The documents included in the notification must meet the requirements specified in art. 51 of the 
act. 
§ 8. 
1.  Financial sums included in the list are in PLN thousands. 
2.  Recalculations in PLN of values initially expressed in EUR or other foreign currencies must be 
made according to rules specified in art. 5 of the act. 
§ 9. 
The notifying undertaking who considers the information presented in the notification to be the 
business secret in the meaning of the regulations on combating unfair competition must indicate 
in the notification which information is the business secret, or in case of notification of the 
intention of concentration made by more than one undertaking, present with the notification 
a request referred to in art. 69 item 4 of the act. 
§ 10. 
The requests to initiate antimonopoly proceedings in cases of concentration before the President 
of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection are subject to a fee amounting to PLN 
5,000 per notification of intention of concentration of undertakings, payable by the notifying 
undertaking. 
§ 11. 
The fee referred to in § 10 is payable by the undertaking obligated to pay it in cash at the cash 
desk or to the bank account of the tax office specific for the place of office of the undertaking. 
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§ 12. 
The undertaking filing a request to initiate the antimonopoly proceeding on concentration 
attaches to the request a proof of payment referred to in § 10.
 
§ 13. 
The regulation of the Council of Ministers dated 3 April 2002 concerning the notification of intention 
of concentration of undertakings (Journal of Laws No. 37, item 334) becomes ineffective. 
§ 14. 
The regulation comes into force 14 days from the day of publication.
Attachment to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers dated 17 July 2007 (item 937).
LIST OF INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 
NOTIFICATION OF THE INTENTION OF CONCENTRATION OF UNDERTAKINGS
Introduction (general explanations) 
1.  The present List of Information and Documents (LID) is a sample application form. The LID 
must be prepared in accordance with the numbering of chapters and points. If a point does 
not apply to a given undertaking or market, please enter “not applicable”. The documents 
included in LID or made available on one’s own initiative must be submitted as attachments. 
They constitute the integral part of the LID. Any information or documents which constitute 
a part of this LID should be additionally submitted in an electronic form (diskette, CD-ROM, 
DVD or sent by e-mail to the e-mail address of the specific department of the Head Office or 
specific Branch office of the Office). 
2.  If the undertaking taking part in the concentration is a natural person referred to in art. 4 
point 1 letter c of the act, the box relating to information about the name (point 1.1.1 or 
point 1.3.1) should indicate the person’s first and last name. Other identification details must 
be provided when they apply to this form of undertaking. 
3.  If the undertaking taking part in the concentration is a local government unit, the box 
relating to information about the name (point 1.1.1 or point 1.3.1) should indicate its name 
and territorial scope. Other identification details must be provided when they apply to this 
form of undertaking. 
4.  If the undertaking taking part in the concentration is an undertaking not operating on the 
basis of the Polish law (foreign entity), the box relating to information about the name 
(point 1.1.1 or point 1.3.1) should indicate also the name and address, possibly the e-mail 
of entities related with it personally, by capital and organisationally, as well as branches and 
representative offices operating in the territory of the Republic of Poland. If the undertaking 
taking part in the concentration is an undertaking not operating on the basis of the Polish 
law (foreign entity), the identification details and documents should specify the registration 
number (point 1.1.2 and 1.3.2) as well as an excerpt from KRS or other register (point 6.1.) 
should be attached, if such register exists. 
5.  If the undertaking taking part in the concentration is a financial institution, the information 
about sales (point 8.2) and structure of supply (point 9.1.) should be filled in using the 
measures specific for the services it provides. 
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PART I 
Information and documents identifying the undertakings participating in concentration and 
describing the intended concentration 
Chapter I 
Basic information about undertakings directly taking part in concentration 
1.1. Details identifying the notifying undertakings 
 For each of notifying undertakings, please provide: 
1.1.1. name (company name) and address of registered office (and e-mail address, if any), 
1.1.2. identification number (for Polish undertakings, NIP or REGON), 
1.1.3. legal form (joint-stock company, limited liability company, other commercial company, 
undertaking operating as partner in a partnership, state-owned company, cooperative, 
other), 
1.1.4. object of actual activity - according to the applicable classifications, 
1.1.5. persons filling the functions of management body members (first and last name, 
functions, addresses and e-mail addresses, if any, if different than in point 1.1.1, phone 
and fax numbers), 
1.1.6. first and last names of proxies, if appointed (their postal or e-mail addresses, phone 
and fax numbers), 
1.1.7. first and last name of the person authorised to contacts with the Office (if different 
than in point 1.1.6 and if the proxies are not appointed, if different than in point 1.1.5, 
his/her postal and e-mail address, phone and fax numbers). 
1.2.  In case of joint notification, in which a joint proxy is appointed, please provide his/her first 
and last name, address and e-mail address if any, and the first and last name and address 
and e-mail address of the person authorised to contacts with the Office, if different than the 
proxy. 
1.3.  Identification details of other undertakings directly taking part in concentration 
 For each of other undertakings directly taking part in the concentration, please provide: 
1.3.1. name (company name) and address of registered office (and e-mail address, if any), 
1.3.2. identification number (for Polish undertakings, NIP or REGON), 
1.3.3. legal form (joint-stock company, limited liability company, other commercial company, 
undertaking operating as partner in a partnership, state-owned company, cooperative, 
other), 
1.3.4. object of actual activity - according to the applicable classifications, 
1.3.5. persons filling the functions of management body members (first and last name, 
functions, addresses and e-mail addresses, if any, if different than in point 1.3.1, phone 
and fax numbers), 
1.3.6. first and last name of the person authorised to contacts with the Office (if different 
than in point 1.3.5 - his/her postal and e-mail address, phone and fax numbers). 
Chapter II 
Detailed description of the intended concentration 
Please provide a detailed description of the intended concentration: 
2.1. Please indicate the form of concentration (merger, taking over of control, creation of a joint 
undertaking) and provide its short characteristics, and in particular: 
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2.1.1. In case the concentration is to take place as a result of merger of two or more 
undertakings, referred to in art. 13 item 2 point 1 of the act, please specify its form in 
the light of provisions of the Commercial Companies Code relating to company merger 
or other provisions. 
2.1.2. In case the concentration is to take place in form of taking over control referred to in 
art. 13 item 2 point 2 of the act - please provide: 
2.1.2.1. whether the control is taken over by one or more undertakings, 
2.1.2.2. whether the undertaking takes over, as part of a single transaction, control 
over one or a larger number of undertakings, 
2.1.2.3. whether the concentration is related to purchase or take over of stock 
admitted for public trading - in what form such concentration will result in taking 
the control over. 
2.1.3. In case the concentration is to take place in form of establishing a joint undertaking 
referred to in art. 13 item 2 point 3 of the act - please provide: 
2.1.3.1. the name (company name) and address of the undertaking established, 
2.1.3.2. indicate the scope of its intended activity, 
2.1.3.3. specify in which consists the concentration nature of the operation. 
2.1.4. In case the concentration is to take place in form of purchasing by one undertaking 
a part of assets of another undertaking (whole or a part of the company) referred to in 
art. 13 item 2 point 3 of the act - please provide: 
2.1.4.1. whether the whole or a part of the undertaking is subject to concentration, 
2.1.4.2. in which consists the concentration nature of the operation. 
2.2. In addition: 
2.2.1. please provide the characteristics: 
2.2.1.1. of the reason for concentration, 
2.2.1.2. its economic objectives, 
2.2.1.3. financing method, 
2.2.1.4. expected consequences of concentration for its participants, competition and 
consumers, 
2.2.1.5. description of the impact of the concentration to the relevant market, 
production costs, product prices and market effect of scale, 
2.2.2. please provide whether the offer to purchase stock admitted to public trading, which 
the notifying undertaking intends to make, is backed up by the management of the 
company whose stock is to be purchased, 
2.2.3. please provide the planned schedule of concentration, 
2.2.4. please indicate the planned structure of ownership and control after concentration, 
2.2.5. please indicate types and amount of public aid related to the notified concentration. 
Chapter III 
Turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration 
3.1. Please demonstrate that the combined turnover of the undertakings participating in the 
concentration, in the year preceding the year of notification, exceeds the values specified in 
art. 13 item 1 of the act and that the notification exclusion provided for in art. 14 point 1 of 
the act does not apply to the intended concentration. 
 When calculating the turnover for the purposes of the act, please take into consideration the 
rules specified in art. 16 of the act and the regulation issued on the basis of art. 17 of the 
act. 
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3.2. Please demonstrate that the turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration does 
not exceed the values specified in art. 1 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (taking into consideration the principles of 
calculating the turnover it provides for). 
3.3. When providing the above information, please also indicate the turnover obtained individually 
by each of the concentration participants. 
Chapter IV 
Information about ownership and control within the capital group 
For each of undertakings directly participating in the concentration, please provide a statement 
of all the undertakings belonging to its capital group in the meaning of art. 4 point 14 of the act 
(with isolation of undertakings which realise the turnover in Poland) and indicate the formal and 
practical grounds of the direct or indirect control it has over other undertakings or what is the 
control over it, with presentation of the characteristics of the capital groups. 
Information required in this chapter should be presented in a descriptive form and in form of 
diagrams, graphic charts or tables. 
Chapter V 
Information about earlier concentrations 
For each of undertakings directly participating in the concentration and for each of undertakings 
listed in the statement referred to in chapter IV, please provide a list and short characteristics 
of concentrations made within the last two years by undertakings belonging to the capital 
groups identified in chapter IV. 
In each case, please indicate whether the concentration was subject to the obligation of 
notification and if yes, please indicate whether, when and to which body it was notified. 
Chapter VI 
Documents confirming the information included in chapters I - V 
The notifying undertakings must attach to this list: 
6.1.  Current excerpt from the National Court Register or other register. 
6.2.  Copies of final or the most up-to-date versions of contracts or documents identifying the 
activities on the basis of which the concentration is to be made. 
6.3. In case of company merger - copies of the merger plan, referred to in art. 499 and 518 of the 
act dated 15 September 2000 - Commercial Companies Code. 
6.4.  In case of public offer of take over - issue prospectus or a copy of the offer in the meaning 
of the act dated 29 July 2005 on trading in financial instruments. 
6.5.  Copies of annual approved financial statements of undertakings participating in the 
concentration from the last two preceding years (in particular the balance sheet, profit and 
loss account, cash flow report, statement of changes in share capital). 
6.6.  The undertakings which have consolidated financial reports meet the above conditions by 
attaching the approved consolidated report to the request. 
6.7. In case of notifying the intention of concentration in a period which makes it impossible to 
present the financial report for the last financial year, the undertaking must present reliable 
estimates in scope of financial results for this year, indicating the reasons for not submitting 
complete documentation in this scope. The missing financial report must be immediately 
provided to the Office in case it is elaborated and approved by the authorised body of the 
undertaking. 
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6.8.  Copies of analyses, reports, studies and research prepared for the members or for the 
meetings of the board, supervisory board or general or ordinary shareholders’ meeting in 
order to assess or analyse the concentration in scope of competition conditions, present and 
potential competitors, as well as conditions on the market. 
6.9.  A list of publicly available sources of information about the markets to be impacted by 
the intended concentration, in particular sector periodicals, statistics and analyses made 
available (also for a fee) to third persons, websites containing information useful to assess 
the notified intention of concentration. 
PART II
Information on relevant markets impacted by the concentration
Chapter VII
Relevant markets impacted by the concentration
7.1. Identification of relevant product and geographic markets 
Please provide in this scope: 
7.1.1. relevant product markets on which the undertaking taking part in the concentration 
operate: 
7.1.1.1 for which the relevant geographic market includes the territory of Poland 
or its part, 
7.1.1.2 for which the relevant geographic market is the market other than 
specified in point 7.1.1.1. 
Please provide these markets, indicating at least the name of the goods (in the 
meaning of art. 4 point 7 of the act), their designation according to the applicable 
classification and the area which according to the notifying undertaking is the 
relevant geographic market; identification of relevant markets maybe made in 
form of a table. 
7.1.2. Pursuant to provisions of art. 4 point 9 of the act: 
7.1.2.1. the relevant product market covers the goods which due to their purpose, 
price and properties, including the quality, are considered by their 
buyers as substitutes, 
7.1.2.2. the relevant geographic market covers the area of goods offering, in 
which - due to their type and properties, existence of barriers of entry, 
consumer preferences, significant differences of prices and costs of 
transport - there are similar competition conditions. 
7.2. Identification of relevant markets impacted by the concentration 
Please indicate: 
7.2.1. all the relevant markets impacted by the concentration in the horizontal 
configuration. The relevant market impacted by the horizontal concentration 
is every product market, on which at least two undertakings taking part in the 
concentration are involved (common markets) and where the concentration leads 
to obtaining a joint share in the geographic market in the amount of more than 
20%, 
7.2.2. all the relevant markets impacted by the vertical concentration. The relevant 
market impacted by the vertical concentration is every product market, if at the 
same time: 
7.2.2.1. at least one of the undertakings taking part in the concentration operates, 
7.2.2.2. it is simultaneously the market of purchase or sale (previous or next 
trade level) on which any of the other undertakings participating in the 
concentration operate, 
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7.2.2.3. the market share of the undertakings participating in the concentration 
on those markets exceeds 30%, regardless on whether there is presently 
the supplier-recipient type relation between those two undertakings. 
Chapter VIII 
Basic information about the relevant markets impacted by the horizontal or vertical concentration 
The information below must be presented separately for each of the relevant product markets 
impacted by the horizontal or vertical concentration, separately for each of the two last or 
preceding years and separately for the Polish market - domestic or local - and for the market 
wider than the Polish market, if the relevant geographic market is not the Polish market 
(domestic or local). 
8.1. The size of market, and please provide: 
8.1.1. the estimate size of market expressed in value and quantity (in natural units), 
8.1.2. indicate the grounds and the sources of data on the basis of which estimates were 
made and, if possible, attach documents confirming those estimates, 
8.1.3. provide the estimate amount of production capabilities which may be directed 
to this market, in the response to an increase of prices significant for producers. 
8.2. The size of sales and share in the market of undertakings participating in the concentration, 
and please provide: 
8.2.1. the size of sales (expressed in value and quantity) of each of the undertakings 
participating in the concentration as well as the estimate percent shares in the 
market of each of the undertakings participating in the concentration, 
8.2.2. indicate the grounds and the sources of data on the basis of which estimates were 
calculated and, if possible, attach documents confirming those calculations or 
estimates. 
8.3. The importance of foreign trade, and please provide: 
8.3.1. the estimate total value and number and directions of import to Poland, 
8.3.2. specify the share of import of the capital groups to which the undertakings 
participating the concentration belong in the total import to Poland, 
8.3.3. estimate the degree in which any quota barriers, tariff barriers and other trade 
barriers as well as the transport costs impact this import, 
8.3.4. indicate the grounds and the sources of data on the basis of which estimates were 
made and, if possible, attach documents confirming those estimates. 
8.4. Main competitors, and please provide: 
8.4.1. the estimate share in the market expressed in value (and if possible, in quantity) and 
in percentage for all the competitors (including the importers) who have at least 10% 
share in the relevant geographic market. 
8.4.2. indicate the grounds and the sources of data on the basis of which estimates were 
made and, if possible, attach documents confirming those estimates. 
8.5. Main recipients and suppliers, and please provide: 
8.5.1. main recipients (at least three), who are not members of the capital group, to which 
the undertaking participating in the concentration belongs, and the estimate percent 
share of their purchases in the total value of sales of undertakings participating in the 
concentration, 
8.5.2. three main suppliers, who are not members of the capital group, to which the 
undertaking participating in the concentration belongs, and the estimate percent 
share of their supplies in the total value of sales of undertakings participating in the 
concentration, 
8.5.3. indicate the grounds and the sources of data on the basis of which estimates were 
made and, if possible, attach documents on which those estimates base. 
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Chapter IX 
Detailed characteristics of the relevant markets impacted by the horizontal or vertical 
concentration 
Separately for each of the relevant markets impacted by the horizontal or vertical concentration, 
please: 
9.1. Specify the structure of supply: 
9.1.1. Describe distribution channels and service networks on those markets, in particular: 
9.1.1.1. present the distribution systems existing on the market and their importance 
and specify the scope in which the distribution is carried out by independent 
undertakings or undertakings belonging to the same capital group to which 
undertakings participating in the concentration belong, 
9.1.1.2. present the service networks (e.g. maintenance and repairs) existing on 
the market and their importance and specify the scope in which the services are 
carried out by independent undertakings or undertakings belonging to the same 
capital group to which undertakings participating in the concentration belong, 
9.1.2. Estimate the value of total production capacities for the last two years preceding the 
concentration and specify what part of those production capacities is assigned to each 
of the undertakings participating in the concentration and the size of indexes of their 
utilisation by each of them; present materials or indicate the sources on the basis of 
which the amounts of estimated production capacities on those markets were assessed. 
9.1.3. Provide all other factors characterising the supply structure on the markets impacted 
by the concentration and which the notifying undertakings consider important. 
9.2. Specify the structure of demand: 
9.2.1. Present the structure and dynamics of supply, indicating: 
9.2.1.1. the market growth stages, e.g. initial stage, development stage, fully formed 
stage and dwindling stage and the estimate growth of demand, 
9.2.1.2. meaning and changes in the preferences of recipients in the scope of product 
brands (including the level of brand loyalty), their differentiation and supply of full 
assortment of products, 
9.2.1.3. level of concentration or scattering of recipients, 
9.2.1.4. division of recipients to various groups with the description of the “typical 
recipient” in each of the groups, 
9.2.1.5. importance of exclusive distribution contracts and other types of long-term 
contracts, 
9.2.1.6. the level at which the demand is created by the public administration bodies, 
government agencies, State-owned enterprises and other similar entities. 
9.2.2. Provide all other factors charactering he structure of demand, which the notifying 
undertakings consider important. 
9.3. Entry on and exit from the market 
9.3.1. Please provide if - according to the best knowledge of the notifying undertakings - 
within the last five years, there were some significant entries on any of the relevant 
markets impacted by the concentration, and what were the estimate market shares of 
those undertakings in that period. 
9.3.2. Provide whether according to the assessment of notifying undertakings, there are 
undertakings (including those which currently operate outside Poland) that could enter 
the market. 
9.3.3. Please describe different existing factors which may impact the entry on the markets 
impacted by the concentration, analyzing the possibilities of entry on those markets 
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from a geographic and product point of view, in particular: 
9.3.3.1. the estimate cost of entry on the market (research and development, creation 
of distribution systems, promotions, advertising, service, etc.) calculated by 
comparison to the costs of operation of a significant competitor, with specification 
of the market share of this competitor, present materials or indicate sources on the 
basis of which the amount of total cost of entry on the market and cost of operation 
of the significant competitor was calculated, 
9.3.3.2. all the legal barriers of entry, such as licenses, permits, or any standards, 
9.3.3.3. all the limitations resulting from patents, know-how or other exclusive rights 
in the scope of intellectual and industrial property on those markets and all the 
limitations in obtaining licences for those rights, 
9.3.3.4. scope in which each of the undertakings participating in the concentration 
is the licensor or licensee of patents, know-how and other exclusive rights on 
relevant markets, 
9.3.3.5. importance of the economy of scale for the production of products on the 
markets impacted by the concentration, 
9.3.3.6. access to supply sources, including for instance availability of raw materials. 
9.3.4. Also you may provide all other factors characterising the entry on the market, exit from 
the market or illustrating the attractiveness of operation on relevant markets impacted 
by the concentration and which the notifying undertakings consider important. 
9.4. Research and development 
9.4.1. Please assess the importance of research and development for the ability to compete 
of the companies operating on the relevant markets in the long term. 
9.4.2. Please present the types of research and development on relevant markets impacted by 
the concentration, carried out by the undertakings participating in the concentration. 
9.4.3. In particular, please focus on: 
9.4.3.1. directions and intensity of research and development carried out on those 
markets, including by the undertakings participating in the concentration, 
9.4.3.2. course of the technological development on those markets in the appropriately 
long period (including development of products or services, production processes, 
distribution systems, etc.), 
9.4.3.3. significant innovations launched on those markets and the undertakings which 
launched them, 
9.4.3.4. innovation cycle on those markets and indication in which stage of this cycle 
the undertakings participating in the concentration are. 
9.5. Cooperation arrangements 
9.5.1. Please provide the level in which the cooperation contracts (horizontal or vertical) 
exist on the markets impacted by the concentration. 
9.5.2. Please provide information on the most important cooperation arrangements 
concluded by the undertakings participating in the concentration, concerning the 
markets impacted by the concentration, such as research and development contracts, 
licence contracts, joint production agreements, specialisation agreements, distribution 
agreements, long-term supply agreements and information exchange agreements. 
9.6. Membership in associations of entrepreneurs 
9.6.1. Please specify the associations of entrepreneurs operating in the Republic of Poland, 
of which the undertakings participating in the concentration are members. 
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Chapter X 
Other information on markets and effects of concentration 
10.1. Information on relevant markets impacted by the conglomerate concentration. 
10.1.1. Please provide all the relevant markets impacted by the conglomerate concentration. 
 The relevant market impacted by the conglomerate concentration is every product 
market, on which between the undertakings taking part in the concentration there are 
no horizontal or vertical relations, but at least one of the undertakings participating in 
the concentration has more than 40 % share in any relevant market. 
10.1.2. For each relevant market impacted by the conglomerate concentration, please 
provide the estimate value of the market and the market shares in the year preceding for 
each of the capital groups, to which the undertakings participating in the concentration 
belong, separately for the Polish market - domestic or local - and for the market wider 
than the Polish market, if the relevant geographic market is not the Polish market 
(domestic or local). 
10.2. Information about the global context of the intended concentration 
10.2.1. The notification may also include a description of the intended concentration in the 
global context, characterising among others the position of undertakings participating 
in the concentration at a scale exceeding the markets related to the markets impacted 
by the horizontal, vertical or conglomerate concentration. 
10.2.2. Please specify: 
10.2.2.1. whether the intention of concentration is subject to notification at another 
national or international competition protection authority, 
10.2.2.2. names of authorities and dates of notifications, if they were already made, 
10.2.2.3. dates and sentences of positions of those authorities, if they have been 
already issued. 
10.3.1. Information on positive effects of concentration, balancing its negative effects for 
the competition, the existence of which will allow to make the decision referred to in 
art. 19 item 2 of the act. 
10.3.2. The notification may also conclude, with the justification, that the intended 
concentration: 
10.3.2.1. will contribute to the economic growth or technical progress, 
10.3.2.2. will have a positive effect on the national economy, 
10.3.2.3. will have other positive effects. 
 (place and date of LID elaboration) 
 (stamp and signature of the person representing the managing body or the proxy of 
the notifying undertaking(s)) 
Chapter XI
Explanations
11. Each time the list refers to: 
11.1. undertakings participating in the concentration, this shall mean; 
11.1.1. undertakings directly participating in the concentration, including: 
11.1.1.1. jointly the merging undertakings - in the case referred to in art. 13 item 2 
point 1 of the act, 
11.1.1.2 undertaking taking the control over - in the case referred to in art. 13 item 2 
point 2 of the act, 
11.1.1.3. jointly all the undertakings participating in establishment of a joint 
undertaking - in the case referred to in art. 13 item 2 point 3 of the act, 
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11.1.1.4. undertaking purchasing a part of the assets of another undertaking - in the 
case referred to in art. 13 item 2 point 4 of the act, 
11.1.2. other undertakings belonging to capital groups, in the meaning of art. 4 point 
14 of the act, to which the undertakings directly participating in the concentration 
belong, 
11.2. financial institutions - this shall mean in particular banks, insurance companies, national 
investment funds, investment funds companies or trust funds companies, pension companies 
and brokerage houses; 
11.3. turnover - this shall mean the turnover calculated according to the provisions of art. 16 of 
the act and regulation issued on the basis of art. 17 of the act; 
11.4. preceding year - this shall mean the financial year preceding the year of notification of the 
intention of concentration.
5. Regulation of the Council of Ministers 
of 26 January 2009
 concerning the mode of proceeding in cases 
of undertakings’ applications to the President 
of the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection for immunity from or reduction of 
fines 
Pursuant to Article 109(5) of the Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection 
(Journal of Laws, No. 50, item 331, as amended1), it is provided as follows:
§ 1. 
The Regulation specifies the mode of proceeding in cases of undertakings’ applications to the 
President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, hereinafter referred to as the 
“President of the Office” for immunity from or reduction of the fines referred to in Article 106(1)
(1) or (2) of the Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection, hereinafter 
referred to as the “Act”.
§ 2. 
1.  An undertaking which believes that it meets the requirements referred to in Article 109(1) or 
(2) of the Act may submit to the President of the Office a written application for immunity 
from or reduction of a fine, hereinafter referred to as “application”. The President of the 
Office provides a confirmation of the date and time of receipt of the application.
2.  An application sent by electronic mail or by fax to the electronic mail address or the fax 
number indicated on the website of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, 
hereinafter referred to as the “Office”, is considered as submitted on the day and time when 
it was received by the Office, provided that the document’s original or its copy, authenticated 
in the way set out in Article 51 of the Act, is delivered to the President of the Office not later 
than in 3 days of the day when the application was received by the Office by electronic mail 
or fax.
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3.  The undertaking may also submit the application orally for the record. The employee who is 
preparing the record puts the date and the time on the document.
4.  The date of receipt of an application submitted orally for the record is the date and hour 
when the record was commenced to be prepared.
§ 3. 
1.  The undertaking encloses with the application the evidence or information referred to in 
Article 109(1)(1) or the evidence referred to in Article 109(2)(1) of the Act.
2.  In the application the undertaking may present a description of the agreement, indicating, 
in particular:
1)  the undertakings which concluded the agreement,
2) the products or services which the agreement refers to,
3)  the territory which the agreement covers, 1 Amendments to the Act were published in 
the Journal of Laws in 2007, No. 99, item 660 and No. 171, item 1206 and in 2008, No. 
157, item 976, No. 223, item 1458 and No. 227, item 1505.
4)  the purpose of the agreement,
5)  the circumstances of concluding the agreement,
6)  the roles of the particular participants in the agreement,
7)  the names, surnames and official posts of the persons performing significant functions 
in the agreement,
8)  the duration of the agreement,
9)  whether an application for immunity from or reduction of a fine has also been submitted 
to the national competition authorities of the European Union Member States or to the 
European Commission.
3.  Moreover, the undertaking encloses with the application the following:
1)  a statement that the undertaking has ceased its participation in the prohibited 
agreement, specifying the date of cessation,
2)  a statement that the undertaking submitting the application was not the instigator 
of the agreement and that it did not induce other undertakings to participate in the 
agreement – in cases referred to in Article 109(1) of the Act.
§ 4. 
The undertaking may also enclose with its application other evidence or information indicating 
the existence of the prohibited agreement.
§ 5. 
1.  The undertaking may submit an application indicating, in particular, the following:
1)  the undertakings which concluded the agreement,
2)  the products or services which the agreement refers to,
3)  the territory which the agreement covers,
4)  the duration of the agreement,
5)  the purpose of the agreement,
6)  whether an application for immunity from or reduction of a fine has been also submitted 
to the national competition authorities of the European Union Member States or to the 
European Commission,
- if the application contains the preliminary information or evidence referred to in Article 
109(1)(1) or (2)(1) of the Act.
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2.  With the application the undertaking encloses the statements referred to in § 3(3) above.
3.  The President of the Office provides a confirmation of the date and time of the application’s 
submission, specifying, without delay, the scope of information that needs to be produced 
to complete the application and the deadline within which the undertaking is obliged to 
complete the application.
4.  The application, having been completed within the deadline referred to in section 3 above, 
is considered as submitted on the date when it was submitted as set out in section 1 above.
5.  Failure to provide the necessary evidence or information referred to in Article 109(1)(1) or 
(2)(1) of the Act on time results in dismissing the application.
§ 6. 
In the event that the President of the Office finds that the application is incomplete, and in 
particular that the attachments referred to in § 3 are missing, or that the application contains 
formal defects, the President of the Office requests, without delay, the undertaking to complete 
the application within a specified deadline. If the application is not completed within the 
specified deadline, the President of the Office dismisses the application, and notifies, without 
delay, the undertaking in writing of this fact, indicating the reasons for the dismissal.
§ 7.
In the event that, based on the analysis of the application, the President of the Office finds 
that the undertaking does not meet the requirements referred to in Article 109(1)(1), or (2)
(1), the President of the Office notifies, without delay, the undertaking in writing about the 
dismissal of the application.
§ 8. 
1.  In the event that, based on the analysis of the application, the President of the Office finds 
that the undertaking potentially meets the requirements referred to in Article 109(1) or (2) 
of the Act, the President of the Office notifies, without delay, the undertaking in writing of 
this fact. In the notification, the President of the Office also informs the applicant that its 
acceptance is of preliminary character and that it shall undergo verification in the course of 
the antitrust proceedings; the undertaking is also instructed about the legal consequences of 
the failure to cooperate or of inadequate cooperation with the President of the Office.
2.  In the notification referred to in section 1 above, the President of the Office also informs 
the undertaking of the order in which the application was submitted to the President of the 
Office.
§ 9. 
In the case of dismissing an application, the application shall not be taken into consideration 
when establishing the order of submitted applications for the purposes of applying Article 
109(1)-(4) and Article 110 of the Act.
§ 10. 
1.  The undertaking may withdraw its application at any time before the President of the Office 
issues the decision concerning the prohibited agreement to which the application refers.
2.  Withdrawal of an application shall not influence the order of the remaining applications 
already submitted.
§ 11. 
1.  An undertaking which believes that it meets the requirements referred to in Article 109(1)
(1) of the Act may submit a summary application in the event that it has submitted to the 
European Commission an application for immunity from fines for participation in a prohibited 
agreement covering the territory of more than three Member States of the European Union.
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2.  The summary application indicates:
1)  the undertakings which concluded the agreement,
2)  the products or services which the agreement refers to,
3)  the territory the agreement covers,
4)  the purpose of the agreement,
5)  the duration of the agreement,
6)  the European Union Member States where evidence for the existence of the agreement 
exists.
3.  The summary application also contains information about applications that have been 
submitted or that will be submitted by the undertaking in other European Union Member 
States or to the European Commission.
4.  With the summary application, the undertaking encloses the statements referred to in § 3(3).
5.  In the event of instituting proceedings concerning the agreement to which the summary 
application refers, the President of the Office requests the undertaking to complete the 
summary application within a specified deadline with the information or evidence referred 
to in Article 109(1)(1) of the Act.
6.  The application completed within the deadline referred to in section 5 above is considered 
as submitted on the date when the summary application was submitted.
§ 12. 
Applications submitted before the date of this Regulation’s entry into force are subject to the 
previous provisions.
§ 13. 
The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 July 2007 concerning the mode of proceeding in 
cases of undertakings’ applications to the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection for immunity from or reduction of fines, is repealed (Journal of Laws No 134, item 
938).
§ 14. 
This Regulation shall enter into force after 14 days of the date of its publication.
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